Ghana’s Security Bill 2025: Why Stronger Human Rights Safeguards Are Essential

The ongoing parliamentary debate on Ghana’s Security and Intelligence Agencies Bill, 2025 has ignited a crucial national conversation about the equilibrium between national security and fundamental human rights. At the forefront of this discourse is the Minority Caucus in Parliament, which has issued a stern warning that the current draft legislation contains critical deficiencies in its human rights protections. Their central argument posits that vaguely worded provisions could inadvertently create legal tools for suppressing legitimate civic engagement, political opposition, and journalistic activity. This comprehensive analysis examines the Minority’s concerns, contextualizes them within Ghana’s constitutional democracy, and explores the necessary amendments to build a security framework that is both robust and firmly anchored in the rule of law.

Introduction: The Delicate Balance Between Security and Liberty

Democratic societies constantly navigate the complex tension between the state’s duty to protect its citizens from threats and the inalienable rights of individuals to freedom of expression, assembly, and association. Legislation governing security and intelligence agencies sits at the heart of this tension. The Security and Intelligence Agencies Bill, 2025, aims to consolidate and modernize the legal architecture for Ghana’s security apparatus. However, the Minority Caucus contends that in its present form, the bill tips the scales too far toward state power without instituting commensurate, enforceable safeguards for citizens. Their critique is not an opposition to security per se, but a call for a rights-respecting security framework that prevents the misuse of authority, particularly during politically sensitive periods like elections. This article dissects the key areas of concern, providing a pedagogical breakdown of the legal and practical implications.

Key Points: The Core Criticisms of the Minority Caucus

The Minority’s opposition to the bill is multifaceted, focusing on three primary pillars: the risk of rights abuse due to vague definitions, the potential for political polarization of security structures, and inadequate financial and operational transparency. These points form the backbone of their demand for amendments before the bill’s passage.

1. The Peril of Imprecise and Overbroad Language

The most significant alarm raised by the Minority concerns clauses that criminalize actions “intended to undermine the constitutional order.” While the objective—protecting Ghana’s democracy—is undisputed, the phrasing lacks the precision required in a criminal law context. In legal theory, statutes that are not clearly defined risk being applied arbitrarily. The Minority warns that without exact definitions, such expansive wording could be interpreted to include:

• Peaceful protest and dissent: Legitimate demonstrations against government policy could be misconstrued as “undermining” order.
• Political opposition activities: Standard opposition rhetoric and organizing might be targeted as subversive.
• Critical journalism and civic education: Reporting that scrutinizes state institutions or educating citizens on their rights could be stifled.

The bill mentions “political neutrality” for security agencies but, as the Minority notes, provides no enforcement mechanisms or sanctions for breaches. A principle without a remedy is merely aspirational, not a functional safeguard.

2. The Politicization Risk in Security Council Structures

The bill proposes establishing Regional and District Security Councils chaired by appointed Regional Ministers and Metropolitan, Municipal and District Chief Executives (MMDCEs). The Minority’s concern is the complete absence of statutory requirements for cross-party representation on these powerful local bodies. This structural design creates a direct pathway for politicization. During election cycles, where these councils could control local security deployments, the risk of their misuse to intimidate opponents, disrupt opposition rallies, or create a climate of fear is not hypothetical but a tangible threat to a level electoral playing field.

3. Opaque Budgets and Weak Parliamentary Oversight

While the Auditor-General audits agency accounts, the bill does not mandate the publication of detailed budget breakdowns or non-sensitive audit findings. Effective parliamentary oversight of intelligence agencies requires meaningful information. Without transparency in how funds are allocated—for operations, technology, or personnel—Parliament’s power of the purse is severely weakened. This opacity can foster waste, corruption, and the funding of unauthorized activities, all shielded from public and legislative scrutiny.

Background: Ghana’s Constitutional and Security Landscape

To understand the gravity of these criticisms, one must appreciate the constitutional context. Ghana’s 1992 Constitution is a robust document that enshrines a wide array of fundamental human rights in Chapter 5, including freedom of speech, assembly, and movement. It also establishes clear principles for the civil service and security agencies, mandating their impartiality. Historically, Ghana has made significant strides in democratic consolidation since 1992, with generally free and fair elections. However, instances of perceived security sector bias during elections have periodically marred this record. The current bill represents an attempt to streamline a fragmented legal regime (spanning the Police Service Act, Immigration Act, etc.) into a cohesive framework. The critical question is whether this streamlining will reinforce constitutional supremacy or inadvertently create loopholes that erode it.

Analysis: Deconstructing the Legal and Democratic Implications

The Minority’s concerns are not merely political rhetoric; they point to specific legal vulnerabilities with profound democratic consequences.

The Doctrine of Legal Certainty and Vagueness

A cornerstone of the rule of law is the doctrine of legal certainty. Laws must be sufficiently clear so that citizens can understand what is prohibited and regulators can apply them consistently. International human rights jurisprudence, including from the UN Human Rights Committee, holds that laws restricting rights like assembly must be “necessary and proportionate” and “not arbitrarily applied.” Phrases like “undermine the constitutional order” are dangerously elastic. Compare this to more precise formulations in other jurisdictions, such as the UK’s Terrorism Acts, which have themselves faced criticism and legal challenges for overbreadth. Ghana has an opportunity to draft a gold-standard bill by using precise terms like “violent overthrow,” “acts of terrorism,” or “sabotage” with clear definitions, thereby excluding peaceful dissent.

Structural Independence vs. Political Control

The composition of the proposed Security Councils is a classic issue of institutional design. By appointing only executive government officials (Ministers, MMDCEs) as chairs, the bill concentrates operational influence over local security within the ruling party’s political hierarchy. A counter-model exists in some democracies where security committees include opposition parliamentary representatives or independent security experts. This does not paralyze decision-making but injects a non-partisan perspective and builds trust in the process. The absence of such a mechanism in the 2025 bill is a glaring omission that contradicts the stated goal of a “professional” security service.

The Accountability Triangle: Executive, Legislature, and Public

True accountability in intelligence agencies operates on three levels:

1. Executive oversight: Internal audit and ministerial responsibility.
2. Legislative oversight: Parliamentary committees with access to information to approve budgets, operations, and policy.
3. Public oversight: Transparency through published reports (redacted where necessary) and independent oversight bodies like a strengthened Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ).

The bill, as critiqued, weakens the legislative and public pillars. It fails to empower Parliament with the information needed for meaningful scrutiny and does not create robust public reporting requirements. A strengthened bill could mandate annual public reports from the oversight committee, detailing general activities, complaints handled, and financial statements, subject only to legitimate national security redactions.

Practical Advice for Stakeholders

Moving forward, various actors have roles to play in ensuring the final legislation safeguards both security and rights.

For Parliamentarians (Especially the Majority):

• Engage in clause-by-clause review with legal experts from the Ghana Bar Association, CHRAJ, and civil society organizations like Ghana Center for Democratic Development (CDD-Ghana).
• Propose specific amendments: Define “undermine the constitutional order” with restrictive, illustrative examples; mandate minority party representation on Regional/District Security Councils; require publication of annual budgets and audit summaries.
• Insist on a strong, independent complaints and oversight mechanism with powers to investigate and recommend prosecution.

For Civil Society and the Media:

• Conduct rigorous public education on the bill’s provisions, translating legal language into accessible terms for citizens.
• Organize expert forums and submit detailed memoranda to the Justice Committee of Parliament.
• Monitor the debate closely and advocate for the inclusion of sunset clauses for any exceptional powers, requiring periodic renewal by Parliament.

For the Government and Security Agencies:

• Recognize that a law perceived as oppressive will undermine public trust, which is a critical intelligence asset. A rights-compliant bill enhances legitimacy and cooperation.
• Engage in good-faith dialogue with the Minority to find common ground. The final product should be a consensus document that outlasts any single administration.
• Draft clear internal codes of conduct that operationalize the bill’s principles, with strict disciplinary measures for violations.

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ)

Q1: Does the Minority Caucus oppose strengthening Ghana’s security agencies?

A: No. Their stated position, as reflected in the source material, is that Ghana needs a security framework that is “strong and professional, but also accountable.” Their critique is aimed at improving the bill, not rejecting security reform outright. They argue that true strength comes from public trust and constitutional integrity, not just expansive powers.

Q2: How does this bill compare to similar laws in other African democracies?

A: Many African security laws have faced similar criticisms for vagueness and lack of oversight. For instance, some versions of anti-terrorism laws in the region have been used to harass journalists and activists. A robust Ghanaian bill could set a positive regional precedent by explicitly incorporating regional and international human rights standards, such as the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, into its definitions and safeguards.

Q3: What specific constitutional articles are at risk if the bill passes unchallenged?

A: Primarily, Chapter 5 (Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms), specifically:

• Article 21: Guarantees freedoms of speech, assembly, movement, and association.
• Article 24: Guarantees property rights, which could be implicated in overly broad asset seizure provisions if not carefully drafted.
• Article 28: Concerns the rights of arrested and detained persons, which must be explicitly preserved and not derogated by security legislation.

Any law inconsistent with the Constitution is void under Article 1(2). Therefore, the bill must be scrutinized for constitutional compliance.

Q4: If the language is clarified, are the other concerns (councils, budget) still valid?

A: Absolutely. Even with perfect definitions, the structural risk of politicized local security councils remains if they are composed solely of executive appointees. Similarly, without mandated financial transparency and reporting, parliamentary oversight remains theoretical. These are separate, critical pillars of accountability that must all be addressed for the framework to be sound.

Conclusion: Towards a Rights-Respecting Security Architecture

The debate on the Security and Intelligence Agencies Bill, 2025 is a defining moment for Ghana’s democracy. It is a test of the nation’s commitment to the principle that security and liberty are not adversaries but complementary goals. A security state that operates in the shadows, unaccountable and with unchecked discretion, ultimately breeds the instability and resentment it seeks to prevent. The Minority Caucus’s call for more potent human rights safeguards is a necessary and constitutional counterweight. The path forward requires constructive engagement to amend the bill: inserting clear, narrow definitions for offenses; ensuring multi-partisan representation on key security bodies; and building robust, transparent oversight mechanisms. The ultimate goal must be a law that empowers Ghana’s security agencies to operate effectively within a framework that is transparent, accountable, and inviolably respectful of the constitutional rights of all Ghanaians. Passing a flawed bill would be a historic error; passing a strengthened, consensus-driven bill would be a legacy of deepened democratic resilience.

Sources and Further Reading

The analysis in this article is based on the public statements of the Minority Caucus and established principles of constitutional law and human rights. For verification and deeper study, the following sources are essential:

• The Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, 1992. Particularly Chapter 5 (Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms) and Chapter 17 (The Public Services).
• The Security and Intelligence Agencies Bill, 2025. The official text as published by the Parliament of Ghana (when available).
• Press Releases and Statements: Official communications from the Office of the Minority Leader, Parliament of Ghana, regarding the bill.
• International Standards: The UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials; the UN Human Rights Committee’s General Comment No. 37 on the right of peaceful assembly.
• Regional Framework: The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR).
• Comparative Analysis: Oversight mechanisms in the UK’s Investigatory Powers Act 2016 and South Africa’s Intelligence Services Act, 2002, for examples of legislative balance.
• Civil Society Reports: Analyses from Ghanaian NGOs such as the Ghana Center for Democratic Development (CDD-Ghana) and the Institute for Democratic Governance (IDEG) on security sector reform and human rights.

Disclaimer: This article is for informational and analytical purposes. It synthesizes publicly available information and legal principles. It does not constitute legal advice. The views expressed are those of the author, based on the cited sources and the Minority Caucus’s stated positions.