Ghana’s Security Vacuum: Analysing the Defence Minister Debate After Burkina Faso Attack

Introduction: A Critical Security Critique

In the complex landscape of West African geopolitics, a single event can illuminate deep structural fissures within a nation’s security architecture. Such was the case following the terrorist assault on Ghanaian tomato traders in Burkina Faso, an incident that sparked a pointed critique from former Defence Minister and Bimbilla MP, Dominic Nitiwul. Nitiwul’s public condemnation of President John Mahama centres on a fundamental governance issue: the prolonged absence of a substantive, confirmed Defence Minister at a time of acute regional instability. This article dissects the core of Nitiwul’s argument, moving beyond political rhetoric to examine the constitutional, operational, and strategic implications of a vacant key defence portfolio. We will analyse whether this absence constitutes a genuine vulnerability in Ghana’s national security posture, the specific protocols expected during a cross-border crisis involving citizens, and the broader context of security threats in the Sahel region. The goal is to provide a clear, factual, and pedagogical exploration of a debate that touches on executive responsibility, inter-ministerial coordination, and the imperative of proactive state protection for its citizens abroad.

Key Points: Deconstructing the Criticism

Dominic Nitiwul’s critique is multifaceted, targeting procedural, strategic, and symbolic dimensions of governance. The key pillars of his argument are:

• The Existential Vacuum: The lack of a confirmed Defence Minister creates a leadership gap at the helm of the Ministry of Defence, impairing strategic decision-making and rapid response coordination.
• Nature of the Threat: The Burkina Faso attack, targeting Ghanaian economic actors, is framed as a transnational terrorist act requiring a high-level, state-to-state diplomatic and security response, beyond the remit of other ministries.
• Mandate Specificity: Nitiwul sharply delineates responsibilities, asserting that cross-border military intelligence, engagement with foreign defence establishments, and operational oversight of security responses are the exclusive purview of the Defence Ministry, not the Interior Ministry.
• Proactive vs. Reactive Posture: The expected action—a Defence Minister leading a delegation to Burkina Faso immediately—is presented as a standard of proactive crisis management that has been neglected, weakening Ghana’s preparedness and deterrence posture.
• Transparency and Assurance: The criticism extends to the government’s communication strategy, demanding detailed public explanations from either the Foreign or Defence Minister to reassure the citizenry.

Background: The Incident and the Institutional Context

The Burkina Faso Tomato Trader Attack

The immediate catalyst for this political firestorm was an incident in which Ghanaian nationals, primarily involved in the tomato trade, were attacked by suspected jihadist elements in Burkina Faso. While exact casualty figures and operational details may vary in initial reports, the incident is consistent with the pattern of violence perpetrated by affiliates of Al-Qaeda or the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) in Burkina Faso’s eastern and northern regions. These groups frequently target civilian convoys, markets, and traders, exploiting porous borders and weak state control. For Ghana, a country with significant cross-border commercial activity and a large diaspora engaged in regional trade, such an attack represents a direct threat to its economic interests and citizen safety, transforming a regional security crisis into a domestic political issue.

Ghana’s Security Governance Structure

To understand the critique, one must appreciate Ghana’s constitutional and administrative security framework. According to the 1992 Constitution of Ghana:

• The President is the Commander-in-Chief of the Ghana Armed Forces (GAF).
• The Minister for Defence is a presidential appointee (subject to parliamentary approval) responsible for the overall policy direction, administration, and civilian oversight of the Ministry of Defence and the Ghana Armed Forces (Army, Navy, Air Force).
• The Minister for the Interior is responsible for internal security, overseeing the Ghana Police Service, the Immigration Service, the Prisons Service, and the National Fire Service. Their mandate effectively ends at Ghana’s international borders.
• The Minister for Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration handles diplomatic relations and consular services for citizens abroad.

In a full operational capacity, a substantive Defence Minister acts as the critical link between the President (as Commander-in-Chief), the Chief of Defence Staff, and international defence partners. They are expected to chair high-level security committees, approve major operational directives for the armed forces, and engage in bilateral defence diplomacy. An acting minister or a minister without parliamentary confirmation may have limited authority and political capital to execute these demanding functions, especially in a crisis requiring swift, high-stakes decisions.

Analysis: Evaluating the Core Arguments

The “Substantive Minister” vs. “Caretaker” Distinction

Nitiwul’s insistence on a “substantive” minister is not merely semantic. In Ghanaian political practice, a minister awaiting parliamentary approval or serving in an acting capacity often operates with constraints. They may lack the full confidence of the security establishment, face challenges in committing resources, and have diminished stature in bilateral meetings. During a fast-moving international incident, these limitations can directly impede the kind of assertive, on-the-ground leadership Nitiwul describes—a minister arriving in Ouagadougou with a pre-assembled team of defence intelligence and operational experts to engage the Burkinabe Ministry of Defence and security forces directly. The argument posits that only a fully confirmed minister possesses the unambiguous mandate to make binding commitments or demand coordinated action.

Mandate and Jurisdiction: Defence vs. Interior

Nitiwul’s demarcation between the Defence and Interior ministries is constitutionally and practically sound. The Interior Minister’s domain is internal public order. Once a security incident crosses an international border and involves foreign military or paramilitary actors (as in Burkina Faso, where the state is fighting a terrorist insurgency), the lead naturally shifts to the Defence portfolio. The required engagement is with the Burkinabe Ministry of Defence, Armed Forces, and intelligence services—counterparts who would not engage substantively with an Interior Minister on joint operations or intelligence sharing concerning a cross-border terrorist cell. Furthermore, if Ghanaian citizens were abducted or the incident involved potential military escalation, the legal and operational frameworks invoked would be under defence and national security statutes, not internal policing acts.

The Regional Security Context: Why This Moment is Different

The Sahel region (Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger) has become the epicentre of a violent jihadist insurgency that has killed thousands and displaced millions. The violence has steadily crept southward, with coastal nations like Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, and Benin increasingly facing spillover attacks, kidnappings, and threats. In this context:

• Ghana’s security forces are actively involved in regional training missions and intelligence fusion through the ECOWAS Standby Force and the Accra Initiative (a cooperation framework between Ghana, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, and Togo).
• A substantive Defence Minister is essential to chair these multinational coordination meetings, approve Ghana’s contributions, and receive direct, classified briefings from regional partners.
• The attack on traders is not an isolated criminal act but part of the terrorists’ strategy to disrupt regional economies and project power. A robust, high-level response is required to signal that such acts have diplomatic and security consequences.

Therefore, Nitiwul’s argument that the “heightened security threats” demand a fully empowered Defence Minister is rooted in the observable deterioration of the regional security environment.

Practical Advice: Strengthening Cross-Border Crisis Response

Regardless of the political debate, the incident underscores actionable lessons for Ghana’s national security apparatus:

1. Activate Immediate Consular and Security Protocols: The Foreign Ministry must immediately establish contact with victims/families and the Burkinabe authorities. Simultaneously, the National Security Secretariat, through its intelligence directorates, must task the Defence Intelligence Unit (under the Chief of Defence Staff) to begin gathering open-source and classified information on the perpetrators and the security situation in the affected area.
2. Formal Inter-Agency Crisis Committee: Even without a substantive minister, the President should institute a clear, top-level crisis committee chaired by a designated senior official (e.g., National Security Coordinator) with mandates from the Presidency. This committee must include the Acting Defence Minister, Foreign Minister, Interior Minister, and heads of intelligence agencies to ensure unified action.
3. Expedite Ministerial Appointments: The executive and legislative branches must prioritize the confirmation of a Defence Minister. The prolonged vacancy in this critical portfolio during a regional security crisis is an unnecessary risk that should be rectified through accelerated parliamentary processes.
4. Public Communication Strategy: The government must balance operational security with the public’s right to know. A joint statement from the Presidency and the relevant ministries (even if led by acting ministers) outlining known facts, steps taken, and citizen safety advisories is crucial to managing public anxiety and countering misinformation.
5. Review Bilateral Security Agreements: This incident should prompt a review of existing defence cooperation agreements with Burkina Faso and other neighbours. Are intelligence-sharing protocols timely? Are joint patrols or communication hotlines functional and regularly tested? The Defence Ministry, once fully staffed, must lead this review.

FAQ: Addressing Common Questions

Q1: Is it constitutional for Ghana to operate without a confirmed Defence Minister for an extended period?

A: The Constitution does not specify a maximum timeframe for an acting minister. However, it mandates that presidential appointees must be approved by Parliament. A prolonged vacancy is politically contentious and can be argued to violate the spirit of constitutional governance, which intends for ministries to be led by officials with direct democratic accountability (via parliamentary approval). Operationally, it creates a gap in the chain of command and civilian oversight.

Q2: Could the Interior Minister not handle this situation by coordinating with police in Burkina Faso?

A: Unlikely and inappropriate. The Burkina Faso police and gendarmerie are operating within a counter-terrorism framework under the direction of their Ministry of Defence and military command. The scale and nature of the threat (terrorist assault) are beyond standard criminal policing. Engaging on operational counter-terrorism matters would require a counterpart with equivalent authority over military and defence intelligence, which is the Defence Minister’s role.

Q3: What specific actions should a Defence Minister take in this scenario?

A: A substantive Defence Minister would likely: 1) Immediately consult with the Chief of Defence Staff and Defence Intelligence to assess the threat to Ghanaian interests. 2) Request a high-level meeting with the Burkinabe Defence Minister, potentially accompanied by the Chief of Defence Staff and intelligence chiefs. 3) Discuss joint intelligence sharing, potential support for victim evacuation or investigation, and coordinated border security measures. 4) Report findings and recommendations to the President and the National Security Council. 5) Provide a public briefing on government actions to protect citizens.

Q4: Does this criticism have partisan undertones?

A: The critic, Dominic Nitiwul, is a former minister from the opposition New Patriotic Party (NPP) who held the Defence portfolio under a previous administration. Therefore, the critique is inherently political and must be viewed through that lens. However, the substantive points about institutional roles, the need for leadership during a crisis, and the regional security threat are matters of national security policy that transcend party politics and can be evaluated on their operational merits.

Conclusion: Beyond Politics, A Question of State Capacity

Dominic Nitiwul’s criticism, while delivered in a politically charged context, raises a profound question about state capacity and readiness. It challenges the Ghanaian government to demonstrate that its security architecture is resilient enough to handle transnational threats even when key leadership positions are in flux. The argument hinges on a clear, constitutionally grounded premise: the Defence Ministry is the primary state organ for engaging with military threats and foreign defence establishments. In a region where terrorist groups actively target economic lifelines and national borders, the absence of a fully empowered leader at that ministry’s helm is more than an administrative oversight—it is a potential vulnerability.

The incident in Burkina Faso serves as a stark reminder that national security is not confined by geography. The safety of Ghanaian traders abroad is a direct concern of the state’s defence and foreign policy apparatus. The government’s response—both in terms of immediate operational coordination and long-term strategic leadership—must match the gravity of the threat. Whether this moment will lead to the expedited appointment of a Defence Minister, a clarified crisis response protocol, or simply fade as a political episode remains to be seen. What is undeniable is that in the evolving security landscape of West Africa, perceptions of governmental preparedness and decisive leadership are as crucial as the capabilities of the armed forces themselves. The debate, therefore, is ultimately about the Ghanaian state’s willingness to align its structures with the unyielding demands of a dangerous neighbourhood.

Sources and Further Reading

• Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, 1992. (Chapter Eight: The Executive).
• Ghana Ministry of Defence. Official Mandate and Structure. (Note: Verify current structure on official government portal).
• International Crisis Group. “The Sahel: A Region in Crisis.” Various Reports, 2023-2024.
• African Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS). “West African Security Challenges.” Research Papers.
• ECOWAS Commission. “Action Plan for the Elimination of Terrorism and Violent Extremism.”
• Verified news reports from reputable agencies (e.g., Reuters, AFP, BBC Africa) on the specific Burkina Faso attack on Ghanaian traders and regional security trends.
• Ghana’s National Security Strategy (if publicly available) or relevant White Papers on Defence and Foreign Policy.