Afenifere Raises Alarm on Escalating Terror in Border States, Urges South-West Governors to Behave Decisively

The Pan-Yoruba socio-political organization, Afenifere, has issued a stark and urgent warning regarding the accelerating spread of terrorist and bandit activities from Nigeria’s northeastern and northwestern belts into states bordering the South-West geopolitical zone. In a formal statement, the group cautions that without immediate, robust, and coordinated regional security measures, Yorubaland faces a imminent threat of a full-scale incursion by armed non-state actors. This call to action underscores a critical juncture in Nigeria’s internal security landscape, highlighting the porous nature of state boundaries and the perceived inadequacy of current defensive postures.

Key Points: The Core of Afenifere’s Alarm

Afenifere’s statement, disseminated through its National Publicity Secretary, Jare Ajayi, crystallizes several alarming trends that form the bedrock of their concern:

• Geographic Expansion of Terror: Violent attacks, historically concentrated in the remote, forested areas of the North-West and North-Central, are now occurring with increasing frequency in states that directly border the South-West—specifically Kwara, Kogi, Niger, and Edo.
• Urban Penetration: The violence is no longer confined to rural, hard-to-reach communities. Kidnappings and attacks are now happening in major metropolitan areas within Yorubaland itself, including Ibadan (Oyo State), Ondo town, and Ekiti towns, signaling a dangerous normalization of terror in urban centers.
• Intelligence-to-Action Failure: Afenifere posits that the primary issue is not a lack of intelligence on impending attacks but a systemic failure to process and act on that intelligence in the citizens’ interest, sometimes implicating officials.
• Call for Regional Autonomy in Security: The organization reiterates and intensifies its demand for the immediate establishment of state police and fully empowered community security arrangements, moving beyond previous resolutions.

Background: The Security Trajectory and Afenifere’s Mandate

The Evolving Threat Landscape

For over a decade, Nigeria has grappled with a multi-faceted security crisis involving Boko Haram in the Northeast, banditry in the Northwest, and herder-farmer clashes in the North-Central. These groups, often operating from vast, ungoverned forested areas, have demonstrated a capacity for large-scale violence, mass kidnapping, and territorial control. The recent escalation in border states represents a strategic shift. States like Kwara, Kofi, Niger, and Edo serve as geographic bridges between the conflict-ridden northern regions and the more densely populated and economically vital South-West.

Afenifere: A Historical Voice for Yoruba Interests

Founded in the 1940s, Afenifere is a prominent Pan-Yoruba organization with a history of advocacy on political, economic, and social issues affecting Nigeria’s Yoruba population, primarily concentrated in the South-West. While not a government body, its statements carry significant weight as a barometer of regional sentiment and concern. Its intervention on security matters reflects a perception among sections of the Yoruba elite that the federal government’s security apparatus is either overwhelmed or strategically neglectful of the South-West’s vulnerabilities, necessitating regional self-help initiatives.

Analysis: Deconstructing the Alarm and the Proposed Response

The “Woro Village” Paradigm: Intelligence Ignored?

Afenifere anchors its argument on the specific, horrific case of the attack on Woro and Nuku communities in Kaiama Local Government Area, Kwara State. Reports indicate that nearly 200 people were killed and many more kidnapped. Crucially, the organization cites the testimony of Alhaji Umar Bio Salihu, head of Woro village, who stated that a warning letter about the impending attack was sent to higher authorities before the assault occurred. If verified, this incident becomes a potent symbol of the “intelligence failure” Afenifere describes—not a failure of collection, but of timely response and political will. This narrative challenges the official security paradigm and demands accountability at the state and federal levels.

The Urbanization of Terror: A Strategic Escalation

The statement’s emphasis on kidnappings in “metropolis” areas like Ibadan’s Challenge area (a busy, upper-middle-class commercial/residential zone) is profoundly significant. It suggests that perpetrators are:

• Confident and Adaptable: They are testing security responses in previously considered “safe” zones.
• Seeking Greater Impact and Ransom: Urban targets often yield higher financial ransoms and greater psychological impact, disrupting daily life and commerce.
• Exploiting Security Gaps: It implies that rural-focused security deployments (e.g., forest patrols) are insufficient against threats that can blend into urban environments or strike quickly and retreat.

The Regional Security Fund (RSF) and the Governance Gap

Afenifere references the November 24, 2025, meeting of South-West governors where they resolved to establish a South-West Security Fund (SWSF) and set up tracking centers. The mention of Ogun State’s CCTV inauguration is a concrete, albeit limited, example. The analysis here is twofold:

1. Positive Step: It acknowledges a nascent, necessary move towards regional security cooperation, recognizing that state lines are irrelevant to roaming terrorist groups.
2. Insufficient Implementation: The organization’s urgent tone implies that these resolutions have not been translated into a sufficiently formidable, operational, and integrated security architecture. The gap between resolution and decisive, boots-on-the-ground action is the core of their frustration.

Practical Advice: From Alarm to Actionable Security Steps

Translating Afenifere’s warning into a practical roadmap requires a multi-layered approach involving state governments, communities, and citizens:

For State Governments (South-West and Bordering States):

• Accelerate State Police Establishment: This is the cornerstone. State-controlled police forces, accountable to governors but operating within federal constitutional frameworks, can provide the rapid, localized intelligence-led response that federal police, stretched thin nationally, cannot.
• Fully Fund and Operationalize the Regional Security Fund: Move from concept to execution. The SWSF must be transparently managed and used to procure necessary equipment (armored vehicles, communication gadgets), train specialized units, and support community watch groups.
• Integrate Technology with Human Intelligence: Expand CCTV networks in strategic urban and border points, but crucially, link them to a regional command center with trained analysts. Pair this with robust community policing programs that build trust and incentivize information sharing from local residents.
• Formalize Border and Forest Patrol Coordination: Establish joint operational commands with neighboring states (e.g., Ogun-Ondo, Kwara-Kogi) for synchronized patrols of interstate highways, border routes, and suspected forest enclaves.

For Communities and Traditional Institutions:

• Establish and Train Local Vigilante Groups: With state backing and proper regulation, community-based security groups can provide immediate first response, local intelligence, and a deterrent presence. They must be trained in legal protocols and human rights.
• Revive and Strengthen Traditional Rulers’ Security Roles: Traditional institutions often have unparalleled access to grassroots intelligence and social influence. Their formal integration into state security advisory councils can bridge the state-community gap.
• Community Early Warning Systems: Develop simple, reliable communication trees (using phones, radios) to alert entire villages or neighborhoods of suspicious movements, coordinated with nearest security outposts.

For Citizens:

• Vigilance and Reporting: Cultivate a culture of situational awareness. Report suspicious persons, vehicles, or activities to authorities immediately. Support community watch efforts.
• Personal Security Measures: Vary routines, avoid predictable movements, especially for high-net-worth individuals. Invest in basic personal and home security where possible.
• Counter-Narrative: Resist spreading unverified rumors that can cause panic. Share verified information through official channels.

FAQ: Addressing Common Queries on the Security Crisis

Q1: Is Afenifere a government agency? Why should its warning be heeded?

A: No, Afenifere is a socio-cultural organization. Its warning is heeded because it represents a significant segment of public opinion in the South-West. Its statement is a diagnostic of the palpable fear among citizens and a reflection of the failure of existing state and federal security structures to provide adequate protection, thereby legitimizing calls for alternative, regional approaches.

Q2: What is the difference between “bandits” and “terrorists” in this context?

A: The terms are sometimes used interchangeably in Nigerian discourse. “Bandits” typically refer to armed groups primarily motivated by criminal enterprise—kidnapping for ransom, cattle rustling, and village raids. “Terrorists” like Boko Haram or ISWAP are ideologically driven, aiming to overthrow the state or create a caliphate. However, the lines blur. Groups operating in the North-West/North-Central exhibit terrorist tactics (massacres, village overruns, display of extreme violence) and may have ideological underpinnings or links to larger jihadist networks. Afenifere uses “terror” to capture the profound fear and societal disruption caused by all such heavily armed, non-state violent actors.

Q3: Can state police truly solve this problem, or will it create more chaos?

A: The argument for state police is based on the principle of subsidiarity—security is best managed by the level of government closest to the people. Proponents argue it allows for faster decision-making, better intelligence gathering due to local knowledge, and accountability (governors can be voted out). Critics fear it could lead to 36 different, potentially uncoordinated security policies, abuse of power, and weaponization against political opponents. The solution lies in a robust national framework that standardizes training, equipment, and operational protocols for state police while ensuring federal oversight on constitutional matters and inter-state crime.

Q4: What is the federal government’s role in all this?

A: The 1999 Constitution vies primary security responsibility on the federal government. The federal government controls the army, air force, navy, and the Nigeria Police Force. Its roles include:

• Securing Nigeria’s international borders.
• Providing military support to states upon request (e.g., for counter-insurgency).
• Coordinating national intelligence.
• Providing funding and equipment to state police if/when they are established.
• Leading the overall national security strategy.

Afenifere’s implicit critique is that the federal government is failing in these duties, forcing states to seek their own solutions. Legal implications could involve constitutional debates over the exact scope of state police powers versus federal authority.

Conclusion: A Critical Inflection Point for Yorubaland’s Security

Afenifere’s alarm is not merely a rhetorical exercise; it is a strategic warning based on observable trends of violence creeping closer to the heart of Nigeria’s commercial and educational hub. The organization has moved beyond diagnosing the problem—the expansion of terror, the urbanization of attacks, and the intelligence-will gap—to prescribing a clear, if challenging, solution: decisive, regionally-coordinated action centered on state policing and community empowerment.

The path forward is fraught with obstacles: constitutional complexities, funding challenges, potential for inter-state rivalry, and the sheer virulence of the non-state armed groups. However, the status quo—relying solely on a overstretched federal security architecture—is demonstrably failing. The governors of the South-West and the bordering states stand at a historical crossroads. They can heed the call from a significant indigenous voice, transform regional security resolutions into a potent, integrated shield for Yorubaland, and potentially create a model for other zones. Or they can risk the gradual erosion of security, economic activity, and public trust, allowing the “disturbing development” Afenifere describes to become the new, grim normal. The time for sermonisation, as Ajayi stated, is over. The era of decisive, collaborative action must begin immediately.