Cartoon: They Are Right Here Once More – Decoding Nigeria’s Recurring Security Threats

The recurring editorial cartoon titled “They are right here once more” serves as a stark, visual commentary on a devastating reality in Nigeria: the persistent and cyclical return of violent non-state actors. This powerful imagery captures the public’s frustration and sense of déjà vu following another major attack by terrorists or bandits. This article moves beyond the cartoon to provide a comprehensive, pedagogical analysis of why these security threats keep resurfacing, the complex background of the conflicts, a grounded analysis of root causes, and practical, multi-layered advice for policymakers and citizens. We address the urgent question: Why does Nigeria seem unable to break this cycle of violence?

Introduction: The Cartoon’s Message and the Cycle of Violence

Editorial cartoons distill complex national traumas into a single, poignant frame. The phrase “They are right here once more” is not just about a physical return; it symbolizes the failure of past strategies, the endurance of underlying grievances, and the tragic repetition of history. In the Nigerian context, “they” most frequently refers to:

• Boko Haram and its Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) offshoot in the Northeast.
• Armed bandits operating in the Northwest and North Central regions.
• Separatist agitators and criminal gangs in the Southeast.
• Communal clashes often exacerbated by herder-farmer conflicts across the Middle Belt.

This article will dissect the reasons behind this cyclical pattern, moving from headline-grabbing attacks to the deep-seated structural, governance, and socio-economic failures that allow these groups to regenerate. Our goal is to provide a clear, evidence-based understanding that informs better solutions.

Key Points: Summary of the Crisis

• Cyclical Nature: Major security crises in Nigeria (e.g., Boko Haram’s 2009 uprising, the 2020 Kaduna and Katsina massacres, the 2022 Plateau attacks) follow patterns of escalation, temporary military pressure, and resurgence.
• Multifaceted Threat: The “they” encompasses jihadist insurgents, criminal bandits, and ethnoreligious militants, each with different motivations but often exploiting the same security vacuums.
• Root Causes: Core drivers include poor governance, endemic corruption, poverty, unemployment, climate change-induced resource competition, and historical marginalization.
• Strategic Failures: Over-reliance on kinetic military solutions, poor intelligence coordination, and inadequate community policing have proven insufficient.
• Humanitarian Catastrophe: The cycle creates millions of internally displaced persons (IDPs), food insecurity, and a collapse of public services in affected regions.
• Need for Integrated Approach: Lasting security requires parallel progress on military, political, economic, and social fronts—a “whole-of-society” strategy.

Background: The Historical and Regional Context

To understand the present cycle, one must trace the historical evolution of Nigeria’s security landscape.

The Evolution of Boko Haram (2002-Present)

Founded by Mohammed Yusuf in 2002, Boko Haram initially protested against Western education and corruption. Its 2009 uprising was violently crushed, but under Abubakar Shekau, it transformed into a brutal insurgency after a 2010 prison break. The group’s 2014 Chibok schoolgirls abduction drew global attention. Following internal splits and the rise of ISWAP (more focused on territorial control), the conflict has killed over 300,000 and displaced millions, according to the UN. Despite the 2015 “technical defeat” declared by the Buhari administration, the group remains lethally active, shifting to guerrilla tactics and suicide bombings.

The Rise of Banditry in the Northwest (2015-Present)

Initially stemming from cattle rustling and local disputes in Zamfara, Sokoto, and Kaduna states, banditry exploded into a full-scale crisis. These groups, often numbering in the hundreds, conduct mass kidnappings for ransom, raid villages, and control vast swathes of territory. The distinction between criminal bandits and jihadist groups is sometimes blurred, with reports of tactical alliances and ideological渗透. The crisis is directly linked to the proliferation of small arms from the Sahel, the collapse of traditional governance, and the lucrative ransom economy.

The Southeast Separatist Agitation

The Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) and its armed wing, the Eastern Security Network (ESN), emerged from perceived marginalization of the Igbo people. While primarily a political movement, its confrontation with state security forces and alleged involvement in attacks on security infrastructure and police add another volatile layer to national security. The government’s proscription of IPOB as a terrorist organization has intensified tensions.

Historical Grievances and Governance Gaps

All these conflicts feed on long-standing issues: perceived regional inequality, a history of military rule, weak local government institutions, and a police force often seen as an occupying force rather than a protective service in many communities. The 1999 constitution’s debates on federalism, resource control, and state policing remain unresolved, creating a structural tension that militants exploit.

Analysis: Why Do They Keep Coming Back? Root Causes and Enabling Factors

The cartoon’s message of recurrence is validated by a convergence of persistent enablers. Military action can displace groups but rarely eliminates the ecosystem that sustains them.

1. Socio-Economic Desperation and Unemployment

With Nigeria’s population growing rapidly and youth unemployment estimated at over 30%, criminal and militant groups offer an alternative livelihood. A bandit can earn more in a single kidnapping ransom than in a year of legitimate work. Poverty and lack of opportunity create a vast recruitment pool. Addressing economic grievances is not just development policy; it is core security policy.

2. Climate Change and Resource Competition

The Lake Chad Basin has shrunk by over 90% since the 1960s, devastating livelihoods and intensifying competition between farmers and herders. This environmental stress is a major driver of conflict in the North, pushing young men into armed groups. Similarly, desertification in the Sahel pushes herders southward, increasing friction. Climate change is a “threat multiplier” that security planners cannot ignore.

3. Corruption and Weak Governance

Corruption diverts security funding, leads to the sale of arms and ammunition to criminals, and results in under-equipped and demoralized troops. At the local level, corrupt or absent local government chairs and traditional rulers create a power vacuum. When the state is seen as predatory or absent, communities either self-arm or invite in armed groups for “protection,” further militarizing society.

4. The Kinetic-Only Military Strategy

Successive administrations have defaulted to large-scale military offensives (e.g., Operation Lafiya Dole). While necessary to degrade fighting capabilities, this strategy alone is insufficient. It often results in civilian casualties, displaces populations without providing alternatives, and fails to address the ideological or criminal drivers. The military is not designed for long-term community policing or socio-economic reconstruction.

5. Poor Intelligence and Inter-Agency Rivalry

Lack of actionable, human intelligence (HUMINT) plagues operations. Rivalries between the Army, Police, Department of State Services (DSS), and other agencies lead to information silos. Critical warnings, such as those that may have preceded the Kwara attack mentioned in the original snippet, are not effectively shared or acted upon in a coordinated manner.

6. The “Ransom Economy”

The payment of millions of dollars in ransom for kidnapping victims has professionalized banditry. It provides funds to buy more weapons, hire more fighters, and bribe officials. This creates a perverse incentive structure where attacks are financially rational. Some analysts argue that a firm, public, and enforced policy of non-payment is necessary to break this cycle, though this carries immense humanitarian risk.

7. Regional and International Dimensions

Arms flow freely across porous borders from Libya, Mali, and Burkina Faso. The instability in the wider Sahel provides safe havens and training grounds. Some jihadist groups have regional ambitions, linking Nigeria’s conflict to a broader transnational ideology. This requires robust regional cooperation (through the Multinational Joint Task Force) and international intelligence sharing, which has been inconsistent.

Practical Advice: A Multi-Layered Path Forward

Breaking the cycle requires a paradigm shift from a purely military response to a comprehensive national security strategy. Here is actionable advice for different stakeholders:

For the Federal Government and Policymakers

• Review and Reform Security Architecture: Seriously consider constitutional and statutory reforms to create state police forces with robust oversight mechanisms to improve community policing and reduce the burden on the overstretched federal police.
• Launch a National Counter-Ransom Initiative: Establish a high-level task force to track ransom flows, impose severe penalties on intermediaries, and launch a public awareness campaign against ransom payments. Explore non-cash payment alternatives for victim families in extreme cases, managed by a transparent fund.
• Massively Increase Investment in Social Infrastructure: Redirect a portion of the security budget towards a Marshall Plan-like initiative for the North and conflict-affected zones. Focus on education (especially Almajiri reform), healthcare, and renewable energy projects to create jobs and hope.
• Establish a Special War Crimes Tribunal: Create a credible, transparent judicial mechanism to prosecute both terrorist offenders AND security personnel accused of human rights abuses. Impunity on all sides fuels cycles of revenge.
• Empower and Resource the North East Development Commission (NEDC) and Equivalent Bodies: These agencies must move beyond paper projects to deliver tangible, visible reconstruction and livelihood programs to displaced persons and host communities.

For State and Local Governments

• Build Local Governance Capacity: Strengthen local government councils, traditional institutions, and community leaders as first responders and early warning systems. Provide them with resources and training for conflict mediation.
• Develop State-Level Security Trust Funds: Complement federal efforts with state-funded community guard networks, properly vetted, trained, and integrated with state police commands.
• Promote Inclusive Development Planning: Ensure state budgets address the specific drivers of local conflict—whether it’s farmer-herder grazing reserves in Benue or mining regulation in Zamfara.

For Communities and Civil Society

• Strengthen Community Early Warning Systems: Establish low-tech, trusted communication networks (e.g., village watch groups, religious leader networks) to report suspicious movements to relevant authorities without fear of reprisal.
• Reject the “Protection Racket”: Communities must collectively resist the temptation to accept “protection” from armed groups, which only legitimizes and strengthens them. Seek state protection, but hold the state accountable.
• Document and Advocate: Civil society organizations should meticulously document abuses by all parties—militants and security forces—to build evidence for future accountability and keep international attention focused.

For International Partners

• Conditional and Targeted Support: Shift from blanket military aid to funding and technical assistance for governance reforms, anti-corruption bodies, and justice sector reform. Support should be tied to measurable improvements in human rights compliance.
• Intelligence and Technical Assistance: Provide advanced surveillance, forensic, and intelligence analysis training to Nigerian agencies with strong oversight safeguards to prevent misuse.
• Support Regional Diplomacy: Increase diplomatic pressure and funding for the Lake Chad Basin Commission and ECOWAS to secure borders and pursue cross-border military cooperation.

FAQ: Frequently Asked Questions

Q1: Is this just a religious war between Muslims and Christians in Nigeria?

A: No. While many attacks have religious dimensions and are framed in jihadist ideology by groups like Boko Haram, the drivers are overwhelmingly socio-economic and political. Banditry in the Muslim-majority Northwest is primarily criminal. Many victims of Boko Haram are Muslim. Many conflicts in the Middle Belt are between Christian farmers and Muslim herders over land, not doctrine. Reducing it to a religious binary oversimplifies and misdiagnoses the problem, hindering effective solutions.

Q2: Why can’t the Nigerian military defeat these groups?

A: The military faces a multi-front war against adaptable, decentralized enemies embedded within civilian populations across vast, difficult terrain. Challenges include: poor morale and equipment, corruption within procurement, lack of adequate air assets for rapid response, and a fundamental mismatch between conventional military tactics and the guerrilla/criminal nature of the threats. Furthermore, military victory cannot occur without parallel political and social victories.

Q3: What is the difference between bandits and terrorists?

A: The primary distinction is motive. Terrorists (like Boko Haram/ISWAP) seek to overthrow the state or establish a caliphate through ideologically driven violence against civilians to spread fear and achieve political goals. Bandits are primarily criminal enterprises motivated by financial gain through kidnapping for ransom, cattle rustling, and robbery. However, the lines blur when bandits adopt some jihadist rhetoric for legitimacy or when terrorist groups engage in criminal activities to fund their operations.