Israel Arrests ISIS Cell Members Planning Terror Attack Amid Broader Crackdown on Crime Syndicates

In a significant dual-operation demonstrating the breadth of Israel’s internal security challenges, authorities announced the arrest of individuals affiliated with an ISIS cell actively planning a terrorist assault within the country. Concurrently, a major operation targeted a senior member of a powerful organized crime syndicate. These actions, carried out by elite units of the Israel Police and the Israel Security Agency (ISA), highlight the persistent and evolving threats posed by both jihadist extremists and sophisticated criminal networks operating inside Israel.

Introduction

On February 18, 2026, Israeli law enforcement and security agencies revealed the successful culmination of two separate, high-stakes operations. The first focused on a mobile cell of individuals inspired by the Islamic State (ISIS), who were in the advanced stages of plotting a terrorist attack. The second targeted a fugitive leader of the Abu Latif crime organization, a group notorious for its involvement in extortion, drug trafficking, and violence. These arrests are not isolated incidents but part of a continuous, proactive strategy by Israel’s internal security apparatus to disrupt threats before they materialize. This report provides a comprehensive, verifiable breakdown of the events, the agencies involved, the suspects, and the broader security landscape.

Key Points

ISIS-Linked Cell Dismantled: Multiple members of an ISIS-inspired cell active in the Jericho area were arrested by the Israel Police’s elite Yamas unit and IDF forces after a weeks-long investigation by the Israel Security Agency (ISA/Shin Bet).
Charges: Suspects are being investigated for “advancing terror activity,” a serious charge under Israeli law encompassing planning, training, and preparation for acts of terrorism.
Organized Crime Blow: In a separate operation in the Golan Heights, Bashar Mahoul, 43, a senior member of the Abu Latif crime syndicate wanted for extortion, was arrested. A copy of a sealed indictment from a related major case was found in his possession.
Ongoing Campaign: The operations follow recent indictments against 17 defendants from the Abu Latif and Hariri crime cartels, indicating a sustained offensive against major organized crime.
Interconnected Threats: While ideologically distinct, both jihadist cells and crime syndicates exploit similar operational tactics (clandestine communication, evasion) and undermine public security and the rule of law.

Background: The Agencies and the Threats

Israel Security Agency (ISA/Shin Bet)

The Israel Security Agency, commonly known as Shin Bet, is the state’s internal security and counterintelligence service. Its mandate includes counter-terrorism, counter-espionage, and protection of state secrets. The ISA operates domestically and in the West Bank, conducting intelligence gathering, surveillance, and interrogations. In these operations, the ISA ordered and oversaw the lengthy investigation that led to the ISIS cell’s arrest, demonstrating its role as the primary coordinator for pre-emptive counter-terrorism actions.

Yamas Border Police

Yamas is the Jerusalem District’s elite undercover counter-terrorism unit within the Israel Border Police. Highly trained in surveillance, apprehension, and high-risk arrests, Yamas often works in tandem with the ISA and regular IDF units. Their involvement in both the Jericho arrests and the Golan Heights operation underscores their specialization in dealing with acute security threats in sensitive areas, including the West Bank and border regions.

The ISIS “Mobile” Threat in Israel

While ISIS lost its territorial caliphate in Syria and Iraq by 2019, its ideology continues to inspire “lone wolf” attackers and small, clandestine cells globally. In Israel, the primary jihadist threat has historically come from Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) in Gaza and the West Bank. However, security services have consistently warned about the potential for ISIS-inspired individuals or tiny, independent cells to attempt attacks, motivated by the group’s global propaganda rather than direct command and control. The term “mobile” in this context likely refers to a decentralized, fluid cell without a fixed headquarters, making it harder to track—a classic modern terrorist tactic.

The Abu Latif Crime Syndicate

The Abu Latif organization, based primarily in northern Israel, is one of the country’s most powerful and violent crime families. It has been linked to extensive extortion rings (often targeting business owners with “protection” threats), drug trafficking, and murder. The reference to the state’s witness known as “the Prince” points to a massive, ongoing criminal trial. The fact that a senior member like Bashar Mahoul was found with a copy of the indictment suggests he was actively monitoring the legal proceedings against his organization from hiding, a common tactic to anticipate law enforcement moves.

Analysis: Operational Details and Strategic Implications

1. The ISIS Cell Operation: A Model of Proactive Counter-Terrorism

The arrest of the ISIS cell participants in Jericho exemplifies a textbook pre-emptive strike. The ISA initiated a “weeks-long action,” indicating a methodical intelligence-gathering phase involving signals intelligence (SIGINT), human intelligence (HUMINT), and surveillance. The involvement of both Yamas and the IDF’s Lions of the Jordan Valley Battalion suggests the cell was operating in the West Bank, an area where military and police jurisdictions overlap for security operations.

The timing of the arrests—three in one week by the IDF battalion, another by Yamas shortly after—shows careful coordination to apprehend all key members simultaneously, preventing any last-minute escalation or escape. The swift transfer to the ISA for interrogation is standard procedure, as the ISA has specialized interrogators for terrorism cases. The stated charge, “advancing terror activity,” is a broad legal category in Israel that allows prosecutors to pursue suspects even if an attack was not imminent but planning, training, or procurement had occurred.

2. The Abu Latif Arrest: Undermining Criminal Resilience

The arrest of Bashar Mahoul in the Had Nes area of the Golan Heights is strategically significant. His residence in Peki’in, a Druze-majority town in northern Israel, indicates the syndicate’s reach. Finding him in the Golan Heights suggests successful tracking by investigators, possibly through financial transactions, communication intercepts, or tips. The seizure of the “Prince” case indictment is a critical piece of evidence. It proves Mahoul’s continued operational involvement and intent to subvert the judicial process. This directly supports charges like extortion by threats, as it shows a pattern of criminal behavior coupled with an effort to evade justice.

This arrest is part of a larger wave. The mention of recent indictments against 17 defendants from both the Abu Latif and Hariri cartels signals a concerted, multi-front legal assault by the State Attorney’s Office and police. The goal is to decapitate leadership, disrupt financial networks, and secure long prison sentences to incapacitate these organizations.

3. The Dual-Threat Environment

Israel faces a uniquely complex security environment. It must simultaneously counter:

State-Level Adversaries: Hamas, Hezbollah, Iran’s proxies.
Sub-State Jihadist Networks: ISIS-inspired cells, PIJ.
Organized Crime Syndicates: which, while not ideologically driven to overthrow the state, create zones of anarchy, violence, and corruption that weaken state authority and public trust. They often engage in arms trafficking that can feed terrorist groups.

The fact that the same elite police unit (Yamas) and investigative frameworks are used against both types of threats speaks to the professionalization of Israel’s security forces. The legal tools differ (terrorism vs. organized crime statutes), but the operational intelligence requirements—penetrating secretive networks, gathering admissible evidence, executing precise arrests—share common ground.

4. Geographic Focus: Jericho and the Golan Heights

Jericho, in the Jordan Valley of the West Bank, has long been a hotspot for militant activity due to its proximity to Jordan and history as a militant hub. The presence of an ISIS cell there, rather than a Hamas cell, is noteworthy and may reflect the global ISIS brand’s appeal to certain individuals disillusioned with local Palestinian factions.

The Golan Heights, annexed by Israel in 1981 (a move not recognized internationally), is a strategic, sparsely populated area bordering Syria. Its use as a hideout by a fugitive crime boss highlights how criminal elements exploit remote border regions to evade law enforcement in major population centers.

Practical Advice for Public Safety and Awareness

While these arrests are a success for security forces, they underscore that threats persist. The public can play a role in community safety:

Vigilance, Not Panic: Be aware of your surroundings, especially in crowded public spaces or near potential symbolic targets. Report suspicious activity—unusual surveillance of facilities, unattended bags, individuals asking probing questions about security procedures—to the police immediately (100 in Israel).
Online Radicalization Awareness: The ISIS cell likely began with online propaganda. Families and communities should be alert to signs of rapid ideological radicalization, such as increased consumption of extremist content, isolation, or glorification of violence. Early intervention is key.
Crime Syndicate Intimidation: Businesses, particularly in the north, should be aware of extortion tactics. The Abu Latif case shows these groups are ruthless and persistent. Any threat should be reported to police. Do not engage or pay. Israel has dedicated units to combat organized crime extortion.
Trust Official Sources: In the immediate aftermath of such announcements, rely on official statements from the Israel Police, ISA, or reputable news outlets. Misinformation can spread rapidly, causing unnecessary fear.
Community Resilience: Strong, cohesive communities are the best defense against both terrorist recruitment and criminal exploitation. Foster dialogue and support local initiatives that promote social cohesion.

FAQ

Q1: Is ISIS a direct operational threat in Israel?

A: Unlike Hamas or Hezbollah, ISIS does not have a dedicated, large-scale military wing operating inside Israel. The primary threat comes from “lone wolves” or very small, self-radicalized cells inspired by its ideology. These individuals are harder to detect due to their lack of formal links to the central organization. The recent arrest shows that this inspiration can translate into concrete, dangerous planning, which is why the ISA treats it with utmost seriousness.

Q2: What is the difference between the ISA and the regular Police?

A: The Israel Police is the civilian law enforcement agency responsible for public order, crime investigation, and traffic law. The ISA (Shin Bet) is the internal security intelligence agency, equivalent to the FBI in the U.S. or MI5 in the U.K. Its focus is on threats to national security: terrorism, espionage, and cyber threats. In terrorism cases, the ISA leads the investigation and interrogation, while police units like Yamas provide tactical support for arrests.

Q3: How serious are the charges against the Abu Latif suspect?

A: Extortion by threats is a severe felony in Israel, punishable by years in prison. Given the violent reputation of the Abu Latif cartel, the threat implied is credible and dangerous. The possession of a sealed indictment from a related major case (“the Prince” affair) suggests he is a deeply involved member, potentially facing additional charges of obstruction of justice or witness tampering. The State Attorney’s Office is seeking a serious indictment at the Haifa District Court, which handles major criminal cases.

Q4: Does this mean Israel is safe from terrorism?

A: No. These arrests demonstrate that threats are constantly present and that security forces are actively working to neutralize them. “Safe” is not an absolute condition. The success of these operations should breed confidence in the security services, but it also means that determined adversaries continue to attempt to plot attacks. Public cooperation and sustained intelligence efforts are essential to maintain a high level of security.

Q5: Can crime syndicates become terrorist organizations?

A: While their primary motivation is profit, not ideology, the lines can blur. Criminal organizations can provide services (weapons, smuggling routes, false documents) to terrorist groups. Furthermore, some individuals within crime syndicates may adopt extremist ideologies. The Israeli security establishment views powerful, violent criminal networks as a fundamental threat to state sovereignty and public order, in and of themselves, worthy of a robust national response.

Conclusion

The simultaneous announcements of the ISIS cell arrests and the Abu Latif syndicate capture underscore the multifaceted nature of the security challenges facing Israel. The proactive, intelligence-led operations by the ISA, Yamas, and IDF highlight a sophisticated and integrated defense posture capable of targeting both ideologically-driven terrorists and profit-driven criminal empires. The dismantling of the ISIS planning cell prevents a potential massacre, while the continued prosecution of the Abu Latif leadership aims to dismantle a network that has long terrorized communities through violence and extortion.

These actions are a reminder that security is not passive. It requires constant vigilance, exceptional intelligence work, and the courage of undercover units. For the public, the message is clear: the state’s security agencies are actively hunting those who seek to harm citizens, whether with a bomb or a blackmail threat. Remaining alert, reporting suspicious activity, and supporting community resilience are vital complements to these professional operations. The fight against both terrorism and organized crime is a persistent one, and these arrests represent a necessary, ongoing victory in that struggle.

Sources

The information in this report is based on the official statements and details released by the following authoritative sources on or around February 18, 2026:

Israel Police Official Spokesperson’s Unit announcements.
Israel Security Agency (ISA/Shin Bet) public statements and briefings.
Reports from reputable Israeli news outlets including The Times of Israel, Haaretz, and Israel Hayom, which commonly cite official security sources for such operations.
Background on the Abu Latif organization derived from previous court documents and investigative reports published by these same outlets over the preceding years.

Note: Specific suspect names and exact charges are subject to the ongoing legal process and may be updated as indictments are formally filed.

Israel arrests ISIS mobile participants making plans terror assault