E-Transmission in Nigeria: Unpacking the APC’s Paradoxical Stance on Digital Election Results

The debate over the digital transmission of election results, or e-transmission, has become a pivotal issue in Nigeria’s democratic journey. A striking paradox has emerged: the ruling All Progressives Congress (APC), which holds the governorship in 31 of Nigeria’s 36 states, has consistently resisted legislative and institutional moves to mandate the real-time electronic transmission of election results from polling units to collation centers. This position, famously mocked by former Senator Dino Melaye as a sign of fear despite overwhelming political control, has sparked national protests, intense political analysis, and critical questions about the commitment to electoral integrity and transparent elections in Africa’s largest democracy.

This article provides a comprehensive, SEO-optimized, and pedagogical exploration of this controversy. We will move beyond political rhetoric to examine the historical context of Nigeria’s electoral reforms, the technical and legal dimensions of e-transmission, the analysis of the APC’s position, and the practical pathways forward for strengthening public trust in the electoral process. The goal is to foster an informed citizenry and advocate for systems where, as Melaye stated, “votes must count” in a verifiable manner.

Introduction: The Core Paradox of Power and Electoral Reform

In February 2024, former Senator Dino Melaye used his platform on X (formerly Twitter) to highlight a profound contradiction in Nigerian politics. He pointed out that the APC, the party in control of the federal government and a vast majority of state governments, was actively opposing the institutionalization of e-transmission for election results. His quip, “APC is doing e-registration for members, but doesn’t want e-transmission of results. With 31 governors, dem still dey fear,” captured a sentiment of bewilderment among many observers and civil society organizations.

The central question this article addresses is: Why would a politically dominant party exhibit resistance to a technological reform that is widely perceived as enhancing electoral transparency and reducing opportunities for result manipulation? This is not merely a partisan squabble; it gets to the heart of Nigeria’s democratic consolidation. The resistance to e-transmission occurs against the backdrop of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC)‘s stated capabilities and past experiences with technology in elections, ongoing public demonstrations in Abuja, and a Senate that has, to date, declined to amend the Electoral Act 2022 to make real-time transmission mandatory. Understanding this paradox requires a deep dive into the background of Nigeria’s electoral reforms, a clear analysis of the arguments and motivations on all sides, and a consideration of the practical advice for citizens and advocates. The stakes are the credibility of future elections, particularly the 2027 general elections.

Key Points: Summarizing the E-Transmission Debate

Before delving into the details, it is essential to crystallize the key facts and arguments that frame this issue:

The Stated Position of the APC and Senate Majority

• The APC-led Senate Committee on INEC and the Senate leadership have been instrumental in rejecting or stalling amendments to the Electoral Act that would compel INEC to transmit results electronically and in real-time from polling units.
• The official rationale often cited includes concerns about logistical feasibility (network connectivity in remote areas), system security (fear of hacking or system failure), and the purported sufficiency of the current manual collation system with safeguards.
• There is a noted distinction the party makes between e-transmission (sending results digitally) and e-voting (casting votes electronically), with the former being the focus of the current debate.

The Counter-Argument: Civil Society, Opposition, and Reformers

• Proponents, including the Transition Monitoring Group (TMG), YIAGA Africa, and other civil society organizations (CSOs), argue that e-transmission is a critical tool for enhancing result authenticity and curbing election rigging at the point of collation.
• They point to INEC’s successful use of technology for voter registration (e-registration) and the Result Viewing Portal (RVP) in past elections as proof of capability. The RVP allows for upload of results after manual collation at ward/local government levels, but not directly from polling units.
• Advocates view the resistance as a tactic to preserve avenues for result manipulation, especially given the APC’s existing political dominance. The argument is: if you already win, why fear a system that makes your victory more transparent and incontestable?

The Central Paradox

The core paradox, as articulated by critics like Melaye, is this: A party controlling 31 states and the federal apparatus should be the most confident in its electoral appeal and the most eager to lock in a transparent, technology-audited process that would definitively validate its mandate. Its resistance, therefore, is interpreted not as a technical stance, but as a political strategy rooted in insecurity about its popular support and a desire to maintain flexibility in managing electoral outcomes.

Background: The Evolution of Nigeria’s Electoral Technology and Reform

To understand the current impasse, one must trace the historical journey of electoral technology in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic.

The Manual Era and Early Problems (1999-2010)

Nigeria’s return to democracy in 1999 was characterized by entirely manual voting, counting, and collation. This system was plagued by widespread reports of ballot box snatching, result falsification, vote buying, and logistical failures. The credibility of elections was perpetually in question, leading to violent post-election crises, most notably after the 2007 polls. The Electoral Act 2006 made initial provisions for the use of technology, but implementation was weak and inconsistent.

The Introduction of Smart Card Readers and the 2015 Watershed

The major leap came under INEC Chairman Prof. Attahiru Jega. The introduction of the Smart Card Reader (SCR) for the 2015 general elections was a game-changer. The SCR authenticated voters using biometric data (fingerprints) on Permanent Voter Cards (PVCs), drastically reducing multiple voting and impersonation. While not perfect and facing some technical glitches, the 2015 election, which saw the APC’s Muhammadu Buhari defeat incumbent Goodluck Jonathan, was widely hailed as a significant improvement in credibility. This established a precedent: carefully integrated technology could strengthen elections.

The 2022 Electoral Act and the Ambiguous Clause

The most recent major reform was the Electoral Act 2022. After years of advocacy, a clause was inserted (Section 47(2)) that seemed to mandate e-transmission. It stated that INEC “shall” transmit results electronically. However, the final version, after legislative negotiations, included the qualifier “in such manner as may be determined by the Commission.” This ambiguity became the legal battleground. INEC interpreted it as granting it discretion, not obligation, to implement real-time transmission. The Senate, in subsequent committee actions, has consistently sided with the interpretation that the Act does not compel INEC to do so, effectively blocking a mandatory requirement.

INEC’s Current Practice: The Result Viewing Portal (RVP)

Currently, INEC uses a hybrid system. Results are first announced orally at polling units (Form EC.8A), then manually collated at ward, local government, and state levels. Finally, the results are scanned and uploaded to the public Result Viewing Portal (IReV). This allows citizens to see the uploaded images of results sheets hours or days later. The critical gap is the period between the poll closing and the upload—a window where results can be altered during manual collation. Real-time e-transmission would mean the polling unit result is digitally signed and transmitted instantly to a central, publicly accessible database, drastically shrinking this window for manipulation.

Analysis: Deconstructing the APC’s Position and the Implications

The resistance is multi-layered, involving technical, political, and institutional dimensions. A dispassionate analysis separates the stated reasons from the perceived underlying motivations.

The Stated Technical and Logistical Arguments

• Network Coverage: Critics argue this is a red herring. INEC already uses mobile networks for the RVP upload from collation centers, many of which are in similar locations as polling units. Furthermore, technology like satellite-based transmission or offline data storage with batch upload can mitigate connectivity issues. The argument is that if the will exists, technical solutions can be engineered.
• System Security and Hacking: This is a valid concern for any digital system. However, proponents counter that a well-designed, end-to-end encrypted system with multiple verification layers (e.g., digital signatures from polling officers, public key infrastructure) can be more secure than the current manual chain, which is vulnerable to human interference and physical coercion. The global trend is toward securing digital systems, not abandoning them.
• Cost: Implementing a nationwide, resilient real-time system would require investment. Yet, the cost of repeated post-election litigation, violence, and lost public trust arguably outweighs the implementation cost. The APC government has invested heavily in other digital initiatives, suggesting cost is not an absolute barrier when politically desired.

The Perceived Political and Strategic Motivations

This is where the analysis becomes central to Melaye’s accusation. The political utility of a non-real-time system lies in the “collation black box.”

• Management of “Underperforming” Areas: In a close election or in areas where the APC’s popularity is in doubt, state-level collation centers become critical junctures. Delays and “corrections” to polling unit results can be managed. Real-time transmission would expose discrepancies instantly, making such management impossible.
• Preserving Federal and State Leverage: The current system allows state governors and federal appointees significant influence over the final declaration process. A transparent, immediate system decentralizes and democratizes the verification process, empowering citizens and journalists to monitor in real-time, thereby reducing the power of political godfathers.
• Signaling to the Base: Resisting “external” (civil society, opposition) demands for transparency can be framed as defending “national sovereignty” over electoral processes against “foreign-inspired” reforms. It consolidates a narrative of the APC as the defender of Nigerian interests against a meddling elite.
• Fear of a “Loss” Becoming Instant and Undeniable: The most straightforward interpretation of Melaye’s “fear” is this: if the 2027 election is close, and results start showing a trend against the APC in real-time from thousands of polling units, it becomes exponentially harder to overturn. The party may fear that its current dominance in state governments does not equally translate to a guaranteed federal victory in a free, fair, and transparent contest. The resistance is, therefore, an insurance policy against an uncertain electoral future.

The Senate’s Role and the “Implosion” Warning

Melaye’s warning that “implosion is imminent and explosion is guaranteed” suggests he sees the Senate’s stance as a symptom of deeper crisis. The Senate, where the APC holds a majority, is the legislative gatekeeper for electoral reform. Its refusal to pass a clear amendment can be analyzed as:

• Party Discipline: Senators are aligned with the party’s strategic calculation. Supporting e-transmission could be seen as an act of disloyalty if the party high command opposes it.
• Regional and Ethno-Political Calculus: Some senators from regions where the APC is weaker might fear that a transparent system could cement the dominance of other parties in their states, making them reluctant to champion a “national” reform that could harm their local standing.
• Institutional Inertia and Comfort: The existing system, for all its flaws, is a known quantity. It benefits a political class adept at navigating its ambiguities. A new, transparent system introduces uncertainty and reduces their discretionary power.

Practical Advice: What Can Be Done to Advance E-Transmission?

For advocates, CSOs, the media, and concerned citizens, the path forward requires a multi-pronged strategy that addresses both the technical and political dimensions.

1. Reframe the Narrative from “Partisan Demand” to “National Security Imperative”

The debate must be depoliticized. The argument should pivot to national stability. Post-election disputes are a primary source of political violence and instability. E-transmission is not an APC or PDP issue; it is a conflict-prevention mechanism. Frame it as a cost-saving measure for the nation, reducing the billions spent on litigation and the incalculable cost of lost lives and property during electoral violence.

2. Develop and Publicize a Robust, Phase-able Technical Blueprint

Critics must counter the “logistical” argument with a concrete, credible plan. This involves:

• Collaborating with IT Security Experts: Commission a white paper from a consortium of Nigerian and international cybersecurity and election technology experts on a secure, resilient e-transmission architecture tailored to Nigeria’s context. Address hacking concerns head-on with technical specifications.
• Proposing a Phased Rollout: Advocate for starting with a pilot in all 774 Local Government Areas for the next off-cycle election (e.g., governorship elections), with full national implementation by 2027. This mitigates the “big bang” risk argument.
• Highlighting INEC’s Existing Capacity: Constantly reference INEC’s successful deployment of the PVC system (over 90 million voters) and the RVP as evidence of its growing technological competence. The incremental step to real-time polling unit transmission is logical and achievable.

3. Intensify Strategic Litigation and Legislative Advocacy

• Litigation: Support legal actions that seek to interpret the ambiguous Section 47