Military Strikes to Dampen Terrorist Use of Drones: Investigations Reach Complex Stage

Introduction

In recent weeks, the Nigerian Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) has intensified its counter‑terrorism efforts against non‑state actors that are increasingly weaponising unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) – commonly known as drones. Maj. Gen. Michael Onoja, Director of Defence Media Operations, confirmed that investigations into how insurgents in the North‑East acquire and deploy these drones have progressed to an advanced, multi‑agency phase. The government’s coordinated response includes targeted military strikes, intelligence‑driven supply‑chain disruption, and legal actions against suspected procurement networks. This article unpacks the latest developments, explains the broader context of drone‑based terrorism in Nigeria, analyses the effectiveness of current countermeasures, offers practical guidance for security stakeholders, and answers frequently asked questions.

Why does this matter for the public, policymakers, and security professionals? Drone‑enabled attacks can strike civilian targets, disrupt critical infrastructure, and undermine the legitimacy of state forces. Understanding the nature of these threats, the investigative process, and the operational steps taken by the Nigerian military is essential for anyone interested in regional security, counter‑terrorism policy, or the evolving landscape of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) warfare.

Key Points

Background

Historical Context of Drone Use by Terrorist Groups in Nigeria

Since 2019, insurgent factions operating in Nigeria’s North‑East – primarily Boko Haram and its splinter, the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) – have begun experimenting with commercial‑grade UAVs for reconnaissance, propaganda, and, in isolated cases, attacks. Reports from the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and Amnesty International highlight at least 12 documented drone sightings in the region, most of which were quad‑copter platforms equipped with cameras and, occasionally, improvised explosive devices (IEDs).

Sources of Drone Acquisition

The supply chain for these UAVs is complex and often opaque. Primary pathways include:

• Illicit imports: Smuggling routes from neighboring countries such as Cameroon, Chad, and Niger, where weak border controls allow the transfer of consumer‑grade drones.
• Local manufacturing: Small workshops in the Lake Chad Basin have reportedly assembled low‑cost UAVs using readily available electronic components.
• Recruitment of technical expertise: Former military personnel or engineers with knowledge of UAV operation can be co‑opted to train insurgents.
• Donations from sympathisers: Some NGOs and diaspora groups have unintentionally supplied drones under the guise of humanitarian assistance.

Legal Framework Governing Drone Use in Nigeria

Nigeria’s aviation law is administered by the Nigerian Civil Aviation Authority (NCAA). The Civil Aviation Act (Cap 23, 2007) prohibits the unauthorised operation of UAVs in controlled airspace without a permit. Violations can result in fines, confiscation of equipment, and criminal prosecution under the Criminal Code Act. Moreover, the use of drones for hostile purposes by non‑state actors contravenes international humanitarian law (IHL) principles of distinction and proportionality, making such actions prosecutable as war crimes under the Rome Statute, should evidence be gathered.

Analysis

Why Military Strikes Are Part of the Countermeasure Strategy

Traditional kinetic operations remain a cornerstone of counter‑terrorism in the North‑East. By conducting strikes against suspected drone‑procurement hubs – such as smuggling depots, clandestine workshops, and training camps – the military aims to degrade the insurgents’ ability to acquire and maintain UAV fleets. This approach aligns with the broader doctrine of “disruption through denial,” which seeks to remove the logistical foundations that enable insurgent technology adoption.

The NDHQ has emphasised that these strikes are calibrated to minimise civilian casualties. According to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), any operation that could affect non‑combatants must comply with the principles of proportionality and necessity. The Nigerian Armed Forces have publicly stated that they are employing precision‑guided munitions and real‑time intelligence to achieve this balance.

The Role of Intelligence and Technical Counter‑UAV Capabilities

Beyond kinetic actions, the military has engaged technical units that specialise in drone detection, jamming, and counter‑measure deployment. These units typically operate under the Directorate of Intelligence (DI) and the Joint Operations Command (JOC). Their tools include:

• Radio‑frequency (RF) monitoring: Identifying control signals to locate launch sites.
• Electro‑optical (EO) sensors: Detecting UAVs via visual and infrared signatures.
• Anti‑UAV jamming systems: Disrupting GPS and communication links to force drones to land or crash.

Maj. Gen. Onoja noted that “businesses with the technical capability to block or disrupt drone operations are already involved in the effort.” This suggests that private‑sector firms, possibly offering commercial anti‑drone services, are being leveraged for rapid deployment of countermeasures in contested zones.

Challenges in Tracking Drone Supply Chains

Investigations have reached a “complex level” because of several intertwined factors:

1. Transnational smuggling networks: Drones can be concealed within cargo shipments of other goods, making customs inspection difficult.
2. Lack of digital traceability: Many consumer drones do not carry embedded tracking devices, complicating forensic analysis of recovered components.
3. Rapid technology diffusion: The low cost of UAVs (often under $500) encourages widespread adoption, even among non‑state actors.
4. Insurgent adaptability: Terrorist groups quickly modify existing platforms, sometimes converting civilian drones into weaponised devices.

To overcome these hurdles, the NDHQ is employing a layered investigative model that combines human intelligence (HUMINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), and open‑source analysis (OSINT). This model is similar to the one used by the United States Department of Defense’s “Counter‑UAV Task Force” in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Impact of Rumors About Soldier Payments at Bauchi Checkpoints

Social‑media posts alleging that soldiers at Bauchi State checkpoints are forced to pay weekly sums to their commanders have circulated widely. Maj. Gen. Onoja categorically labelled these claims as “allegations” and stressed that the military will only act upon verified intelligence. This stance reflects a broader commitment to transparency and the avoidance of baseless accusations that could erode public trust.

If credible evidence emerges, the Nigerian Armed Forces have the legal authority to initiate disciplinary proceedings under the Armed Forces Act, which includes provisions for addressing corruption and coercive practices within the ranks.

Refugee Return as a Security Indicator

The repatriation of Nigerian refugees from Cameroon, announced by Maj. Gen. Onoja, signals that certain communities in the North‑East have regained a degree of safety. While this is a positive development, security analysts caution that the return of displaced persons does not automatically translate into a permanent reduction of drone‑based threats. Ongoing surveillance and community‑based early‑warning systems remain essential to prevent insurgent groups from exploiting the re‑population of previously insecure areas.

Practical Advice

For Security Agencies and Policymakers

1.Enhance inter‑agency coordination: Formalise joint task‑force structures that combine the NDHQ, the Nigerian Civil Aviation Authority, the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), and the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) to share intelligence on drone procurement.

2.Deploy anti‑UAV technologies: Integrate RF‑jamming and EO‑sensor suites at high‑risk checkpoints, refugee transit points, and critical infrastructure sites. Conduct regular drills to ensure rapid response times.

3.Strengthen legal frameworks: Update the Civil Aviation Act to explicitly criminalise the use of drones for hostile purposes, and ensure prosecutors have the capacity to handle UAV‑related evidence.

4.Invest in forensic analysis: Establish a dedicated laboratory for UAV component analysis, similar to the US Department of Defense’s UAV forensics program, to trace origins and identify procurement patterns.

5.Promote public awareness: Launch campaigns that educate civilians on the dangers of drone sightings and the procedures for reporting suspicious UAV activity to authorities.

For Civil Society and Media

1.Verify information before dissemination: Use official channels (e.g., NDHQ press releases, verified government social‑media accounts) to confirm claims about soldier payments or other allegations.

2.Support community‑based monitoring: Encourage local NGOs to develop “drone‑watch” networks that can quickly alert security forces to unauthorised UAV flights.

3.Advocate for transparency: Request periodic briefings from the NDHQ on the status of investigations and the outcomes of counter‑UAV operations.

For International Partners

1.Share best practices: Provide training on counter‑UAV tactics, especially those involving electronic warfare and signal‑interception, to Nigerian technical units.

2.Assist with equipment: Offer portable anti‑drone kits that can be deployed in remote or mobile operations, ensuring they comply with Nigerian export‑control regulations.

3.Facilitate intelligence exchange: Establish secure channels for sharing satellite imagery and open‑source data on suspected drone procurement routes across the Lake Chad Basin.

FAQ