Introduction: Understanding Presidential Concerns on National Security

In a revealing post-presidency interview, Ambassador Ibrahim Gambari, who served as Chief of Staff to former Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari, provided critical insights into his former principal’s state of mind regarding the nation’s security landscape. Central to his account is President Buhari’s expressed deep personal concern and frustration over the deteriorating security situation in Nigeria’s Northwest and North Central geopolitical zones. This disclosure sheds light on the complex interplay between presidential authority, intelligence dissemination, and the harsh realities of governing a nation grappling with multifaceted security threats. While the Buhari administration celebrated significant military successes in reclaiming territories from the extremist group Boko Haram in the Northeast, the persistent and evolving crises—including armed banditry, kidnapping, and farmer-herder clashes—in other regions became a source of profound regret for the outgoing president. This article delves into Gambari’s statements, contextualizes them within Nigeria’s recent security history, analyzes the administrative dynamics he described, and extracts broader lessons on governance and security management.

Key Points from Ambassador Gambari’s Interview

Ambassador Gambari’s appearance on Channels Television’s Politics Today yielded several核心 (core) revelations about the final days of the Buhari administration and the ex-president’s reflections:

• Personal Pain Over Insecurity: President Buhari was deeply pained by his perceived inability to fully resolve the escalating security crises in the Northwest and North Central regions before his term ended in May 2023.
• Legacy of Northeast Gains: Gambari emphasized that a major achievement of the administration was ensuring no Nigerian territory remained under the firm control of Boko Haram, a stark contrast to the situation at the beginning of Buhari’s tenure in 2015.
• The “Cabals” Challenge: He warned of a persistent governance problem where certain advisors (often termed “cabals”) may filter information, telling a leader what they want to hear rather than what they need to know, potentially distorting decision-making.
• Multiplicity of Intelligence Sources: Gambari noted that while the Chief of Staff is a key advisor, the president receives information from numerous sources, and a CoS cannot be privy to all intelligence or counsel.
• Buhari’s Unique Position: He contextualized Buhari’s presidency, noting he was only the second former military head of state to be democratically elected (after Obasanjo), which shaped his perspective and approach to national security.
• Expression of Exhaustion: Gambari quoted Buhari as feeling he had “done everything I can for these people” regarding the affected regions, indicating a sense of having reached the limit of his administrative capacity to address the issues.

Background: Nigeria’s Security Landscape Under Buhari (2015-2023)

The Northeast and the Boko Haram Threat

When President Buhari took office in May 2015, Boko Haram controlled significant swathes of territory in Nigeria’s Northeast, particularly in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa states. The group had declared a “caliphate” and conducted brutal attacks. A central pillar of Buhari’s early presidency was a reinvigorated military offensive, with regional cooperation from the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF). By 2016, the military had largely pushed the group into remote areas and Sambisa Forest, reclaiming most major towns and roads. The administration consistently highlighted this as a top security achievement, arguing it prevented Nigeria from becoming a “failed state” in that region.

The Emergence of New Threats: Northwest & North Central

As Boko Haram’s territorial control waned in the Northeast, other violent threats proliferated with alarming speed:

• Northwest (Zamfara, Kaduna, Sokoto, Katsina, Kebbi, Niger): This region became the epicenter of devastating armed banditry. Large, mobile criminal gangs, often numbering in the hundreds, conducted mass kidnappings of schoolchildren, attacked villages, and rustled cattle. The line between criminal banditry and ideologically motivated terrorism often blurred, with some groups pledging allegiance to Boko Haram or ISWAP. The crisis led to thousands of deaths, massive internal displacement, and the closure of numerous schools.
• North Central (Plateau, Benue, Nasarawa, Niger, Kogi): This region, part of Nigeria’s Middle Belt, has long been a flashpoint for farmer-herder conflicts. These clashes, often between predominantly Christian farmers and predominantly Muslim herders (Fulani), over land and water resources intensified dramatically post-2015. The conflicts became deadlier, with the use of sophisticated weapons. The region also experienced spillover violence from banditry and, at times, reprisal attacks from herders linked to groups in the Northwest.

These crises presented a different challenge: they were geographically vast, involved non-ideological criminal enterprises or communal tensions, and strained the capabilities of the police and, in some cases, the military. The federal and state governments often accused each other of lacking the political will or legal authority to act decisively.

Ibrahim Gambari: The Chief of Staff

Ambassador Ibrahim Gambari, a seasoned diplomat and former Foreign Minister, served as President Buhari’s Chief of Staff from August 2020 until the end of the administration in May 2023. His office is constitutionally responsible for coordinating the activities of the presidential cabinet, managing the flow of information to the president, and overseeing the administration of the Aso Rock Villa. As such, he was a central figure in the inner circle and a primary channel for national security briefings and policy coordination.

Analysis: Deconstructing the “Pain” and the Governance Challenge

The Psychology of a Retiring Commander-in-Chief

Gambari’s portrayal of Buhari as “pained” is significant. Buhari, a former military dictator (1983-1985) and a leader who built his political brand on a promise of strong, decisive action against insecurity, faced a paradox. His military background likely instilled a belief in the state’s monopoly on force and the possibility of “solving” security problems through operational dominance. The persistence of mass kidnappings, village raids, and communal massacres in regions outside the Northeast, despite his administration’s efforts and resources, would naturally clash with this worldview. His reported statement—”I have done everything I can for these people”—suggests a leader confronting the limits of executive power against deeply entrenched, socio-economically rooted conflicts that military action alone cannot permanently fix. This “pain” can be interpreted as the frustration of a leader facing asymmetric and hybrid threats that defy conventional counter-insurgency models.

The “Cabals” and the Flow of Information

Gambari’s caution about “cabals” who tell the president “what he wants to hear” is a perennial critique in Nigerian governance and beyond. In the context of security, this can manifest in several ways:

• Optimistic Filtering: Advisors or security chiefs may present progress reports that downplay setbacks or emerging threats to maintain a narrative of control.
• Political Shielding: Information that might implicate powerful political actors, ethnic groups, or even state governments in security failures may be suppressed.
• Bureaucratic Silos: Security agencies (Army, Police, DSS, DIA) may not always share intelligence seamlessly, creating an incomplete picture for the president.

Gambari’s statement serves as a reminder that the quality of presidential decision-making is only as good as the information ecosystem surrounding it. A president isolated from harsh ground truths will inevitably formulate inadequate strategies. His note that the president has “many sources of information” is crucial—it implies that a diligent president must actively seek dissenting views and on-the-ground reports beyond the official briefings from his Chief of Staff and security apparatus.

Defining the “Buhari Security Legacy”

Gambari’s defense of the administration’s legacy on the Northeast is factually sound. The territorial defeat of Boko Haram as a conventional force is widely acknowledged by independent analysts and regional partners. However, the security picture is nuanced:

• Success (Northeast): Degradation of Boko Haram’s territorial control, liberation of thousands of hostages, and prevention of the group’s expansion into a full-blown state entity.
• Challenges/Limitations: The group evolved into a resilient insurgency conducting guerrilla attacks, suicide bombings, and raids, particularly in rural areas. The humanitarian crisis in the Northeast remained catastrophic throughout Buhari’s tenure.
• Failure (Northwest/North Central): The inability to stem banditry and communal violence represents a major gap in the legacy. These threats caused comparable, if not greater, loss of life and displacement in absolute numbers during Buhari’s second term. The perception of a “selective” security response—military-heavy in the Northeast versus a more hesitant, politically constrained approach in the Northwest/North Central—undermined national cohesion and fueled narratives of marginalization.

Thus, the “Buhari security legacy” is dualistic: a clear tactical victory in one theater overshadowed by a strategic stalemate and growing crisis in others. Gambari’s comments highlight the president’s acute awareness of this dichotomy.

Practical Advice: Lessons for Governance and Security Policy

Based on the insights from this interview, several actionable lessons emerge for future administrations, security chiefs, and civil society:

For Future Presidents and Chiefs of Staff:

1. Institutionalize Diverse Intelligence Channels: Actively create formal and informal mechanisms to receive unfiltered reports from junior officers, local community leaders, NGOs, and journalists operating in conflict zones. This counters the “cabal” effect.
2. Demand Regional-Specific Strategies: A one-size-fits-all security approach (e.g., treating banditry like a Northeast insurgency) is destined to fail. Each region’s conflicts (ideological, criminal, communal) require tailored legal frameworks, operational tactics, and development-integrated strategies.
3. Publicly Acknowledge Different Threats: Recognizing the distinct pain of communities in the Northwest and North Central, as Buhari reportedly did privately, must be matched with public empathy and equally resourced responses. Denial or minimization erodes trust.
4. Strengthen Inter-Agency and Federal-State Coordination: The legal ambiguity over who controls the police and the need for state governors to request military support created deadly delays. Future governments must clarify command structures for joint operations across all regions.

For Policymakers and Legislators:

1. Enact Specialized Legal Frameworks: Develop distinct legal instruments for dealing with armed banditry, large-scale kidnapping, and communal violence, separate from the “terrorism” laws used for Boko Haram. This allows for more appropriate operational rules of engagement and prosecution pathways.
2. Invest in Community Policing and Early Warning: Long-term security depends on trusted local police and conflict early warning systems, especially in the North Central’s farmer-herder context. This requires sustained budget allocation and training.
3. Integrate Security with Development: Address the root causes of banditry (unemployment, climate change, poverty) and farmer-herder clashes (land-use policies, grazing reserves) through coordinated ministries of agriculture, environment, and planning. Security forces cannot provide a permanent solution to socio-economic problems.

For Civil Society and the Media:

1. Document and Amplify Local Voices: Consistently report on the human cost of insecurity in all regions, ensuring the narratives from Zamfara, Kaduna, or Benue receive national attention equal to that of Borno.
2. Advocate for Transparency in Security Budgeting: Scrutinize the allocation and execution of security funds to ensure they correspond to the threat levels across all geopolitical zones.
3. Monitor Information Flows: Act as a check on the “cabal” phenomenon by investigating discrepancies between official government statements and verified reports from conflict zones, using data and firsthand accounts.

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ)

Did President Buhari fail in his promise to tackle insecurity?

The answer is complex and depends on the metric and region. On the metric of reclaiming territory from Boko Haram, he succeeded where his predecessor struggled. On the metric of reducing overall deaths from violent conflict and making citizens feel safe nationwide, data from groups like the Council on Foreign Relations’ Nigeria Security Tracker indicates that fatalities from banditry, kidnapping, and communal violence soared during his tenure, particularly after 2019. Therefore, while he delivered on a specific, high-priority campaign promise (defeating Boko Haram), he did not achieve a holistic reduction in national insecurity, a failure he reportedly internalized.

What exactly are “cabals” in Nigerian governance?

“Cabal” is a term used in Nigerian political discourse to describe an informal, unelected group of influential individuals—often family members, long-time associates, political financiers, or powerful ministers—who are perceived to wield disproportionate influence over a president or governor. They are accused of gatekeeping access to the leader, shaping policy behind closed doors for their own interests, and filtering information to present a favorable narrative. Their existence is frequently cited as a reason for poor policy outcomes and presidential isolation.

Why were the Northwest and North Central so difficult to secure?

These regions presented a “perfect storm” of factors absent or less pronounced in the Northeast’s Islamist insurgency:

• Vast, Porous Borders: The Northwest borders the Sahel, facilitating the influx of weapons and armed groups from the wider region.
• Criminal, Not Primarily Ideological, Motivation: Banditry is driven by profit (ransom, cattle, looting), making it adaptable and less susceptible to ideological deradicalization.

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