Ghana’s DACF and the MP’s Share: A Constitutional Analysis and Path to Reform

The District Assemblies Common Fund (DACF) is a cornerstone of Ghana’s decentralized governance system, established to ensure equitable national development reaches every community. However, a persistent and contentious practice—the direct allocation of a portion of this fund to individual Members of Parliament (MPs)—has sparked a profound constitutional debate. This practice, often termed the “MP’s Share,” is challenged by policy think tanks like IMANI Ghana as a clear constitutional overreach that undermines the very principles of local governance enshrined in the 1992 Constitution. This article provides a comprehensive, SEO-friendly, and pedagogical examination of the issue, exploring its legal foundations, historical origins, practical consequences, and the essential reforms needed to restore constitutional fidelity.

Introduction: The Pillar and the Crack

Ghana’s Fourth Republic was built on the promise of decentralization, moving away from centralized, top-down administration towards participatory local governance. The District Assemblies Common Fund (DACF) is the primary fiscal instrument designed to fulfill this promise, guaranteeing that a minimum of 5% of national revenue is allocated directly to Metropolitan, Municipal, and District Assemblies (MMDAs). This mechanism transforms development from an “administrative favour” into a constitutional right for local communities. Yet, for over two decades, a significant slice of this fund has been diverted to a parallel channel: the MP’s Share. This brief from IMANI Ghana argues that this practice is not just a administrative quirk but a felony overreach—a term underscoring its serious conflict with constitutional law—that must be rectified to safeguard Ghana’s democratic decentralization. The central question is whether political expediency should override the clear text and spirit of the constitution.

Key Points: The Core of the Controversy

• Constitutional Text vs. Practice: Article 252 of the 1992 Constitution mandates the DACF be disbursed among District Assemblies. It does not mention MPs as beneficiaries.
• Historical Origin: The MP’s Share (typically 2.5% of the DACF) was not a constitutional amendment but a 1997 political compromise, extracted by parliamentary leaders threatening to block the DACF formula.
• Institutional Confusion: The practice blurs the critical separation between the legislature’s oversight role and the executive’s implementation function, compromising accountability.
• Distorted Public Perception: It fosters a dangerous “belief meets practice” gap, where constituents chase MPs for personal favours and projects, bypassing their Assemblies and MMDCEs.
• Undermining Assemblies: It creates administrative ambiguity, making MMDAs appear as mere conduits for MPs’ political agendas rather than sovereign local governments.
• Path to Reform: The solution lies in allocating 100% of the DACF to MMDAs, as the constitution prescribes, while allowing MPs to advocate for projects within the formal Assembly planning framework.

Background: The Architecture of Decentralization and the DACF

The Constitutional Mandate for Local Governance

Ghana’s 1992 Constitution is a progressive document that explicitly devolves power. Chapter 20 and the Sixth Schedule establish a system of decentralized local government. The key institution is the District Assembly, which is “the highest political and administrative authority” in its district, as stated in the Local Governance Act, 2016 (Act 936). This legal framework was designed tocreate self-governing entities with the authority and resources to plan and manage their own development.

The District Assemblies Common Fund (DACF): Purpose and Design

To operationalize this constitutional vision, Article 252(1) states: “There shall be a Fund to be known as the District Assemblies Common Fund which shall be administered by the Administrator of the District Assemblies Common Fund appointed by the President in accordance with the advice of the Council of State.” Crucially, Article 252(2) specifies: “The amount to be allocated to the Fund shall be not less than five percent of the total revenue of Government… and shall be disbursed among the District Assemblies.” The language is precise and exclusive: the beneficiary is the District Assembly as an institution, not its individual members or other external bodies.

The Genesis of the MP’s Share: A Political Bargain, Not a Constitutional Imperative

The MP’s Share did not emerge from a constitutional amendment or a legislative act passed after due process. According to accounts from key participants, such as former Minister for Local Government Kwamena Ahwoi, the allocation was a political compromise in 1997. Facing resistance to the initial DACF formula in Parliament, legislative leaders reportedly threatened to reject the entire fund unless they were granted a direct slice for constituency projects. This political bargaining resulted in the informal—and later formalized—practice of allocating a percentage (often cited as 2.5%) of the DACF directly to MPs’ accounts for “constituency development.” This origin story reveals the practice as a concession to legislative power, not a tool to enhance constitutional decentralization.

Analysis: Why the MP’s Share is a Constitutional Overreach

Violation of the Clear Constitutional Text

The starting point for any constitutional analysis is the text itself. The Constitution says the DACF is for “District Assemblies.” Full stop. It does not say “District Assemblies and MPs” or “for projects identified by MPs.” If the framers had intended to create a parallel, direct funding stream for legislators, they would have said so explicitly, as they did for other institutions (e.g., the Legislature’s own budget under Article 96). The principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius (the express mention of one thing excludes others) applies strongly here. The MP’s Share is a judicial and scholarly red flag—it creates a beneficiary not recognized by the supreme law of the land.

Contradiction of the Local Governance Act, 2016 (Act 936)

Act 936, which gives effect to the constitutional provisions on local government, reinforces this reading. It vests executive authority in the District Assembly, presided over by a Presiding Member and implemented by the District Chief Executive (DCE/MMDCE). The Assembly approves development plans and budgets. Allowing MPs to control a separate pot of money for projects bypasses this entire statutory structure, rendering Act 936 partially inoperative in practice. It creates a dual, competing system of local development—one constitutional (the Assembly) and one extra-constitutional (the MP’s discretionary fund).

The Blurring of Separation of Powers

Ghana’s system relies on a separation of powers. Parliament makes laws and oversees the executive. The executive (through MMDAs) implements policies and projects. When MPs become direct implementers of development projects using DACF resources, they move from oversight to execution. This creates an inherent conflict of interest. Can an MP objectively oversee the performance of a District Assembly when they are simultaneously competing for the same resources and implementing parallel projects? Their constitutional duty to hold the local executive accountable is compromised by their role as a competing executive actor. This fusion of roles is antithetical to sound democratic governance.

The “Belief Meets Practice” Gap and Erosion of Civic Engagement

Research by Suhuyini, Antwi-Boasiako, and Abdul-Rashid (2023) highlights a critical social consequence: a widespread public misperception. Many constituents believe the DACF or national development funds are deposited into their MP’s personal or constituency account. This fosters a culture where citizens “chase” their MP for handouts and specific projects, treating them as a personal development patron. This actively undermines the authority and responsibility of the MMDAs and MMDCEs, who are the constitutionally mandated development planners. Citizen engagement becomes transactional and personalized around the MP, rather than institutional and systemic around the Assembly. This weakens the very foundation of participatory local democracy that decentralization aims to build.

Practical Advice: A Roadmap for Constitutional Reform

Reforming this flawed system requires political courage and a disciplined return to constitutional first principles. The goal is not to diminish the MP’s role as a champion for their constituency, but to channel that energy through the correct constitutional channels.

1. The Primary Reform: 100% Allocation to MMDAs

The simplest and most constitutionally sound solution is to cease the diversion entirely. Parliament should amend the DACF formula to allocate 100% of the Fund to the MMDAs, as Article 252 demands. The Administrator of the DACF should release funds directly to the Assemblies’ consolidated accounts, managed by the Assembly and its appointed Finance Officer. This restores the original design: the Assembly is the sole developer, planner, and implementer for the district.

2. Redefining the MP’s Role: Advocate and Legislator, Not Implementer

In this reformed model, the MP’s vital function shifts from project implementer to chief advocate and sponsor. An MP who identifies a critical need—a school, clinic, or road—should work with their Assembly’s planning department to have the project included in the Assembly’s Medium-Term Development Plan (MTDP) and annual budget. The MP can then:

• Use their platform in Parliament to advocate for the Assembly’s budget needs.
• Help mobilize additional resources (from NGOs, corporate social responsibility, etc.) for Assembly-approved projects.
• Monitor the Assembly’s execution of the project through their constitutional oversight role, holding the Assembly and MMDCE accountable for quality and timeliness.

This preserves the MP’s responsiveness to constituents while maintaining the institutional integrity of local government.

3. Enhancing Transparency and Public Education

To combat the “belief meets practice” gap, a massive public education campaign is needed. The government, NCCE, and civil society must clearly communicate: “The DACF belongs to your District Assembly. Your MP does not control it. Your MMDCE and Assembly Members are responsible for development planning.” Furthermore, the DACF Administrator must publish real-time, detailed disbursement data showing all funds going directly to MMDAs. Citizens must be empowered to track spending at the Assembly level, not through their MP’s office.

4. Strengthening Assembly Capacities

Critics of reform often argue Assemblies lack capacity. This is a valid concern, but the solution is not to circumvent them with an extra-constitutional MP’s Share. Instead, a reform package must include significant investment in building the technical, financial, and project management capacities of MMDAs. This ensures they can effectively plan, procure, and execute projects, making them true centers of local development.

FAQ: Addressing Common Questions

Q1: Isn’t the MP’s Share necessary because Assemblies are corrupt or inefficient?

A: This is a common justification but a flawed one. It assumes two unconstitutional things: first, that an MP is inherently less corrupt or more efficient (for which there is no systemic evidence), and second, that the solution to institutional weakness is to bypass the institution altogether. The constitutional remedy is to strengthen the Assembly’s capacity and accountability mechanisms, not to create a parallel, less transparent system. Corruption risks actually increase when funds flow through an MP’s discretionary office with fewer formal procurement and oversight rules.

Q2: Will this reform take away the MP’s ability to help their constituency?

A: No. It will redefine and strengthen that help. An MP’s most powerful tools are their voice in Parliament, their influence on national policy, and their oversight authority. By focusing on advocating for their Assembly’s needs in the national budget and holding the local executive accountable, the MP can drive more sustainable, planned, and equitable development. The current system encourages short-term, piecemeal, and often politically motivated projects. A reformed system encourages long-term, planned development aligned with the district’s overall vision.

Q3: What about the legal status? Is the MP’s Share illegal?

A: This is the core of IMANI’s argument. Based on a plain-text reading of the 1992 Constitution and Act 936, the diversion of DACF resources to MPs appears to be ultra vires (beyond the powers) of both the Constitution and the Act establishing the Fund. Parliament, by allowing the diversion, may be acting contrary to the very Constitution it swore to uphold. While the courts have not yet definitively ruled on this specific practice, the constitutional tension is clear and profound. A formal legal challenge could be mounted to test this practice against the supreme law.

Q4: Has this practice always existed? Why change it now?

A: No, it began in 1997 as a political deal. It has persisted due to political convenience and a lack of strong public advocacy for constitutional purity. The time for change is now because:

• The weaknesses of the current system—confusion, inefficiency, and eroded trust—are more apparent.
• There is a growing consensus among governance experts and civil society that genuine decentralization is key to addressing regional inequalities.
• Ghana’s democratic maturity requires aligning practice with constitutional principle.

Conclusion: Upholding the Rule of Law in Local Governance

The debate over the MP’s Share of the DACF is not a technical fiscal dispute; it is a fundamental test of Ghana’s commitment to constitutional democracy. The practice represents a quiet but significant departure from the constitutional ideal of robust, autonomous local government. It substitutes a constitutionally mandated system of institutional development (the MMDA) with an extra-constitutional system of personalistic, MP-driven development. This undermines accountability, distorts public understanding of governance, and compromises the separation of powers.

Reforming the DACF is not about weakening the link between MPs and their constituents. It is about strengthening the *correct* link. The MP’s power should lie in their legislative and oversight capacity to ensure the *Assembly*—the rightful owner of the DACF—has the resources and capacity to serve the people effectively. The path forward requires the political will to reverse the 1997 compromise. It demands allocating 100% of the DACF to MMDAs, as the constitution unequivocally requires, and then empowering those Assemblies to deliver. In doing so, Ghana would affirm that in its constitutional order, development is a right managed by accountable local institutions, not a political privilege dispensed by individual legislators. The integrity of the Fourth Republic’s decentralization project depends on it.

Sources and References

• Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, 1992. (Article 252).
• Local Governance Act, 2016 (Act 936).
• Ahwoi, K. (2013). *Local Government and Dec