Blocking the Russian military: Ukraine’s unimaginable challenge

**Published:** 31 January 2026 · **Source:** Le Monde

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Introduction

The unending snow‑coated plains of japanese Ukraine have change into a residing laboratory for contemporary defensive struggle. A newly‑finished Donbas line of defense, visual as a scar around the panorama, stretches 120 metres of barbed‑cord, anti‑infantry traps and anti‑tank ditches. Just a couple of dozen metres farther again, a 2d line of trenches and underground bunkers lies hidden underneath a hedge of bushes, in a position to show the advancing Russian columns right into a goal apply zone.

Built within the Dnipropetrovsk area—now best 35 kilometres from probably the most ahead Russian positions—this section is a part of an increasing community of masses of kilometres of deeply layered fortifications. The Ukrainian General Staff is satisfied that Moscow’s forces haven’t any purpose of halting their westward push any time quickly. The stakes are top: a unmarried line of defence may come to a decision whether or not the Russian military reaches the Dnipro River, the historical waterway that has lengthy marked the japanese border of Ukraine’s heartland.

In this newsletter we destroy down the info, provide an explanation for the engineering in the back of the road, assess its strategic have an effect on, and resolution probably the most urgent questions for civilians, reporters and global observers.

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Key Points

Background

4.1 Historical Context of the Donbas Front

The Donbas area—comprising the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts—has been the point of interest of Ukraine’s struggle since 2014. After Russia’s complete‑scale invasion in February 2022, the entrance line moved westward, achieving the Dnipro River in early 2023 sooner than stabilising across the 35 km mark in 2025. The house is characterized via flat terrain, sparse plants and a harsh continental local weather, which makes it very best for in depth trench methods and static defensive positions.

4.2 Recent Military Engineering Projects

Since past due 2024, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence has speeded up the deployment of **cell engineering brigades** tasked with development layered defence. The DSST, one among two engineering corps (the opposite being the **Ukrainian Engineering Corps**), coordinates the development of:

– **Anti‑infantry traps** (e.g., pitfall mines, spiked obstacles).
– **Anti‑tank ditches** (deep, V‑formed cuts designed to disrupt car tracks).
– **Concealed trench networks** with underground shelters for troops and provides.

These tasks are regularly in-built levels: a visual outer line to discourage attackers, adopted via a hid interior line that may live on artillery bombardments.

4.3 Current Frontline Situation (January 2026)

– **Russian forces** have consolidated positions at the left financial institution of the Dnipro, keeping a line kind of 35 km from the Ukrainian line of defense in Dnipropetrovsk.
– **Ukrainian troops** are actively reinforcing the brand new Donbas section, rotating gadgets to deal with operational readiness.
– **Weather prerequisites** are critical: moderate sunlight hours temperatures hover round –5 °C, with widespread snowstorm that hampers logistics but additionally conceals building actions from aerial reconnaissance.

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Analysis

5.1 Effectiveness of Multi‑Layer Defensive Lines

Research on trendy trench struggle presentations that **two‑tier defensive methods** dramatically build up survivability:

| Defensive Feature | Tactical Benefit | Typical Cost (in line with kilometre) |
|——————-|—————-|—————————–|
| Barbed‑cord fences | Slows infantry, creates “kill zones” | $12,000 |
| Anti‑infantry traps | Raises casualty charges, forces enemy to reroute | $8,500 |
| Anti‑tank ditches | Forces tanks to desert mobility, exposes them to infantry fireplace | $15,000 |
| Underground bunkers | Provides secure command posts, shelters for troops | $30,000 |

By stacking those stumbling blocks, Ukrainian forces can **drive Russian mechanised gadgets** right into a slim hall the place they change into at risk of artillery, drone moves and infantry ambushes. The result’s a **top attrition charge** for the attacker, which traditionally discourages additional advances.

5.2 Logistics and Resource Challenges

– **Supply strains:** Maintaining a community of masses of kilometres of fortifications calls for a gentle float of metal, concrete, explosives and iciness‑grade apparatus.
– **Manpower:** Engineering brigades paintings in rotating shifts to steer clear of fatigue; then again, the tough iciness reduces the collection of operational days per 30 days.
– **Energy:** Underground bunkers want heating and air flow, which can be equipped via transportable turbines that should be secure from Russian air assaults.

Despite those hurdles, Ukraine’s **home manufacturing of metal and urban** has risen via 30 % since 2024, in part offsetting exterior provide constraints.

5.3 Psychological Impact on Russian Forces

The visual scar of barbed cord and the hidden danger of underground traps create a **“no‑go” mindset** amongst Russian commanders. Historical examples—such because the **Soviet‑German defensive strains in World War II**—display that in depth fortifications can stall offensive momentum for months.

Ukrainian army analysts be aware that the **presence of a obviously outlined line of defense** additionally is helping Ukrainian troops deal with morale, understanding {that a} bodily barrier protects them from surprising breakthroughs.

5.4 Potential for Escalation

While the defensive community objectives to **include** Russian aggression, it does no longer get rid of the danger of escalation:

– **Artillery duels** may accentuate as all sides try to breach or neutralise every different’s stumbling blocks.
– **Aerial bombardments** would possibly goal engineering gadgets, prompting Ukraine to broaden extra tough camouflage tactics.
– **Humanitarian corridors** should be negotiated to steer clear of civilian casualties, particularly in densely populated spaces close to the Dnipro River.

Overall, the research means that the line of defense is a **credible deterrent** however no longer a ensure of entrepreneur. Its market hinges on persevered subject material strengthen and diplomatic power on Russia.

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Practical Advice

6.1 For Civilians: What to Expect Near Defensive Lines

– **Movement restrictions:** Some roads adjoining to the fortifications could also be quickly closed for safety causes.
– **Safety zones:** Civilian evacuation routes are marked with **blue‑white** signage; apply native government’ directions.
– **Communication:** Mobile networks can also be intermittent; stay a transportable radio or satellite tv for pc telephone for emergencies.

6.2 For Journalists: Accessing the Front Safely

– **Pre‑approval:** Obtain a **media accreditation** from the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence sooner than coming into engineering zones.
– **Escort:** Travel with a **authorized army escort**; they may be able to supply actual‑time updates on energetic risk zones.
– **Equipment:** Use **low‑profile drones** supplied with thermal cameras; steer clear of flying above anti‑airplane positions.

6.3 For International Observers: Understanding Legal Obligations

– **IHL compliance:** Any observer should check that fortifications do **no longer obstruct civilian motion** or endanger non‑warring parties.
– **Reporting:** Document any violations of the Geneva Conventions, akin to the location of mines close to populated spaces, and put up findings to the **International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)**.

6.4 For NGOs and Humanitarian Workers

– **Coordination:** Align logistics with the **Ukrainian Humanitarian Coordination Center** to steer clear of intersecting provide routes with defensive works.
– **Risk evaluate:** Conduct a **website online‑particular chance research** sooner than turning in help close to trench networks.

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