Asempa FM RTI Request Unearths Earlier Gold-for-Reserve Programme Losses; 2025 Figures Exceptional

Introduction

The Bank of Ghana (BoG) has released detailed financial data regarding its Domestic Gold Purchase and Gold-for-Reserve programmes, following a Right to Information (RTI) request filed by Asempa FM’s Ekosiisen programme. This disclosure provides the first official, audited figures detailing the net losses incurred between 2022 and 2024. While the central bank confirmed significant gold acquisition volumes in 2025, it withheld specific loss figures for that year, citing pending external audit confirmation.

This article analyzes the data released by the BoG, the context of the RTI request, and the varying interpretations of these financial outcomes by different state institutions. It explores the implications of these losses on Ghana’s economic stability and offers a practical guide to understanding the mechanics of the Gold-for-Reserve (G4R) programme.

Key Points

Background

The Gold-for-Reserve (G4R) programme and the Domestic Gold Purchase initiative were introduced by the Bank of Ghana to bolster the country’s foreign reserves and stabilize the local currency. The strategy involves purchasing gold locally—often from artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) sectors—and using it to build reserves or exchange for essential imports like petroleum products (Gold for Oil).

The RTI Request

On January 7, 2026, Philip Osei Bonsu, host of the Ekosiisen programme on Asempa FM, filed a formal Right to Information request. The request was directed at the Bank of Ghana and was grounded in Article 21(f) of the 1992 Constitution and the Right to Information Act, 2019 (Act 989).

The specific objective was to obtain transparency regarding the financial performance of the G4R programme. This move came amidst public debate fueled by an International Monetary Fund (IMF) report suggesting the programme had incurred a US$214 million loss during the first nine months of 2025. The BoG had previously dismissed these figures as speculative, necessitating an official disclosure.

The IMF Context

The controversy was heightened by the IMF’s Fifth Review Report under Ghana’s Extended Credit Facility (ECF). The report highlighted “trading shortfalls” and “high off-taker rates” as contributors to the financial strain. Specifically, the IMF cited an alleged US$214 million loss within the first three quarters of 2025. This international validation of financial distress placed pressure on the central bank to provide accurate, localized data to refute or explain the discrepancy.

Analysis

The data released by the Bank of Ghana on January 12, 2026, paints a clear picture of the financial trajectory of the gold purchase programmes from 2022 to 2024, while introducing ambiguity regarding the current fiscal year.

Breakdown of Historical Losses (2022–2024)

According to the BoG’s formal response, the net losses recorded under the combined Gold for Oil (G40) and Gold for Reserves (G4R) programmes—including transactions involving artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) gold—are as follows:

• 2022: GH¢74.44 million
• 2023: GH¢1.37 billion
• 2024: GH¢5.66 billion

The sharp escalation in losses from 2022 to 2024 suggests increasing operational inefficiencies or widening gaps between the cost of acquisition and the market value of the gold or the resulting forex. The central bank clarified that these figures are drawn from final audited accounts, lending them high credibility.

The 2025 Anomaly

For 2025, the Bank of Ghana disclosed a massive increase in gold acquisition volumes—110.99 tonnes valued at approximately US$11.4 billion. However, the BoG left the loss column for 2025 blank in its response. The official explanation provided was that the 2025 results are “pending external audit confirmation.”

This creates a significant information gap. While the volume of gold purchased suggests the programme was scaled up aggressively, the lack of audited financial results prevents a definitive assessment of the profitability or cost of this expansion. The refusal to release unaudited figures suggests a cautious approach by the BoG to avoid releasing data that could be legally or reputationally damaging if found inaccurate.

Diverging Institutional Narratives

The interpretation of these losses has become a point of contention between the Bank of Ghana and the newly established Ghana Gold Board (GoldBod).

The BoG’s Perspective: The central bank views the programme as a strategic necessity. They argue that while there are “net losses” in trading accounts, the macroeconomic benefit—such as forex stabilization and reserve accumulation—justifies the expense. They classify the losses as resulting from the mechanics of the G40 (Gold for Oil) and G4R programmes.

GoldBod’s Perspective: Sammy Gyamfi, CEO of the Ghana Gold Board, has offered a counter-narrative. He stated that GoldBod generated an industry surplus of over GH¢960 million in 2025. Gyamfi argues that the BoG’s reported trading costs should be viewed as “operational expenses” rather than “national economic losses.” He emphasizes that the mobilization of over US$8 billion in foreign currency through these programmes represents a net positive for the economy, regardless of the accounting losses on the BoG’s balance sheet.

Practical Advice

For citizens, investors, and policy observers trying to make sense of the Gold-for-Reserve programme disclosures, it is essential to understand the terminology and the economic mechanics at play.

Understanding “Net Loss” vs. “Economic Cost”

When a central bank reports a “net loss” in a trading programme, it usually means the cost of purchasing the asset (gold) plus operational costs exceeded the revenue generated from selling it (or the value of the reserves added). However, this accounting loss does not always equate to a net loss for the country.

Example: If the BoG buys gold and uses it to import oil, preventing a fuel shortage, the “economic cost” might be lower than the cost of a national economic shutdown. Conversely, if the BoG buys gold at a high premium and sells it at a low price, it is simply burning cash. The debate between BoG and GoldBod centers on which of these scenarios applies.

How to Interpret Pending Audits

The BoG’s reliance on “pending external audit” for 2025 figures is a standard governance practice. Audits verify that financial statements are free from material misstatement. Until the 2025 audit is concluded, any loss figure released by the BoG could be subject to revision. Investors and the public should treat the 2025 data (volume and value) as preliminary and await the final audited financial statements for the full picture.

Monitoring the IMF Reviews

The IMF’s Extended Credit Facility (ECF) reviews are a reliable source for independent verification of Ghana’s economic health. While the BoG may dispute specific numbers, the IMF’s assessment of “trading shortfalls” usually points to underlying structural issues in how the G4R programme is managed. Observers should cross-reference BoG releases with subsequent IMF reports to gauge the accuracy of the central bank’s disclosures.

FAQ

Conclusion

The Right to Information request filed by Asempa FM has successfully brought transparency to the historical performance of Ghana’s Gold-for-Reserve programme, revealing significant net losses of GH¢7.104 billion between 2022 and 2024. However, the picture for 2025 remains incomplete. While the volume of gold purchased has increased dramatically, the lack of audited loss figures leaves a critical question unanswered: Is the aggressive expansion of the programme a strategic masterstroke for reserve accumulation, or a costly financial drain?

Resolving the discrepancy between the BoG’s accounting losses and GoldBod’s operational surpluses will require clear, audited financial reporting. Until the 2025 external audit is concluded, the true financial impact of the Gold-for-Reserve programme remains a subject of intense scrutiny and debate.