FCT Election Debacle: Odinkalu’s “Woeful Failure” Verdict on Amupitan’s INEC

In a blistering assessment that has reverberated across Nigeria’s political landscape, former National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) Chairman, Professor Chidi Odinkalu, has issued a stark condemnation of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) following the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) area council election. Describing the commission’s performance as a “woeful failure” under the leadership of Professor Mahmood Yakubu’s successor, Professor Olusegun Agbaje (often misreported as Joash Amupitan, a former INEC National Commissioner), Odinkalu argued that the documented shortcomings were not a matter of legal incapacity but a profound “failure of will” and electoral organization. His analysis, delivered on Channels Television’s Politics Today, frames the FCT rerun not as an isolated incident but as a critical stress test exposing deep-seated vulnerabilities in Nigeria’s electoral management system, with dire implications for the 2027 general elections.

Introduction: A “Moderately Small Election” with Massive Implications

The February 3, 2024, rerun elections in the FCT were intended to be a relatively contained exercise to fill local government chairmanship and councillorship positions. However, the logistical chaos, security lapses, and administrative disarray that marked the process transformed this “moderately small election” into a national embarrassment. For Odinkalu, the scale of the failure is precisely what makes it so alarming. If INEC could falter so dramatically in the meticulously monitored, geographically compact, and politically significant heart of Nigeria’s capital, what does it portend for the vastly more complex, nationwide general elections slated for 2027? His verdict is unambiguous: the conduct demonstrated a catastrophic lack of preparedness and a deficient “electoral capital”—the institutional knowledge, planning, and voter engagement infrastructure necessary for credible polls.

Key Points: Deconstructing the “Woeful Failure”

Odinkalu’s critique is methodical, moving beyond general disappointment to itemize specific, evidence-based failures. He asserts that the problems were not abstract but concrete and documented, falling into four primary categories:

1. Catastrophic Electoral Logistics

The most visible failure was in the deployment and retrieval of electoral materials—polling units’ sensitive and non-sensitive materials, including ballot boxes, result sheets, and voting cubicles. Reports from observer groups like the YIAGA Africa and media outlets indicated late arrivals, incomplete kits, and in some polling units, a total absence of materials on election day. This fundamental breakdown prevented the election from even starting in many locations, disenfranchising thousands of registered voters. Odinkalu notes this was not a new problem but a persistent, unaddressed flaw.

2. Collapse of Electoral Knowledge and Voter Education (“Electoral Capital”)

Beyond physical materials, Odinkalu identifies a failure in “electoral capital”—the intangible assets of trained personnel, clear guidelines, and an informed electorate. He highlights the last-minute, chaotic reassignment of polling units and voting centers for thousands of voters just hours before the election. This was done without adequate public notification, voter education campaigns, or training for ad-hoc staff (polling officials) on the new arrangements. The result was mass voter confusion, inability to locate polling stations, and ultimately, suppressed turnout.

3. Unacceptable Levels of Electoral Violence

The election day was marred by reports of violence, intimidation, and disruptions by political thugs in several wards. Security agencies, whose primary duty on election day is to protect voters, materials, and officials, appeared overwhelmed or, in some instances, complicit. This created an atmosphere of fear that further depressed participation and compromised the secrecy of the ballot, a cornerstone of free and fair elections.

4. Tampering with Results and Collation Breakdown

Perhaps the most damning accusation is the alleged manipulation of results at the ward collation level. Odinkalu states that “four results manifestly were replaced in different locations.” This suggests not just administrative error but deliberate falsification. Furthermore, the collation process at the Area Council level itself “glitched on the day,” indicating systemic breakdowns not just at the polling unit but in the aggregation of votes—a critical phase where results are officially tallied and declared.

Background: The Context of Nigeria’s Electoral Struggles

To understand the gravity of Odinkalu’s remarks, one must situate them within Nigeria’s contentious electoral history. Since the return to democracy in 1999, elections have often been characterized by allegations of rigging, violence, and logistical failures. The 2015 and 2019 general elections, while marking historic transfers of power, were also heavily criticized by domestic and international observers for similar issues: late arrival of materials, vote-buying, and insecurity. The 2023 general election, overseen by then-INEC Chairman Mahmood Yakubu, was particularly contentious, with major opposition candidates rejecting the presidential results and citing widespread irregularities.

Into this fraught environment, President Bola Tinubu appointed Professor Olusegun Agbaje (the individual Odinkalu refers to, correcting the name ‘Amupitan’) as INEC Chairman in October 2023. Agbaje, a respected academic and former Vice-Chancellor, was seen by many as a reform-minded technocrat tasked with restoring public confidence in the commission after the polarizing 2023 polls. The FCT election, therefore, was his first major test in a live electoral exercise. The scale of the failure, as documented by Odinkalu and corroborated by field reports, suggests that the deep structural and operational problems plaguing Nigeria’s electoral system are resistant to change at the top, persisting despite changes in leadership.

Analysis: “Failure of Will” vs. Legal Constraints

Odinkalu makes a crucial distinction that elevates his critique from mere complaint to systemic diagnosis. He explicitly states, “No, it’s not about the law. It is about the failure of will. It’s a failure of electoral organization.” This is a pivotal argument.

The Legal Framework Exists: Nigeria’s Electoral Act 2022 is widely regarded as one of the most progressive and detailed electoral laws in Africa. It mandates early and transparent logistics planning, strict timelines for material deployment, voter registration and education programs, and clear procedures for collation and result declaration. INEC also has expansive regulations and guidelines. Therefore, the legal scaffolding for conducting credible elections is largely in place.

The Gap is in Implementation and Political Commitment: The “failure of will” implies that the leadership and career bureaucrats at INEC either lack the competence, the courage, or the political backing to implement the law faithfully. Planning is inadequate, contingency plans are absent, and the culture of “it can’t be done” prevails. The last-minute voter reassignment in the FCT, for instance, is a clear violation of the spirit—if not the letter—of the Act’s provisions for adequate voter information. It suggests a commission reacting to pressure (likely from political actors) rather than proactively managing the process based on established, communicated plans.

Electoral Organization as a Discipline: Modern election management is a complex field requiring project management skills, data analytics, supply chain logistics, and public communication strategies. Odinkalu’s charge of “failure of electoral organization” accuses INEC of operating without this professional discipline. The “glitch” in collation points to a lack of robust, tested systems for result transmission and aggregation, a basic requirement in the 21st century.

Symbolic Importance of the FCT: The FCT is not just another state; it is the seat of federal power, housing the Presidency, National Assembly, and INEC headquarters. The eyes of the nation and the international community are perpetually on it. A failure there is a failure on the world stage, undermining Nigeria’s democratic credentials more than a similar failure in a remote state might. It signals that even the most visible, politically sensitive election cannot be properly managed.

Practical Advice: What Must Change Before 2027

Odinkalu’s conclusion is a direct challenge to INEC’s leadership: “The election administrators have got to do their homework, and if they are not willing to do their homework, they must get the hell out.” Translating this into actionable steps requires a multi-stakeholder approach:

For INEC:

• Overhaul Logistics Planning: INEC must develop and publicly share a detailed, time-bound logistics blueprint for 2027, with independent audits of its supply chain and deployment capabilities. Lessons from the FCT must be integrated into a new Standard Operating Procedure.
• Invest in Technology and Transparency: Accelerate the full implementation of the results viewing portal (RVOP) and explore secure, offline-capable technology for result collation to minimize human interference. All planning documents and procurement records should be proactively published.
• Conduct a Forensic Audit of the FCT Election: Commission an independent, transparent post-mortem of the FCT election, publishing names of officials responsible for specific failures and instituting clear accountability measures.
• Launch an Aggressive, Year-Round Voter Education Campaign: Move beyond election-week jingles. Partner with civil society to educate voters on their rights, polling locations (with stable updates), and the voting process. The last-minute reassignment fiasco must never be repeated.
• Secure Unconditional Support from Security Agencies: INEC must hold pre-election security meetings with the Inspector General of Police and service chiefs to secure written, specific commitments on neutrality and proactive protection for voters, materials, and officials.

For Civil Society and the Media:

• Intensified Scrutiny and Documentation: Maintain constant observation and data collection on INEC’s preparatory activities, not just on election day. Use legal avenues to demand compliance with the Electoral Act.
• Public Pressure and Advocacy: Mobilize public opinion around specific, evidence-based demands for INEC reform. Frame the issue as one of national security and democratic stability, not just partisan politics.

For Political Parties and Candidates:

• Commit to Peaceful Conduct: Publicly renounce violence and thuggery and hold their supporters accountable. Participate actively in INEC’s inter-party committee meetings to resolve logistical issues pre-emptively.
• Focus on Building Real Campaigns: Reduce reliance on electoral manipulation and violence as strategies. Invest in grassroots mobilization based on issues and policies.

FAQ: Addressing Common Questions

Q: Was the FCT election a “test run” for 2027? Should we be this concerned?

A: Yes, all sub-national elections are test runs for the larger general election. The FCT election was a critical test because it involved the same INEC headquarters, similar (though smaller-scale) logistical challenges, and intense political interest. The comprehensive failure across logistics, voter education, security, and collation indicates that the systemic weaknesses are not being fixed. If these core functions cannot be executed in a controlled, capital-city environment, scaling them up to 176,000+ polling units nationwide in 2027 is a recipe for disaster. The concern is not just justified; it is imperative for the survival of Nigeria’s democracy.

Q: Is Odinkalu being too harsh? Aren’t elections always messy?

A: Odinkalu’s harshness is a response to the avoidable and repetitive nature of these “messy” failures. The Electoral Act 2022 was meant to solve these problems. The “mess” in the FCT was not an organic difficulty but a direct result of INEC’s poor planning, last-minute decisions, and failure to learn from past mistakes. He is not painting a “gloomy picture” in despair; he is issuing a diagnostic report. His point is that the picture is *fixable* if there is “will.” The “woeful” descriptor is reserved for a performance that falls below the basic, legally mandated standard of organization, not for an election that is merely imperfect.

Q: What does “electoral capital” mean in this context?

A: “Electoral capital” refers to the accumulated institutional knowledge, experienced personnel, established procedures, public trust, and voter awareness that an electoral management body (EMB) possesses. It is the intangible infrastructure that allows an EMB to run smooth elections. A high “electoral capital” means staff know their roles, voters know where to vote, systems are tested, and plans are communicated. The FCT election showed INEC’s electoral capital to be severely depleted. The last-minute voter reassignment wiped out years of voter education efforts in those affected areas. The collation “glitch” showed a lack of tested systems. Rebuilding this capital requires consistent, transparent, and competent management over time—something the FCT result suggests is currently lacking.

Q: Could legal challenges change the outcome of the FCT election?

A: Legal challenges are almost certain and are a legitimate part of the process. Candidates who believe their results were altered (as Odinkalu alleges for “four results”) or that the process was fundamentally flawed can petition the election tribunal. However, the legal standard for overturning an election is very high; petitioners must prove that the irregularities were substantial enough to have affected the outcome. The documented logistical failures (non-accreditation of voters due to absent materials) could meet this threshold in specific wards. Ultimately, while courts can nullify and order reruns in specific areas, they cannot rebuild INEC’s institutional capacity. The primary remedy for Odinkalu’s critique is administrative and political reform, not judicial intervention, though the latter can provide accountability for specific acts of malpractice.

Conclusion: The Stakes for 2027 and Nigeria’s Democratic Future

Chidi Odinkalu’s characterization of the FCT election as a “woeful failure” of Amupitan’s (Agbaje’s) INEC is more than punditry; it is a forensic indictment of Nigeria’s electoral management