Cocoa Farmers Protest Ghana: The People’s Forum Billboards Against Price Cut

Update: In February 2026, the civil society organization The People’s Forum initiated a high-visibility billboard campaign across major cocoa-growing regions of Ghana. The protest directly challenges the Ghanaian government’s decision, through COCOBOD, to reduce the mid-season cocoa farmgate price by 28.6% for the remainder of the 2025/2026 crop year. This article provides a comprehensive, SEO-friendly analysis of the protest, its context, and the underlying economic realities facing Ghana’s cocoa sector.

Introduction: A Visual Outcry from Ghana’s Cocoa Heartlands

The landscape of Ghana’s cocoa belt, spanning the Ashanti, Western North, Eastern, and Greater Accra regions, now features a stark new message. Billboards depicting weary farmers surrounded by cocoa pods carry a powerful, simple question: “Our sweat, their excuses. GH¢2,587 per bag? How do we survive?” This is the core of a protest campaign launched by The People’s Forum, a non-governmental advocacy group. The campaign uses the hashtags #CocoaFarmersMatter and #JusticeForFarmers to amplify its message on social media, framing the recent cocoa farmgate price cut as a crisis of equity and economic survival for the nation’s backbone agricultural workforce.

The protest is a direct response to a formal announcement made on February 12, 2026, by Ghana’s Finance Minister, Dr. Cassiel Ato Forson. He declared that the guaranteed price paid to farmers for a 64-kilogram bag of cocoa would be slashed from GH¢3,625 to GH¢2,587. The government, via the Ghana Cocoa Board (COCOBOD), justified this drastic cocoa price reduction by citing plummeting international cocoa prices and severe financial distress at the state-owned marketing agency. This article unpacks the protest, the policy decision, and the complex web of economic factors at play.

Key Points: Understanding the Core Conflict

To grasp the significance of the billboard protest, several critical facts must be established:

The Price Cut: The farmgate price for a 64kg bag of cocoa was reduced by 28.6%, from GH¢3,625 to GH¢2,587, effective mid-season for 2025/2026.
Official Justification: The Ministry of Finance and COCOBOD attribute the cut to a sustained decline in global cocoa prices and the unsustainable financial losses incurred by COCOBOD.
Protest Mechanism: The People’s Forum is using outdoor advertising (billboards) in key cocoa-growing areas as a primary tool for public pressure and awareness.
Farmer Grievance: Farmers and advocacy groups argue the new price fails to cover the rising costs of production, including labor, fertilizer, and transportation, pushing them into financial jeopardy.
Regional Focus: The protest and its impact are concentrated in Ghana’s primary cocoa-producing regions: Ashanti, Western North, Eastern, and parts of Greater Accra.
Warning of Unrest: The People’s Forum has warned that government inaction could lead to organized protests and civil disobedience by the farming community.

Background: Ghana’s Cocoa Sector in Crisis

Ghana’s Position in the Global Cocoa Market

Ghana is the world’s second-largest producer of cocoa beans, behind Ivory Coast, and the sector is a cornerstone of the national economy. It generates significant foreign exchange, provides livelihoods for over 800,000 smallholder farmers, and supports millions more in ancillary industries. The government, through COCOBOD, has historically guaranteed a minimum farmgate price to farmers at the start of each crop season (October-September) to provide income stability and encourage production. This system is designed to insulate farmers from volatile international markets.

The 2025/2026 Season: A Perfect Storm

The current season has been marked by a confluence of adverse factors:

Global Price Collapse: International cocoa prices on exchanges like ICE and Euronext have fallen sharply from their 2024 peaks due to expectations of surplus production in West Africa and weakening global demand forecasts.
COCOBOD’s Financial Woes: COCOBOD has accumulated substantial debt, partly from borrowing against future cocoa sales to finance operations and farmer payments. Falling international prices have reduced its revenue, exacerbating this debt burden. The 2026 mid-season price cut is a direct attempt to stem financial losses.
Soaring Input Costs: While export prices fall, the costs for farmers to produce cocoa have risen. Key inputs like fertilizers, pesticides, and, critically, labor for harvesting and pod-breaking have become more expensive due to inflation and supply chain issues.
Climate & Yield Pressures: In recent years, Ghana has faced challenges with crop diseases (like Cocoa Swollen Shoot Virus) and irregular rainfall patterns, impacting yields per hectare and increasing farmer vulnerability.

Analysis: Deconstructing the Policy and the Protest

The Economics of the GH¢2,587 Price

To understand the farmer’s anger, one must analyze the price in real terms.

Nominal vs. Real Value: While GH¢2,587 is a higher nominal figure than prices in past decades, its purchasing power has been eroded by Ghana’s persistent inflation. More importantly, it represents a 28.6% cut from the season’s starting price, a sudden and severe shock to household budgets.
Cost of Production Estimates: Various farmer advocacy groups and agricultural economists estimate the total cost of producing a 64kg bag of cocoa (including land, labor, inputs, and transport) now exceeds GH¢3,000 in many areas. At GH¢2,587, the guaranteed price does not cover full costs, meaning farmers are effectively losing money on every bag sold to COCOBOD.
The COCOBOD Dilemma: COCOBOD operates on a fixed margin. If it buys from farmers at GH¢2,587 but can only sell the beans on the world market for an equivalent of, for example, GH¢2,200 after costs, it incurs a loss per bag. The price cut is an attempt to align the farmgate price with anticipated export revenues to avoid deeper insolvency for the parastatal.

The Politics of Protest: Billboards as a Tool

The People’s Forum’s choice of billboards is a strategic communication tactic.

Geographic Targeting: Placing ads in cocoa-growing regions ensures the message reaches the directly affected population and the local political and traditional leaders who represent them.
National Narrative Shift: The imagery and slogan (“Our sweat, their excuses”) aims to reframe the national conversation from one of national economic necessity (COCOBOD’s finances) to one of social justice and farmer exploitation.
Media Amplification: Dramatic outdoor protests are inherently news-worthy. The visuals are designed to be picked up by traditional media and shared on social media, multiplying their reach beyond the physical billboard locations.
Accountability Mechanism: By publicly naming the problem and the decision-makers (“their excuses”), the campaign creates a permanent record and a point of accountability that is harder for officials to ignore than a closed-door meeting.

Practical Advice: What This Means for Stakeholders

For Cocoa Farmers and Cooperatives

Document Costs: Meticulously record all production expenses (labor receipts, input purchases, transport costs). This data is crucial for any future negotiations, advocacy, or legal challenges regarding a “living income.”
Unionize and Organize: Strength lies in collective action. Strengthen farmer-based organizations (like the Ghana Cocoa Farmers Association) to have a unified, stronger voice in discussions with COCOBOD and the government.
Explore Alternative Markets: Investigate, where legally permissible, opportunities for direct sales to local processors or through certified sustainable channels (e.g., Fairtrade, Rainforest Alliance) that may offer a premium over the COCOBOD price.
Engage with Extension Services: Seek advice from COCOBOD’s extension officers on best practices to improve yield per hectare. Higher productivity can partially offset lower per-bag prices.

For Policymakers and COCOBOD

Transparency is Key: Publish detailed financial reports and cost-benefit analyses that led to the price decision. Transparency can build trust, even if the news is bad.
Staggered Adjustments: Consider mechanisms for more gradual price adjustments rather than mid-season shocks, perhaps using stabilization funds accumulated during high-price years.
Input Subsidy Reform: Review the efficiency and targeting of fertilizer and input subsidy programs. Ensuring these reach farmers can lower their effective cost of production, making a lower farmgate price more viable.
Long-Term Diversification: Accelerate plans for local value addition (grinding, chocolate manufacturing) to capture more of the value chain in Ghana, reducing sole reliance on raw bean exports and their price volatility.

FAQ: Common Questions About the Cocoa Price Protest

Why is COCOBOD losing money?

COCOBOD’s financial model is vulnerable to international price swings. It borrows money against future cocoa sales to pay farmers upfront. When global prices fall, its sales revenue decreases, but its debt servicing costs (interest on loans) remain fixed. The gap between revenue and costs creates losses. The 2025/2026 season saw a significant and sustained drop in international prices, triggering this specific crisis.

Is the government legally required to pay the guaranteed price?

Yes, the guaranteed farmgate price is set by the government of Ghana, advised by COCOBOD, and is a binding policy for the official marketing season. It is not a market-determined price but a regulatory intervention. Changing it mid-season is a policy decision, not a legal breach, but it contradicts the initial guarantee and is the source of the farmers’ grievance.

What is a “farmgate price”?

The farmgate price is the price paid directly to the cocoa farmer at the point of first sale, typically at a COCOBOD buying center or to a licensed buying company. It is the farmer’s income before any costs for transport, drying, or fermentation are deducted. It is distinct from the FOB (Free on Board) or export price, which is what COCOBOD receives at the port.

Could farmers simply sell to other buyers?

Legally, all cocoa produced in Ghana must be sold through COCOBOD or its licensed buying companies. This monopoly system is designed to ensure quality control, provide a single export channel, and guarantee the minimum price. Selling outside this system is illegal and risks seizure of beans and loss of future selling privileges. This legal framework is central to the farmers’ powerlessness in the current situation.

How do international prices affect Ghanaian farmers if the price is guaranteed?

The guarantee is only sustainable if COCOBOD can sell the beans on the international market for more than it paid farmers (plus its costs). When international prices crash, COCOBOD’s revenue collapses. The government must then choose between: 1) Letting COCOBOD go bankrupt (disrupting the entire sector), 2) Bailing out COCOBOD with taxpayer money, or 3) Cutting the farmgate price. The 2026 decision represents option three.

Conclusion: A Crossroads for Ghana’s Golden Bean

The billboard protest by The People’s Forum is more than a roadside criticism; it is a symptom of a deep structural tension in Ghana’s cocoa economy. On one side is a state-owned entity, COCOBOD, grappling with unsustainable debts and the harsh realities of a falling global commodity market. On the other are hundreds of thousands of smallholder farmers, the human capital of the sector, facing an abrupt and severe reduction in their primary income during a period of high inflation and input costs. The stark imagery of the billboards forces the public and policymakers to confront a fundamental question: Can Ghana’s iconic cocoa industry survive on a model that periodically demands farmers absorb the brunt of market volatility?

Resolving this crisis requires more than a temporary price fix. It demands a holistic review of the COCOBOD value chain, accelerated investment in local processing to capture more value domestically, and stronger social safety nets for farmers. The protest’s power lies in its emotional truth—the disconnect between the romanticized image of Ghana’s “golden bean” and the harsh arithmetic of survival for those who harvest it. The path forward must ensure that the sector’s profitability does not come at the permanent expense of the producer’s livelihood, or risk a long-term decline in the very production that fuels the national economy.

Sources and Further Reading

The information in this article is based on the following verifiable sources and contextual knowledge:

Ghana Ministry of Finance. (2026, February 12). Statement on the Mid-Season Adjustment of the Cocoa Farmgate Price for the 2025/2026 Crop Year. [Official Press Release].
Ghana Cocoa Board (COCOBOD). (2025). Annual Report & Financial Statements. [Details on operational costs, debt position, and pricing mechanism].
International Cocoa Organization (ICCO). (2026). Cocoa Market Report. [Data on global supply, demand, and price trends].
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations. (2024). FAOSTAT: Cocoa Production Data for Ghana. [Historical production and yield statistics].
Graphic Online & MyJoyOnline. (2026, February). News coverage of The People’s Forum billboard campaign and farmer reactions in Ashanti and Western North regions. [Reportage on the ground].
Ghana Statistical Service. (2025). Inflation Report. [Context on general price levels affecting production costs].

Disclaimer: This article is for informational and analytical purposes. The views expressed in the cited protest materials are those of The People’s Forum. Economic data and policy justifications are sourced from official Ghanaian government and COCOBOD statements. This platform does not necessarily represent the views of any specific media group.