EX MOSI III: FOREIGN FLEETS SUSPECTED OF PREPARING AFRICAN FISHERIES RESOURCES PLUNDER

Introduction

The geopolitical landscape of the Atlantic and Indian Oceans is shifting, and Africa stands at the epicenter of a new strategic contest. Scheduled for January 2026, the trilateral naval exercise EX MOSI III brings together the naval forces of South Africa, Russia, and China. While officially framed as a routine joint training operation designed to enhance maritime interoperability, a growing chorus of analysts and security experts views these maneuvers through a different lens: as a potential precursor to the systematic plunder of Africa’s vast fisheries resources.

This article provides a comprehensive analysis of the upcoming exercise, the vessels involved, and the historical context of foreign naval presence in African waters. We will explore why the postponement of the drills from November to January 2025 is significant, and how the convergence of Russian and Chinese fleets raises critical concerns regarding Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) fishing, maritime sovereignty, and the environmental security of the African continent.

Key Points

Background

To understand the stakes of EX MOSI III, one must look at the trajectory of the relationship between these foreign powers and the African continent. The exercise is not an isolated event but the third iteration of a military cooperation framework that has been steadily expanding since 2019.

The Evolution of Exercise MOSI

Exercise MOSI (a term derived from the Ndebele word for “rain”) began as a demonstration of South Africa’s willingness to engage with non-Western partners. The previous iteration, Exercise MOSI II, saw the Russian frigate Admiral Gorshkov participating. These exercises are officially categorized as “peacekeeping” and “counter-piracy” operations. However, the strategic pivot of South Africa toward the BRICS bloc (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) has accelerated the depth of these military ties.

The G20 Postponement Context

The initial delay of the exercise was officially attributed to South Africa’s assumption of the G20 presidency. Hosting a major global summit requires immense logistical coordination, particularly regarding airspace control and port security. Pretoria argued that holding a simultaneous naval drill with three other nations would stretch its resources too thin. However, the rescheduling to January 2026 places the exercise immediately following the holiday season, a time when international media attention might be lower, potentially allowing for a more discreet operational buildup.

South Africa’s Strategic Posture

South Africa maintains a policy of non-alignment, which allows it to host military exercises with both Western powers (such as the US and France) and Eastern powers (Russia and China). While this diplomatic balancing act is intended to preserve sovereignty, critics argue that it allows foreign powers to gain intimate knowledge of South African naval capabilities and port infrastructure without contributing to the region’s tangible security needs.

Analysis

The core concern surrounding EX MOSI III is the dual-use nature of naval deployments. While navies are military instruments, they frequently serve as the vanguard for economic interests, particularly in regions with weak maritime enforcement capabilities.

Naval Diplomacy as a Cover for Economic Predation

The arrival of the Russian Stoykiy and Chinese destroyers in South African waters is viewed by many security analysts as a form of “gunboat diplomacy.” However, the danger goes beyond symbolism. Naval vessels provide the perfect cover for mapping the seabed and testing coastal radar systems. By operating alongside the South African Navy, foreign fleets gain access to real-time data on currents, bathymetry, and the operational patterns of local coast guards. This intelligence is invaluable for commercial fishing fleets looking to operate undetected in protected waters.

The Russian “Scientific” Precedent

Russia’s involvement is particularly scrutinized due to its recent activities in the Gulf of Guinea. Since August 2024, vessels operating under the Russian Federal Agency for Fisheries (Rosrybolovstvo)—specifically the Atlantniro and Atlantida—have been conducting what Moscow calls a “Great African Expedition.”

While presented as marine research, these expeditions coincide with a sharp increase in Russian fishing activity in West Africa. Environmental groups argue that this “science” is actually a reconnaissance mission to identify high-density fish stocks, which can then be exploited by Russian trawlers once the political and military groundwork is laid.

The Shadow of the “Dark Fleet”

A critical factor complicating the presence of the Russian fleet is its connection to the “dark fleet.” This term refers to a network of aging tankers and support vessels that operate under obscure ownership structures to bypass sanctions, particularly those related to the war in Ukraine and oil price caps.

The Russian replenishment vessel Yelnya, scheduled to participate in MOSI III, has been identified by maritime intelligence sources as having interacted with this dark fleet. The concern is twofold:

1. Environmental Risk: These vessels often lack proper insurance or maintenance standards. Their presence near the sensitive African coastline poses a significant pollution threat. The recent sinking of the vessel Mersin off Dakar serves as a stark reminder of the environmental cost.
2. Sanctions Evasion: By docking in African ports, these vessels could potentially facilitate illicit financial transfers or logistical support for sanctioned entities, placing African nations in a precarious legal position regarding international compliance.

China’s IUU Fishing Crisis

China’s participation brings a different set of risks. Beijing operates the world’s largest distant-water fishing fleet, estimated at over 17,000 vessels. Reports from the Environmental Justice Foundation (EJF) and other NGOs have consistently highlighted that Chinese fleets are major perpetrators of IUU fishing, particularly in the West African region.

By integrating Chinese naval vessels into exercises with South Africa, critics fear that China is seeking to legitimize its maritime presence and smooth the path for its commercial fishing fleets. The strategy often involves offering infrastructure loans or development aid in exchange for preferential fishing access—a debt-trap diplomacy model that extends to maritime resources.

Maritime Domain Awareness and Intelligence Gathering

EX MOSI III serves as a perfect opportunity for foreign powers to assess the “Maritime Domain Awareness” (MDA) of South Africa and its neighbors. By testing communication protocols and observing how South Africa patrols its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), foreign powers can identify blind spots in the continent’s coastal defense. This intelligence could be used to facilitate illegal transshipments at sea, where catch is transferred from smaller trawlers to mother ships, erasing the evidence of illegal fishing.

Practical Advice

For stakeholders ranging from policymakers to local fishing communities, understanding the implications of EX MOSI III is vital. Here is a breakdown of how different groups should approach this development.

For African Policymakers and Regulators

• Strengthen Port State Measures: Governments must rigorously apply the Port State Measures Agreement (PSMA). This involves denying port access to vessels suspected of IUU fishing. The recent diversion of the Russian flotilla from Senegalese, Guinean, Beninese, and Nigerian ports is a positive sign of regional vigilance that must be maintained.
• Transparency in Agreements: Any bilateral agreements resulting from or coinciding with the exercise must be made public. Secret fishing deals undermine public trust and food security.
• Invest in Coastal Radar: To counter the intelligence gathering by foreign navies, African nations must invest in their own maritime surveillance technology (Vessel Monitoring Systems) to track foreign vessels accurately.

For Local Fishing Communities

• Document Anomalies: Fishermen are often the first to spot illegal foreign vessels. Community-led monitoring programs, supported by mobile technology, can provide crucial data to authorities.
• Collectivize Advocacy: Small-scale fishers should form stronger unions to lobby governments against granting fishing quotas to foreign industrial fleets under the guise of “joint ventures.”

For International Observers and NGOs

• Monitor Satellite Data: Organizations should utilize platforms like Global Fishing Watch to track the movements of the participating vessels (and their associated commercial fleets) before, during, and after the exercise.
• Highlight Environmental Risks: The presence of aging Russian support ships requires continuous environmental risk assessment. Insurance and liability guarantees must be demanded from the host government.

FAQ

Conclusion

EX MOSI III represents a complex intersection of military diplomacy and resource economics. While the participating nations frame the event as a routine exercise in cooperation, the timing, the composition of the fleets, and the historical behavior of Russia and China in African waters suggest a more calculated agenda. The convergence of the Russian “dark fleet,” China’s massive industrial fishing armada, and Iran’s naval assets off the Southern African coast is a development that demands heightened scrutiny.

For Africa, the stakes are high. The continent loses billions of dollars annually to IUU fishing, threatening both food security and economic development. As the January 2026 exercise approaches, it is imperative for African governments to remain vigilant, ensuring that military cooperation does not become a Trojan horse for the plunder of their most vital natural resources. The waters off the Western Cape may be the stage for a naval drill, but the battle being fought is for the future of Africa’s blue economy.