Why Council of State will have to be mounted, now not scrapped – Constitution Review Chair explains – Life Pulse Daily

Introduction

The debate regarding the utility and future of the Council of State in Ghana’s constitutional architecture has taken center stage following recent remarks by Professor Henry Kwasi Prempeh, the Chairman of the Constitution Review Committee. In a comprehensive interview on Joy News, Prof. Prempeh articulated a compelling case for the reform rather than the abolition of this critical governance institution. As Ghana navigates a deeply polarized political landscape, the question remains: should the Council of State be scrapped, or is it an essential mechanism for national stability?

Professor Prempeh argues that the Council of State represents a unique constitutional innovation rooted in traditional governance, serving as a necessary counterweight to the excesses of partisan politics. While acknowledging the public’s legitimate grievances regarding the Council’s perceived lack of independence and opacity, he posits that the solution lies in structural reform. This article delves into the Chairman’s analysis, exploring the proposed amendments designed to restore the Council’s original mandate, enhance transparency, and ensure that this “authentically Ghanaian” institution remains a pillar of the country’s democratic maturity.

Key Points

Background

To understand the significance of Professor Prempeh’s recommendations, one must first understand the historical and constitutional context of the Council of State. Established under Article 89 of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana, the Council of State is a body of eminent persons established to counsel the President of the Republic.

Constitutional Mandate

The Council is composed of the following members:

• A person who has previously held the office of President of Ghana.
• The President of the National House of Chiefs.
• The Speaker of Parliament and the Chief Justice.
• The Chairman of the Council of State (elected by the members).
• Twenty-five other members appointed by the President in consultation with the Council of State.

Historically, the Council was envisioned as a reservoir of wisdom—a “traditional council of elders” translated into a modern constitutional framework. Its role is to check executive rashness and provide independent counsel on matters of state. However, over the years, the composition of the Council has often been criticized for being populated largely by political allies of the sitting President, leading to a perception that it functions as an extension of the Executive rather than an independent check.

Public Perception and Discontent

Over the last decade, public dissatisfaction with the Council of State has grown. Critics argue that the institution has failed to stand up to the executive branch on critical national issues, ranging from corruption scandals to controversial state contracts. The appointment process, which ultimately vests significant power in the President, has led to accusations that the Council lacks the political diversity and independence required to offer unbiased advice. This sentiment of dissatisfaction is the backdrop against which the Constitution Review Committee is operating.

Analysis

Professor Prempeh’s analysis offers a nuanced perspective that bridges the gap between abolitionist sentiments and institutional preservation. His arguments rely on the premise that the polarization of Ghanaian politics necessitates a stabilizing force situated in the “middle.”

The “Authentically Ghanaian” Institution

One of the most potent arguments against scrapping the Council is its cultural resonance. Prof. Prempeh notes that the Council is “rooted in traditional governance.” In many African societies, the Council of Elders serves as the final arbiter of disputes and the guardian of communal values. By retaining the Council of State, Ghana preserves a constitutional mechanism that reflects its indigenous governance heritage. Scrapping it would mean discarding one of the few institutions that looks authentically Ghanaian rather than a wholesale import of Western political models.

Addressing the Independence Deficit

The core of the criticism is the Council’s lack of independence. The Committee gathered evidence suggesting that the Council is often seen as a “rubber stamp” for the ruling party. The analysis suggests that this is not an inherent flaw of the institution itself, but of its composition and operational secrecy. The proposal to diversify membership is a direct response to this. By bringing in voices from the Academy, the Labour movement (TUC), the private sector (Industries and Chamber of Commerce), and Traditional Authorities, the Council becomes a microcosm of the nation rather than a political caucus.

Checks and Balances: The “Second Look” Mechanism

A significant analytical point is the proposal to give the Council a role in reviewing “certain agreements and certain bills.” Prof. Prempeh specifically mentioned deals like the lithium agreement. In resource-rich nations, the executive branch often negotiates deals that may not be in the long-term national interest. The analysis posits that a reformed Council could serve as a preliminary ratification body. This does not equate to a “veto” (which would paralyze governance), but rather a mandatory “cooling-off” period where the President must reconsider the advice given by a diverse body of experts before proceeding.

Practical Advice

For the reform proposals to move from theory to practice, specific legislative and procedural changes are required. Here is a practical breakdown of how the Council of State can be effectively “mounted” and strengthened.

1. Institutionalizing Independent Nominations

To break the cycle of political patronage, the law should mandate that specific quotas of the Council are nominated by independent bodies rather than the President. For example:

• The Academy of Arts and Sciences should nominate a set number of members to ensure intellectual rigor.
• The Trades Union Congress and Ghana Association of Industries should nominate representatives to ensure labor and business interests are balanced.

This structural change ensures that the Council is not merely an extension of the Jubilee House.

2. Enhancing Transparency Protocols

The criticism that “what they do, we don’t know” must be addressed through legislation. The Council should be subject to the Right to Information Act, 2019 (Act 989), to the extent that its operations do not infringe on executive privilege. Furthermore, the Council should be required to publish the minutes of its meetings or at least a summary of its advice to the President on a quarterly basis. This transparency allows the public to hold the Council accountable for the advice they offer.

3. Defining Binding Advice

While the President retains the constitutional right to ignore the Council’s advice, the Committee suggests making certain advice binding. A practical implementation would be to amend the Constitution or relevant statutes to specify that appointments to key independent offices (e.g., the Auditor-General, Commissioners for CHRAJ or the Electoral Commission) cannot proceed without the binding recommendation of the Council of State. This elevates the Council from a mere consultant to a constitutional gatekeeper.

4. Mandatory Review of High-Value Contracts

Parliament and the Executive often rush through natural resource extraction agreements. A practical reform would be to amend the Public Procurement Act or the Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act to require that any contract above a certain financial threshold (e.g., $100 million) must be submitted to the Council of State for a mandatory review period of 30 days. This provides a safety net against corruption and poor negotiation.

FAQ

Conclusion

The debate surrounding the Council of State is not merely about an institution; it is about the character of Ghanaian democracy. Professor Henry Kwasi Prempeh’s argument to reform rather than scrap the Council offers a pragmatic path forward. While the current iteration of the Council has undeniably fallen short of public expectations, its potential as a stabilizing force in a polarized political environment remains high.

By diversifying its composition, binding its advice on critical matters, and mandating transparency, the Council can be transformed from a perceived political appendage into a robust guardian of national interest. The goal is to restore the “original idea”—a council of elders for the modern state—that can showcase to the world that Ghana can blend traditional wisdom with constitutional governance. The path forward is not destruction, but reconstruction.