Whose Safety? Whose Hobby?: U.S. Army Motion, Nigeria’s Internal Failure, and the Dynamics of ECOWAS in West Africa

Introduction

West Africa stands at a critical juncture, grappling with a resurgence of unconstitutional changes of government, the proliferation of terrorist networks, and complex geopolitical maneuvering. At the center of this volatility lies Nigeria, a nation with the potential to anchor regional stability yet struggling with deep-seated internal security challenges. The recent intervention of the Nigerian Air Force in neighboring Benin highlights the country’s enduring role as the de facto security provider of the region. However, this capacity is increasingly strained by domestic failures, raising difficult questions about the sustainability of the current security architecture.

Simultaneously, renewed interest from global powers, particularly the United States, introduces new variables into the equation. While external support is often framed as a solution to the “terrorism and insurgency” devastating the Sahel and the Gulf of Guinea, historical precedents suggest a more transactional reality. This article analyzes the complex interplay between Nigeria’s internal governance deficits, the institutional limitations of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the strategic interests of external actors. It argues that sustainable peace in West Africa cannot be outsourced; it requires a fundamental overhaul of the political incentives that perpetuate violence and a recommitment to genuine regional integration.

Key Points

Background

To understand the current dynamics, one must look at the historical role Nigeria has played since the 1990s. As the region’s demographic and economic heavyweight, Nigeria has often deployed its military hardware to quell civil wars and attempted coups in neighboring states. The intervention in Sierra Leone and Liberia established a precedent: when ECOWAS fails to act, Nigeria usually fills the vacuum. This was evident again on December 7, 2025, when the Nigerian Air Force provided immediate air support to Benin Armed Forces to counter an attempted coup, acting before formal ECOWAS mobilization.

This rapid response capability stems from Nigeria’s advanced military infrastructure relative to its neighbors. However, this external capability stands in stark contrast to the country’s internal struggles. For over a decade, Nigeria has battled a multifaceted security crisis involving Boko Haram, ISWAP, and rampant banditry. The Gulf of Guinea serves as a microcosm of this duality: Nigeria took the lead in upgrading naval capabilities to combat piracy, setting a template for the region, yet its own coastal waters remain vulnerable to spillover violence from the Sahel.

The Erosion of Domestic Security

The “internal failure” referenced in the analysis is not merely a lack of equipment, but a systemic breakdown in the political will to eradicate violence. The persistence of jihadist insurgency and banditry suggests that the Nigerian state has struggled to coordinate a unified, sustained response. This paralysis at the center has created a vacuum that external actors are increasingly eager to fill, not necessarily for Nigeria’s benefit, but for their own strategic positioning in the resource-rich West African corridor.

Analysis

The Political Economy of Insecurity

Perhaps the most critical insight is the concept of insecurity as a “political resource.” In many analyses of African politics, violence is viewed solely as a governance failure. However, a closer look at Nigeria suggests that chronic insecurity serves the interests of specific political elites. It justifies escalating military budgets, provides patronage networks through security contracts, and serves as a potent tool for electoral mobilization. When fear becomes a currency, solving the problem becomes counter-productive for those in power. This “political market system” of insecurity means that without a change in the internal incentive structure, external military aid will likely be absorbed into the status quo rather than resolving the root causes of violence.

U.S. Interests and the Illusion of Altruism

There is a growing expectation that the United States, with its vast military resources, should intervene to stabilize Nigeria. The article argues that this is a dangerous misconception. U.S. foreign policy is historically driven by clearly defined national interests. This transactional logic is evident in current engagements in Ukraine, where access to rare earth minerals is part of the strategic calculus, and in Venezuela, where counter-narcotics operations are intertwined with energy security goals.

If great powers extract resources even from European allies, it is naive to expect a different treatment for Africa. Therefore, viewing U.S. military motion as a purely benevolent act ignores the history of unequal power relations. U.S. intervention in West Africa is likely to prioritize American strategic positioning and resource access over the long-term stability of the Nigerian state.

ECOWAS: An Elite Club?

ECOWAS faces a crisis of legitimacy. The organization was founded on the principles of collective security and economic integration. However, recent events highlight a disturbing trend of selective securitization. The speed with which ECOWAS mobilized to protect President Patrice Talon of Benin—a leader who had narrowed democratic competition through constitutional reforms—contrasts sharply with its lethargy in confronting terrorism in Nigeria, Burkina Faso, and Mali.

This suggests that ECOWAS is increasingly functioning as an “elite club” focused on regime security rather than citizen security. By rushing to defend constitutional order only when it favors incumbent leaders, while ignoring existential threats to the population, ECOWAS undermines its own normative standing. Consequently, the failure of Nigeria’s security sector is mirrored and compounded by the failure of regional governance.

Practical Advice

Resolving the West African security crisis requires a multi-layered approach that moves beyond superficial military interventions.

For Nigeria: Political Renewal and Institutional Reform

Nigeria must engage in honest self-reflection. The country cannot project itself as the “Giant of Africa” while failing to secure its own territory. The priority must be the restoration of internal security through institutional reform. This involves:

1. Dismantling the Insecurity Economy: Investigating and reforming defense procurement and budgeting to eliminate incentives for prolonged conflict.
2. Coherent Strategy: Moving from reactive troop deployments to a holistic strategy that addresses the socio-economic drivers of banditry and insurgency.
3. Political Will: Demonstrating that the safety of citizens takes precedence over partisan political interests.

For ECOWAS: Consistency and Capability

ECOWAS must evolve from a diplomatic forum into a robust security community. This requires:

• Normative Consistency: Treating unconstitutional changes of government and “constitutional coups” (where leaders manipulate term limits) with equal severity. Sanctions must be applied indiscriminately.
• Investment in Standby Forces: Moving beyond ad hoc coalitions to a fully funded, equipped, and trained ECOWAS Standby Force capable of rapid deployment and sustained counter-terrorism operations.
• Technological Integration: Investing in Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities to combat asymmetric warfare.

For Engagement with External Powers

West African nations must adopt a transactional approach to foreign partners. Whether engaging the U.S., Russia, or China, the guiding principle should be the building of indigenous capacity. Reliance on external “mercenaries” is perilous; their loyalty is to their paymasters, not to the host nation’s long-term stability. Security assistance should be sought to supplement local forces, not replace them.

FAQ

Conclusion

The security landscape of West Africa is defined by a dangerous paradox. Nigeria, the region’s anchor, is hobbled by a political class that appears to benefit from the very insecurity it is tasked with fighting. Meanwhile, ECOWAS functions more as a shield for incumbents than a sword against terrorism. In this vacuum, external powers like the United States circle, ready to engage—but on their own terms and for their own gain.

True safety for West Africa cannot be imported, nor can it be sustained by a political elite that views violence as a resource. The path forward requires Nigeria to reclaim its “Giant of Africa” status through domestic political renewal and the dismantling of the incentives for conflict. Simultaneously, ECOWAS must mature into a genuine collective security bloc capable of consistent, people-centered action. Until these internal and regional reforms are realized, the region will remain a theater of competing interests, where the safety of the people remains secondary to the hobbies of the powerful.