NDC Dual Roles Directive: Fifi Kwetey’s Critique of ‘Greedy’ and ‘Mercenary’ Combatants

Introduction: A Storm Within Ghana’s Opposition Party

In a pivotal moment for internal party democracy, Fifi Fiavi Kwetey, the General Secretary of Ghana’s National Democratic Congress (NDC), has launched a scathing attack on members of his own party who are resisting a new directive on holding dual roles. The directive, aimed at separating governmental appointments from optional party positions, has become a flashpoint for a broader debate on political professionalism, patronage, and organizational integrity within one of Ghana’s largest political entities. Kwetey’s characterization of dissenters as “greedy” and “mercenaries” underscores the high stakes and deep frustrations surrounding this governance issue. This article provides a comprehensive, SEO-optimized analysis of the controversy, unpacking the directive’s specifics, its historical context, the arguments from all sides, and its potential implications for political party management in Ghana and similar democracies.

Key Points: The Core of the NDC Directive Controversy

• The Directive: The NDC’s new internal rule mandates that party executives who accept full-time government appointments (such as ministerial, CEO, or Metropolitan/Municipal/District Chief Executive roles) must either resign from their optional party positions several months before contesting new party offices, or retain their government jobs while relinquishing party finance-related roles.
• The Rationale (Pro-Directive): Proponents, led by General Secretary Kwetey, argue that the demands of a full-time executive government role are incompatible with the daily, ground-level work required for effective party organization. Holding both leads to inefficiency in both spheres.
• The Resistance (Anti-Directive): Some executives oppose the rule, citing historical precedents where individuals successfully held both government and party roles simultaneously. They view the directive as restrictive and unnecessary.
• Kwetey’s Rhetoric: Kwetey has dismissed the resistance, labeling opponents as “greedy” and warning they risk becoming “mercenaries” motivated by personal gain and influence rather than the NDC’s collective success.
• Broader Principle: The NDC frames this not as a new policy but as the reinforcement of a longstanding organizational practice designed to ensure governmental effectiveness while creating opportunities for a wider pool of party members to serve.

Background: The Context of Party-Government Roles in Ghana’s Fourth Republic

Historical Precedents and the Patronage System

Since the inception of Ghana’s Fourth Republic in 1993, the relationship between political parties in government and party organizational structures has been fluid. The two dominant parties, the New Patriotic Party (NPP) and the National Democratic Congress (NDC), have often operated with a degree of overlap between government appointees and party executives. This overlap is sometimes seen as a practical necessity, allowing government ministers to maintain direct connections to the party base that elected them. However, critics have long argued it fosters a system of political patronage, where party loyalty is rewarded with government jobs, and government resources are potentially used for party advantage.

The NDC’s Organizational Philosophy

The NDC, born from a military revolutionary background, has historically emphasized disciplined, centralized organization. Its constitution and internal regulations have always sought to manage the tension between being a government-in-waiting and a mass political movement. The current directive fits within this tradition of attempting to professionalize the party’s structure, especially when in opposition. By insisting on a clear demarcation, the party leadership aims to build a stronger, more sustainable grassroots apparatus that does not depend on the transient presence of government appointees for its vitality.

Analysis: Deconstructing the Arguments and Implications

The “Impossible Task”: Efficiency vs. Dual Allegiance

At the heart of Kwetey’s argument is a fundamental assertion about capacity. He states unequivocally that a ministerial position or a role like a Metropolitan Chief Executive (MCE) is a “full-time” job with immense responsibilities. To simultaneously perform the demanding, hands-on work of a party organiser—organizing ward meetings, mobilizing supporters, resolving local disputes, and fundraising—is, in his view, an “impossible task.”

He illustrates this with a pointed example: referencing a minister who also serves as a national youth organiser. Kwetey suggests that even the individual involved would privately concede the conflict. This speaks to a universal management principle: divided loyalties and overextension lead to diminished returns in both roles. For the government appointee, party work becomes a sporadic, symbolic activity rather than a sustained, strategic effort. For the party, relying on such part-time, high-profile figures stunts the development of dedicated, professional party organizers at the local level.

“Greedy” and “Mercenaries”: The Politics of Rhetoric

Kwetey’s choice of words—”greedy” and “mercenaries”—is deliberately provocative. It frames the opposition not as a legitimate policy debate but as a moral failing. “Greedy” implies an excessive desire to hold onto power, perks, and influence from both the state and the party. “Mercenaries” is an even stronger charge, suggesting these individuals are motivated solely by private gain (salaries, privileges, access) and are willing to fight for their position, but lack true ideological commitment to the NDC’s cause.

This rhetoric serves several purposes: it mobilizes the party base against a perceived elite, justifies a purge of internal opponents under the guise of principle, and attempts to morally delegitimize any argument for dual roles. It shifts the conversation from a practical discussion of organizational design to one of character and loyalty. This is a common tactic in internal party disputes where institutional rules are contested, using moral language to win a bureaucratic battle.

The Pool of Talent Argument

Kwetey’s secondary, more constructive argument is about opportunity. He contends that the NDC, as a mass party with “millions of supporters,” has a vast pool of capable individuals who are denied the chance to serve in party roles because a small cadre of government appointees cling to both sets of positions. By enforcing separation, the party leadership can co-opt new talent, prevent the ossification of power around a few individuals, and build a deeper bench of experienced organizers. This is a classic argument for term limits and rotation in office, applied to the intra-party sphere. It promotes meritocracy and renewal over entrenched incumbency.

Is This Truly a “Longstanding Practice”?

The NDC General Secretary insists the directive is not new but a reinforcement of “longstanding organisational practice.” This claim requires scrutiny. While informal norms against dual roles may have existed, their consistent enforcement is questionable. The very fact that executives are “combatting” the directive suggests such a clear, rigid, and enforced rule is a new or recently revitalized imposition. Historical examples of ministers doubling as party organisers, which opponents cite, indicate the practice was tolerated, if not officially endorsed. The controversy itself reveals a gap between aspirational party rules and actual practice, which the current leadership is now trying to close.

Practical Advice: Lessons for Political Party Management

While specific to the NDC, this controversy offers universal lessons for political parties, especially those navigating the transition between opposition and government or managing internal democracy.

For Party Leaders and Constitution Drafters:

• Clarity is Key: Party constitutions must have unambiguous articles on dual roles, specifying which government positions are incompatible with which party offices. Vague language leads to conflict.
• Sunset Clauses and Transition Rules: Rules should include grace periods (like the “several months” mentioned) to allow for orderly transitions without sudden vacancies.
• Define “Optional” vs. “Statutory” Offices: Clearly distinguish between party roles that are elected by popular vote within the party (which may have stronger mandates) and those that are appointed or optional, as the directive seems to do.

For Government Appointees from Political Parties:

• Prioritize and Delegate: If holding both is temporarily unavoidable, appointees must explicitly delegate their party duties to trusted deputies, making the delegation public and accountable.
• Transparency: Be transparent about the arrangement with both the party hierarchy and the public to avoid accusations of using state resources for party work.
• Know the Rules: Ignorance of party regulations is not a defense. Appointees must understand the constitutional boundaries of their dual capacities.

For Party Members and Grassroots:

• Focus on Systemic Strength: Resist the allure of charismatic, high-profile “big men” who are rarely present. Advocate for rules that build permanent, professional local party structures.
• Evaluate Performance: Hold all leaders, whether in government or party roles, accountable for concrete results in their designated sphere, not for symbolic presence in both.

FAQ: Addressing Common Questions

Q1: Is this directive unique to the NDC?

A: No. Many political parties globally have rules against or limiting dual roles, especially between paid government office and key party executive positions. For example, in the UK, MPs who become ministers typically step down from frontbench roles in their local party associations. The specific enforcement and cultural acceptance vary widely.

Q2: Could this directive weaken the NDC if it’s in government?

A: Potentially, in the short term. It could create a gap between the government and the party’s grassroots machinery, making coordination harder. However, proponents argue it strengthens the party in the long term by creating an independent, robust organizational base not reliant on government patronage, which is crucial when the party returns to opposition.

Q3: What happens to party funding if those in finance roles must step aside?

A: This is a critical operational question. The directive likely targets those in *executive* finance roles (like National or Regional Treasurers) who are also government appointees. The party would need to ensure these roles are filled by full-time party officials or very dedicated volunteers to maintain financial integrity and operational continuity.

Q4: Is Kwetey’s “mercenaries” comment legally defamatory?

A: In the context of heated internal political debate, such rhetoric is often considered “fair comment” or “rhetorical hyperbole” and is protected as free speech, especially if not directed at a specific named individual with malicious intent. Legal defamation would require proving false statements made with negligence or malice that caused reputational harm. Political insults, however harsh, rarely meet this threshold in court.

Conclusion: A Test of Organizational Maturity

The clash ignited by Fifi Kwetey is more than a squabble over party rules; it is a stress test for the NDC’s institutional integrity. His forceful language reveals a leadership determined to assert control and reshape the party’s culture away from a patronage-based model towards a more professionally separated one. The success or failure of this directive will depend on consistent enforcement and the party’s ability to fill the vacuum left by departing dual-role holders with capable, dedicated new blood.

Ultimately, this debate touches on a fundamental question for all political parties in developing democracies: Can they build organizations that are strong enough to win power without becoming so entangled in the spoils of office that they lose their distinct identity, grassroots vitality, and ideological compass? The NDC’s current struggle is a vivid case study in that global challenge.

Sources and Further Reading

• Original Report: Life Pulse Daily. (2026, February 16). “Fifi Kwetey slams combatants of directive on twin roles as ‘greedy’ and ‘mercenaries’.” [Note: Publication date as per original source; verification of this specific article’s availability may be required as it appears to be from a future date in the provided text].
• Constitution of the National Democratic Congress (NDC) of Ghana. (Latest available edition). – For official rules on party offices and eligibility.
• Gyampo, R. A. (2013). The Changing Face of Political Party Finance in Ghana. Ghana Center for Democratic Development. – Provides context on party funding and roles.
• Boafo-Arthur, K. (Ed.). (2006). Voting for Democracy in Ghana: The 1996 and 2000 Presidential and Parliamentary Elections. Freedom Publications. – Offers historical background on Ghana’s party system.
• Lindberg, S. I. (2010