CDD-Ghana Demands Independent Anti-Corruption Commission in Mahama’s First-Year Review

The Centre for Democratic Development Ghana (CDD-Ghana), a prominent civil society organization and think tank, has issued a stringent call for sweeping institutional reforms to fortify Ghana’s anti-corruption framework. In its detailed one-year governance review of President John Dramani Mahama’s administration, released on February 19, 2026, CDD-Ghana acknowledges preliminary steps but underscores critical gaps that undermine long-term effectiveness. The report’s central, urgent recommendation is the establishment of a single, powerful, and truly independent anti-corruption body to replace the current fragmented system.

Introduction: The Imperative for an Impartial Anti-Corruption Architecture

Corruption remains a persistent and corrosive challenge to Ghana’s democratic development, economic prosperity, and public trust. While successive governments have pledged to combat it, the institutional architecture has often been characterized by overlapping mandates, political interference, and resource constraints. The CDD-Ghana report, titled a one-year overview of the Mahama supervision (administration), provides a critical, evidence-based assessment. It argues that the foundational structure itself is flawed and that piecemeal improvements are insufficient. The solution proposed is a radical consolidation: merging key agencies into one autonomous commission with prosecutorial power, insulated from executive influence. This article synthesizes the report’s findings, explores the background of Ghana’s anti-corruption institutions, analyzes the proposed reforms, and offers practical advice for policymakers and citizens alike.

Key Points: Core Recommendations from the CDD-Ghana Review

The CDD-Ghana review presents a clear roadmap for institutional change. The following points distill its most significant and actionable recommendations for overhauling Ghana’s anti-corruption mechanisms.

1. Merger into an Independent Anti-Corruption and Ethics Commission

The cornerstone proposal is to amalgamate the mandates of three existing bodies:

• Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP): Established in 2018 with a specific mandate to investigate and prosecute corruption cases involving public officers and politically exposed persons.
• Economic and Organised Crime Office (EOCO): Statutorily mandated to investigate and prosecute serious economic and organised crime, including some corruption-related offenses.
• Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ): A constitutional body with a broad mandate to investigate complaints of administrative injustice, human rights violations, and corruption, though its prosecutorial powers are limited.

CDD-Ghana endorses the Constitutional Review Committee’s earlier proposal to dissolve these separate entities and create a new, unified Independent Anti-Corruption and Ethics Commission (IACEC). This commission would have a comprehensive mandate covering investigation, prosecution, and prevention, eliminating jurisdictional conflicts and resource duplication.

2. Stripping the Attorney-General of Prosecutorial Authority in Corruption Cases

A critical feature of the proposed IACEC is its operational independence. To achieve this, the report recommends amending the law to remove the Attorney-General’s (AG) prosecutorial discretion over corruption matters. Currently, the AG, a political appointee and member of the executive, has final say on whether to prosecute many corruption cases. The report explicitly recommends: “Ensure that the Attorney-General or any person exercising prosecutorial authority may not discontinue a commenced prosecution without leave of court.” This legal safeguard is designed to prevent political interference and ensure that once a case is initiated based on evidence, it proceeds unless a judicial authority deems it unfit.

3. Guaranteeing Sustainable and Adequate Funding

The report warns that chronic underfunding has historically crippled accountability institutions. It calls on the government to move beyond “rhetorical commitments” and ensure “adequate and sustained funding” through direct and protected budgetary allocations. Financial independence is presented as a non-negotiable prerequisite for operational independence.

4. Enacting the Long-Delayed Conduct of Public Officers Bill

CDD-Ghana presses for the immediate passage of this foundational legislation. The bill must include robust provisions on asset declaration, conflict of interest, and post-employment restrictions for public officers. The current gaps, the report argues, allow for unethical conduct to go unpunished and create loopholes for illicit enrichment.

5. Full and Effective Implementation of NEACAP 2026–2030

The National Ethics and Anti-Corruption Action Plan (NEACAP) is Ghana’s strategic framework. The think tank cautions against repeating the implementation failures of the previous NACAP I. It demands that the new plan be fully funded, monitored with clear Key Performance Indicators (KPIs), and applied with consistency across all levels of government.

Background: The Fragmented Anti-Corruption Landscape in Ghana

To understand the urgency of CDD-Ghana’s proposal, one must examine the existing, often confusing, institutional setup. Ghana’s anti-corruption fight is conducted by multiple agencies with overlapping and sometimes competing jurisdictions.

The Existing Agencies and Their Mandates

• Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ): Created under the 1992 Constitution (Article 218). It investigates corruption and maladministration, can recommend prosecution, but lacks its own prosecutorial power and must refer cases to the AG or ACP.
• Economic and Organised Crime Office (EOCO): Established by the Economic and Organised Crime Office Act, 2010 (Act 804). It investigates and prosecutes economic crimes, including some complex corruption and money laundering cases.
• Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP): A relatively new body created by the Office of the Special Prosecutor Act, 2017 (Act 959). It has a focused mandate to investigate and prosecute corruption cases involving public officers, politically exposed persons, and their relatives, and to recover proceeds of corruption.
• Attorney-General’s Department & Ministry of Justice: Holds the ultimate prosecutorial authority for most criminal cases, including many corruption matters not exclusively assigned to the OSP or EOCO.
• Audit Service & Internal Audit Agencies: Play a preventive and detective role through financial audits.

Historical Challenges and the “Reset” Agenda

This multi-agency system has led to:

• Jurisdictional Conflicts: Cases can fall between cracks or be subject to “turf wars,” delaying justice.
• Inconsistent Standards: Different agencies may have varying levels of expertise, resources, and political will.
• Executive Control: The AG’s prosecutorial power and the government’s control over budget allocations for all agencies create avenues for political influence.

President Mahama’s administration has touted a “Reset” agenda, promising greater accountability. Early actions cited by CDD-Ghana include limiting ministerial appointments, launching a Code of Conduct for appointees, supporting the OSP, and initiating asset recovery efforts. However, the report stresses that these are preliminary signals. The true test is whether the administration will tackle the root institutional weaknesses, a move that would require significant political courage to reduce executive control over the prosecutorial process.

Analysis: Deconstructing the Proposed Independent Anti-Corruption and Ethics Commission

The CDD-Ghana proposal is not merely an administrative tweak but a fundamental re-engineering of Ghana’s anti-corruption DNA. A critical analysis reveals its strengths, inherent challenges, and comparative context.

The Logic of Consolidation: Efficiency and Focus

Merging OSP, EOCO, and CHRAJ’s anti-corruption functions into a single IACEC offers clear advantages:

• Elimination of Overlap: Resources (personnel, forensic labs, IT systems) would be pooled, creating a more efficient and specialized unit.
• Clear Chain of Command: A single leadership and strategic direction would prevent confusion and ensure consistent application of anti-corruption law.
• Enhanced Expertise: The commission could develop deep, specialized knowledge in tracking complex financial crimes, money laundering, and grand corruption.
• Stronger Public Perception: A unified, prominent body is easier for the public to understand and hold accountable, potentially boosting citizen engagement and reporting.

The Constitutional and Legal Hurdles

The proposal is legally complex. It would require:

• Constitutional Amendment: CHRAJ is a constitutional body under Article 218. Its dissolution or mandate transfer would necessitate a referendum or a stringent parliamentary process with a two-thirds majority, as per Article 290(5) of the 1992 Constitution.
• Repeal of Three Separate Acts: The OSP Act, EOCO Act, and relevant parts of the CHRAJ Act would need to be repealed and replaced with a single, comprehensive IACEC Act.
• Transfer of Prosecutorial Power: Removing the AG’s authority over corruption cases is a direct challenge to a centuries-old common law principle where the AG is the chief law officer of the state. This would be a profound shift in the legal balance of power.

Ensuring True Independence: The “How” Matters

Creating a commission on paper is not enough. The enabling legislation must embed iron-clad safeguards:

• Appointment Process: The head and governing board must be appointed through a transparent, bipartisan process involving the President, Council of State, and Parliament, with fixed, non-renewable terms.
• Financial Autonomy: The commission’s budget must be approved as a standalone line item in the national budget, with protection against mid-year executive reductions.
• Operational Immunity: The head must have security of tenure, removable only for proven misconduct or incapacity, following a rigorous procedure.
• Transparency and Reporting: Mandatory public annual reports on activities, seized assets, and prosecution outcomes.

Practical Advice: Pathways for Government and Citizens

Translating the CDD-Ghana report’s vision into reality requires coordinated action from state actors and an engaged citizenry.

For the Executive and Legislature

1. Prioritize the Constitutional Amendment: The government must initiate the complex process of amending the constitution to facilitate the merger, building a national consensus across party lines.
2. Draft a Model IACEC Bill: Establish a technical committee with legal experts, former judges, and civil society to draft a bill that incorporates global best practices (e.g., Hong Kong’s ICAC, Singapore’s CPIB) and Ghana’s unique context.
3. Engage in Public Dialogue: Launch a nationwide education campaign on the proposed changes to build public support and preempt misinformation.
4. Immediately Strengthen OSP and EOCO: While the merger is pursued, the government must stop underfunding existing agencies. Increase their budgets, ensure timely recruitment, and publicly reaffirm their independence.
5. Fast-Track the Conduct of Public Officers Bill: This is a lower-hanging fruit that can be achieved within the current parliamentary term. Its passage would demonstrate serious intent.

For Civil Society, Media, and Citizens

1. Vigilant Monitoring: As CDD-Ghana pledges, civil society must rigorously track the government’s performance against its own “Reset” promises and the report’s benchmarks. Scorecards and public dashboards can be effective tools.
2. Strategic Litigation: Where political interference is suspected (e.g., an AG discontinuing a case), interested parties can seek judicial review, arguing the violation of the proposed constitutional spirit and the need for a fair prosecution process.
3. Public Demand for Asset Declaration: Citizens and media must consistently demand that all public officers file detailed, publicly accessible asset declarations and explain any discrepancies.
4. Support Whistleblowers: Advocate for and help implement a strong, confidential whistleblower protection law and system, which is currently weak.
5. Electoral Pressure: Use the issue of concrete anti-corruption results as a key metric in future elections, rewarding candidates and parties with demonstrable records on institutional integrity.

FAQ: Addressing Common Questions on Ghana’s Anti-Corruption Reform

Why can’t Ghana just fix the current agencies instead of merging them?

While improving funding and independence for existing bodies is a necessary short-term step, the fundamental issue is structural. The 1992 Constitution created CHRAJ with a broad human rights and administrative justice mandate, not purely as a prosecutorial anti-corruption agency. The OSP and EOCO were later creations with specific, non-overlapping mandates. This “silo” approach was not designed for a coordinated war on grand corruption. Merger creates a singular focus and eliminates the “passing the buck” phenomenon.

Wouldn’t merging agencies create a monolithic, unaccountable “super-agency”?

The risk is real. That is precisely why the independence safeguards are critical: a diverse, bipartisan appointment committee; fixed, non-renewable terms for leadership; guaranteed funding; and robust, transparent reporting requirements. The goal is a powerful but *accountable* agency, with oversight from Parliament, the Auditor-General, and an active civil society.

Is removing the Attorney-General’s prosecutorial power constitutional?

Currently, the AG’s power derives from the Constitution (Article 88) and common law. Removing it for a specific class of crimes (corruption) would require a constitutional amendment. The argument in favor is that the AG, as a political appointee, cannot be impartial in cases involving the executive branch. A specialized, independent prosecutor for corruption aligns with global trends (e.g., the U.S. Special Counsel) and is a valid constitutional objective if achieved through the proper amendment process.

What about corruption in the new Commission itself? How would that be prevented?

The proposal must include a strong internal affairs unit, overseen by the governing board, to investigate misconduct by commission staff. External