How Political Parties Can Use Submission Fees to Eliminate Vote-Buying: Barker-Vormawor’s Proposal

Introduction: A Structural Solution to Electoral Corruption

The persistent challenge of vote-buying, particularly during political party primaries and delegate conferences, remains a significant blot on the integrity of electoral processes worldwide. In Ghana, recent controversies, such as the one surrounding the Ayawaso East parliamentary primary, have once more thrust this issue into the national spotlight, prompting urgent calls for systemic solutions rather than mere condemnation. Oliver Barker-Vormawor, a respected Constitutional Rights and Policy Strategy Advisor and convener of Democracy Hub, has put forward a compelling, structurally-focused proposal. His central argument is that political parties can and should strategically utilize revenues from candidate submission charges (or filing fees) to directly cover all legitimate delegate expenses, including transportation and accommodation. By internalizing these costs, parties would effectively remove the most common—and often exploited—justification for delegates to accept gifts or cash from individual candidates, thereby creating a powerful disincentive for vote-buying.

This article provides a detailed, SEO-friendly, and pedagogical exploration of Barker-Vormawor’s proposal. We will examine the context of the Ayawaso East case, dissect the mechanics of how submission fees could be repurposed, analyze the legal and political frameworks that could enable such a change, and provide practical advice for stakeholders. The goal is to move beyond the cycle of scandal and investigation toward a sustainable, institutional strategy for cleansing Ghana’s internal party democracy and strengthening public trust in the broader electoral system.

Key Points: The Core of the Proposal

• Root Cause Analysis: A primary driver of vote-buying is the expectation that delegates must cover their own costs to attend conventions, creating a financial burden candidates feel compelled to meet.
• Proposed Mechanism: Political parties should allocate a portion of the mandatory submission charges paid by all aspirants to establish a centralized fund for all legitimate delegate expenses.
• Eliminating Justification: If the party comprehensively covers transportation, accommodation, and meals, any candidate offering additional money or gifts has no credible defense that they are merely assisting with participation costs.
• Party Accountability: This shifts responsibility from individual candidates to the party hierarchy, making the party the guarantor of delegate welfare and the primary enforcer of anti-buying rules.
• Enforceable through Regulation: Parliament and the Electoral Commission of Ghana (EC) can mandate this practice through amendments to the Political Parties Act and EC guidelines for internal elections.
• Requires Political Will: The proposal’s success hinges entirely on the genuine commitment of party leaderships and national executives to reform their own internal financial practices.

Background: The Ayawaso East Controversy and the Delegate System

The Ayawaso East Primary Incident

The immediate catalyst for this discussion was the February 7, 2026, parliamentary primary for the National Democratic Congress (NDC) in the Ayawaso East constituency. Reports emerged that the campaign team of the eventual winner, Mohammed Baba Jamal Ahmed, distributed items including 32-inch television sets and boiled eggs to delegates during the voting process. This blatant act of what was widely perceived as vote-buying or “vote-sharing” triggered national outrage. The Office of the Special Prosecutor opened investigations, and an NDC-appointed three-member committee reportedly recommended the annulment of the primary. However, the NDC’s National Executive Committee (NEC) overruled this recommendation, citing time constraints and constitutional limitations, and maintained Baba Jamal as its candidate for the March 3 by-election. This sequence of events highlighted a critical gap: the investigative and punitive mechanisms within parties are often weak, inconsistent, and susceptible to political expediency.

The Delegate Model in Ghanaian Politics

To understand the proposal, one must grasp the structure of candidate selection in Ghana’s major parties. For parliamentary and presidential primaries, the delegate system is predominant. Delegates are typically elected from polling stations, wards, or constituencies and are responsible for voting at a special conference to choose the party’s flagbearer or parliamentary candidate. These delegates are ordinary party members who often incur significant personal costs—transportation from their locales to the conference venue, accommodation if the event is multi-day, and meals. Historically, it has become an entrenched, albeit unofficial, expectation that aspirant candidates will provide “motivation” or “transportation money” to these delegates. This cultural norm is the thin edge of the wedge that easily expands into full-scale vote-buying with cash, goods, and promises of future patronage.

Analysis: Deconstructing Barker-Vormawor’s Proposal

1. The Financial Logic of Submission Charges

Political parties in Ghana require aspiring candidates to pay non-refundable submission charges (filing fees) to be placed on the ballot. These fees vary by party and office sought but can be substantial. For the NDC’s 2024 presidential primary, the fee was GHS 500,000. For parliamentary primaries, it is significantly lower but still a considerable sum. Barker-Vormawor’s insight is that this revenue stream is already collected centrally by the party. A pre-determined, transparent percentage (e.g., 10-20%) of every candidate’s fee could be ring-fenced into a dedicated Delegate Welfare Fund. This fund would then be managed by an independent committee—possibly including representatives from the party’s elections directorate, a civil society observer, and a financial expert—to disburse payments directly for verified delegate expenses.

Why this breaks the cycle: The delegate arrives at the conference having already been compensated for their travel and stay by the party itself. They are no longer in a position of financial need that a candidate can exploit. If Candidate A then approaches them with an envelope of cash, the delegate’s refusal is simpler: “The party has already taken care of my transport. Why are you giving me this?” The candidate loses the plausible deniability of “just helping with transport.” The act is unambiguously exposed as a bribe for a vote.

2. Shifting the Legal and Moral Burden

Currently, the legal framework (the Political Parties Act, 2000 (Act 574)) places the onus on individual candidates not to bribe. Enforcement is reactive and complaint-based. Barker-Vormawor’s model is proactive and structural. It makes the political party the primary actor responsible for ensuring a level playing field. The party, by failing to adequately fund delegate welfare from submission fees, would be implicitly creating the conditions for corruption. This could form the basis for new regulations. For instance, the Electoral Commission, which supervises the overall electoral process, could stipulate in its guidelines for “internal party elections” that any party whose delegates report seeking money from candidates will have its submission fee allocation reduced or its primary results scrutinized more heavily. The party’s own constitution and code of conduct could be amended to make the comprehensive funding of delegate costs a mandatory pre-condition for conducting a valid primary.

3. Addressing Potential Counterarguments

• “It will increase submission fees for all candidates.” Not necessarily. The proposal advocates for the reallocation of a portion of existing fees, not an automatic increase. The total fee amount is a separate political decision. However, even if a modest increase were required, it would be a transparent, upfront cost borne equally by all aspirants, unlike the variable, hidden, and morally corrosive costs of direct vote-buying.
• “Delegates will still demand money; the culture won’t change.” Culture changes with consistent practice and enforcement. If, for three consecutive election cycles, every delegate receives a standardized travel allowance directly from the party treasury before the conference, the social expectation will shift. The new norm becomes “the party pays,” not “the candidate pays.” The few delegates who still demand money can be easily identified and sanctioned by the party’s disciplinary committee, as they would be acting against explicit, funded party policy.
• “Parties will siphon the money.” This is a valid risk. That is why the proposal crucially includes an independent oversight mechanism. The fund’s management must be transparent, with published budgets and receipts. Civil society organizations (like Democracy Hub), the media, and even rival candidates within the party should have audit rights. Sunlight is the best disinfectant.
• “It only covers ‘legitimate’ expenses. What about food and incidentals?” The definition of “legitimate” must be clear and reasonable: official transport (bus, fuel stipend), accommodation (up to a standard hotel rate), and meals during the conference period. It does not include “pocket money” or “motivation.” The line is drawn at the actual cost of participation, not at turning delegate duty into a profit-making venture.

Practical Advice: Implementing the Proposal

For Political Parties (The Primary Agents)

1. Amend Party Constitutions: Insert a clause mandating the establishment of a Delegate Welfare Fund, sourced from submission charges, for all internal elections.
2. Create Transparent Guidelines: Develop a detailed policy document specifying eligible expenses, application procedures for delegates, disbursement timelines, and the composition of the oversight committee.
3. Communicate Relentlessly: Before any primary, educate all aspirants and delegates about the new system. Make it clear that any candidate offering personal money will be disqualified, and any delegate soliciting it will be expelled.
4. Lead by Example: The national executives and sitting MPs must be the first to abide by and champion this system, setting the tone for the entire party structure.

For the Electoral Commission of Ghana

1. Issue Regulatory Guidelines: The EC can use its authority to issue “Guidelines on the Conduct of Internal Party Elections.” These can require parties to have such a welfare fund as a condition for the EC’s recognition of their primary results.
2. Conditional Recognition: The EC could state that it will not accept a party’s list of elected candidates if the party’s primary is marred by credible, widespread reports of vote-buying that point to a failure to fund delegate welfare.
3. Capacity Building: The EC’s Political Parties Department could offer training for party election directors on implementing such financial management systems transparently.

For Parliament

1. Amend the Political Parties Act: The most robust solution would be to amend Act 574 to explicitly require political parties to establish mechanisms to cover the reasonable costs of delegate participation in national conferences and primaries, funded from party revenues including submission fees.
2. Tie Compliance to Public Funding: Parliament could link compliance with such internal financial integrity standards to a party’s eligibility for the state-funded subsidy provided under Article 55(3) of the 1992 Constitution.
3. Empower the Special Prosecutor: Clarify legislation to give the Office of the Special Prosecutor clear jurisdiction over vote-buying in party primaries, treating it as a form of corruption or electoral offense when it involves public office seekers.

For Civil Society and the Media

1. Advocacy and Monitoring: Groups like Democracy Hub, IMANI Ghana, and the Ghana Center for Democratic Development (CDD) should advocate for this specific reform and monitor its implementation.
2. Investigative Journalism: Media houses should investigate how submission fees are used by parties. Are they treated as revenue for general operations, or is a portion ethically allocated to delegate costs? Shine a light on best and worst practices.
3. Public Education: Run campaigns to change public perception. Normalize the idea that delegates should not be “paid to vote” by anyone; their service is a civic duty compensated by the party, not a commodity sold to the highest bidder.

FAQ: Addressing Common Questions

Q1: Is this proposal legally permissible under Ghana’s current constitution and laws?

A: Yes, fundamentally. Political parties have the autonomy to regulate their internal affairs under Article 55 of the 1992 Constitution. Determining how to allocate funds from submission charges is a classic internal management decision. Parliament’s power to legislate on the “functions of political parties” (per Article 55(2)) provides a basis for setting minimum standards to promote transparency and combat corruption that undermines the integrity of elections, which is a constitutional goal. The EC’s supervisory role over the electoral process gives it ancillary authority to issue guidelines on party primaries that feed into the general election.

Q2: Wouldn’t this just institutionalize a new form of party spending that could still be abused?

A: Any financial system can be abused. However, the key difference is transparency and accountability. The current system of candidate-to-delegate cash handouts is entirely opaque, off-the-books, and impossible to audit. A centralized fund with a published budget, independent oversight, and receipt requirements moves the transaction into the open. Abuse of the fund itself (e.g., inflating transport costs) would be a separate, more easily detectable financial fraud that can be audited by the party’s own auditors, the EC, or the Auditor-General if public funds are involved. The alternative—the current system—is a guaranteed, large-scale, and un-auditable corruption scheme.

Q3: What about the argument that delegates need “motivation” beyond just transport to perform their duty diligently?

A: This argument is ethically bankrupt and legally perilous. It explicitly justifies bribery. Civic duty should be its own motivation. If a delegate requires a financial incentive beyond basic participation costs to vote for whom they believe is best, they are already compromised. The role of a delegate is to represent their constituency’s choice, not to auction their vote to the most generous candidate. A party that believes its delegates need cash inducements to show up has a profound cultural and organizational problem that this proposal helps to solve by removing the financial pressure point.

Q4: Has any other country tried a similar system?

A: While no system is identical, the principle of parties bearing the cost of participation is recognized in various forms. In many mature democracies, party conventions are fully funded by the national party committee, and local delegates receive per diems for travel