NDC Sanctions Explained: Why the Party Can Reprimand but Not Prosecute

Introduction: The Boundaries of Political Party Power

In the complex ecosystem of democratic governance, political parties serve as the fundamental building blocks for political participation and leadership selection. However, their internal mechanisms for enforcing discipline and ethical conduct are often misunderstood. A pivotal statement by Mustapha Gbande, Deputy General Secretary of Ghana’s National Democratic Congress (NDC), has brought this issue into sharp focus. Following allegations of vote-buying and inducements during the party’s February 7, 2026, parliamentary primaries, Gbande clarified a critical limitation: the NDC can publicly reprimand members found culpable but possesses no inherent power to prosecute them criminally or impose penalties beyond its constitutional mandate. This declaration sparks a vital conversation about the scope of political party sanctions, the separation between internal party rules and national law, and the challenges of curbing electoral malpractice from within. This article provides a clear, pedagogical breakdown of Gbande’s explanation, the legal framework governing party discipline, and the broader implications for democratic integrity in Ghana and beyond.

Key Points: Decoding Gbande’s Core Arguments

During an interview on Joy News’ PM Express, Mustapha Gbande articulated several non-negotiable premises regarding the NDC’s response to the inducement allegations. These key points form the backbone of the party’s official stance and highlight the structural constraints it faces.

The Primacy of the Party Constitution

Gbande repeatedly anchored the party’s actions to its internal constitution. He argued that the described conduct—delegates receiving televisions and cash—was deemed “inappropriate” but was not explicitly codified as a specific, punishable offense within the NDC’s foundational document. “Because, again, if it was captured in our Constitution, I’m sure that it would have been given a different description,” he stated. This underscores a core principle: party disciplinary actions must be explicitly authorized by the party’s own rules. Without a specific constitutional provision defining vote-buying as an expellable offense, the party’s highest sanction is a reprimand.

The Distinction Between Party and State

Gbande’s most definitive assertion was the categorical separation of roles. “Can you go beyond reprimand when the conduct is inappropriate? No, unless we want to assume the role of a state institution, which we don’t have that capacity,” he said. Here, he draws a bright line: the functions of investigation, prosecution, and penalization under criminal law are the exclusive preserve of state institutions like the police and the judiciary. A political party, regardless of its size or power, is a voluntary association, not a sovereign entity with prosecutorial authority.

The “Reset Agenda” and a Tangible Outcome

In response to criticism that “nothing happened,” Gbande pointed to the case of Baba Jamal, a senior government appointee and ambassador who was a candidate in the primaries. He stated that President John Dramani Mahama (in his capacity as party leader and former head of state) reprimanded Jamal. Gbande linked this to the party’s “reset agenda,” which he claimed established a new code of conduct for government appointees. This was presented as the most severe consequence possible within the party’s reach—a direct reprimand from the highest leadership for violating the spirit, if not the explicit letter, of party ethics.

A Call for Industry-Wide Reform

Gbande framed the NDC’s public acknowledgment of the problem and its internal discussions as a precedent-setting effort. “It hasn’t happened in the history of this country,” he claimed, suggesting the party’s vocal stance was a drastic and commendable first step. He then challenged other political parties to adopt similar transparency and internal reform measures, implying that the onus for clean politics extends beyond one party to the entire political class.

Background: The February 7, 2026, NDC Primaries and the Allegations

To understand the significance of Gbande’s remarks, one must contextualize them within the events of the NDC’s internal elections. Held on February 7, 2026, these primaries were intended to select the party’s parliamentary candidates for the upcoming general election. The process, however, was immediately clouded by widespread reports and visual evidence suggesting a culture of inducement. Delegates, who hold the sole vote to select candidates, were reportedly offered cash payments, consumer goods like television sets, and other material incentives in exchange for their support.

These allegations struck at the heart of internal party democracy, transforming a candidate selection process into what many observers characterized as an auction. The public nature of the claims, amplified by social media videos, forced the NDC’s leadership into a reactive posture. The central question became: what tools does the party possess to investigate these claims and impose meaningful sanctions on candidates and delegates who violated the spirit, if not the rules, of fair play? Mustapha Gbande’s interview was the most comprehensive public attempt to answer that question, and its premises reveal the inherent weaknesses in relying solely on internal party mechanisms to police electoral finance.

Analysis: The Legal and Structural Limits of Party Discipline

Gbande’s explanation is not merely a defense of inaction; it is a candid admission of the legal and constitutional architecture that defines a political party’s power. A deeper analysis reveals why his statements are likely accurate, albeit politically damaging, and what they expose about the ecosystem of political finance.

The Voluntary Association Doctrine

In legal terms, a political party is typically structured as a voluntary association or an unincorporated society. Its authority flows from its constitution and the consent of its members. It does not possess ultra vires powers—authority beyond what its founding documents grant. Therefore, if the NDC Constitution does not stipulate that offering inducements to delegates is an offense punishable by suspension or expulsion, the National Executive Committee or any disciplinary committee would be acting unlawfully if it imposed such a penalty. The principle of natural justice (audi alteram partem—hear the other side) also demands clear, pre-existing rules. This is the bedrock of Gbande’s “constitution” argument.

The State’s Monopoly on Legitimate Force and Prosecution

Gbande’s reference to not assuming the role of a “state institution” touches on a foundational concept in political science: the state’s monopoly on the legitimate use of force, as described by Max Weber. This monopoly extends to the criminal justice system. Only the state, through its police, prosecutors, and courts, can determine that an act constitutes a crime (like bribery or corruption under Ghana’s Criminal Code) and impose state-sanctioned penalties (fines, imprisonment). A political party can investigate a breach of its *internal* rules, but it cannot investigate or punish a breach of *national* law. If the inducements constitute a criminal offense, the appropriate channel is a police report and prosecution by the Attorney-General’s department. The NDC, lacking investigative and prosecutorial arms, cannot bridge this gap.

The Challenge of “Unwritten Rules” and Ethical Norms

The crux of the issue lies in conduct that is ethically reprehensible but not explicitly forbidden. The NDC leadership clearly views vote-buying as “inappropriate conduct” that undermines party integrity. However, without a specific constitutional clause, they are hamstrung. This exposes a common flaw in party constitutions: they often focus on procedural disputes (e.g., filing deadlines, delegate eligibility) rather than substantive ethical violations like financial inducement. Amending a party constitution is a deliberate, often cumbersome process, usually requiring a delegates’ conference. This creates a lag between emerging unethical practices and the rules designed to curb them.

Comparative Perspective: How Do Other Parties Handle This?

Gbande’s call for other parties to follow suit invites comparison. In many established democracies, major parties have robust, detailed codes of conduct with explicit sanctions for “bribery and corruption” in internal elections. For example, the UK’s Labour Party and Conservative Party have rules that can lead to the suspension or expulsion of members found guilty of “undue influence” or “corrupt practices.” Their disciplinary committees are often independent and have clearer mandates. However, even these parties are limited to internal sanctions (like banning someone from holding office or voting in internal polls). They, too, cannot prosecute members under criminal law. The real deterrent in such systems is often the combination of strict internal rules *and* a robust, independent electoral commission or ethics body with the power to investigate and refer cases for criminal prosecution. Ghana’s Electoral Commission has a mandate over public elections, but its authority over internal party primaries is more limited, creating a regulatory vacuum.

The Political Cost of the “Reprimand-Only” Stance

While legally sound, the “we can only reprimand” argument carries significant political risk. It can be perceived as a weak excuse for tolerating a rotten culture, especially by grassroots members and the public. It signals that the party’s internal democracy is fragile and that financial muscle, not ideas or loyalty, can sway outcomes. The reprimand of Baba Jamal, while a concrete action, may be seen as symbolic if he retains his ambassadorial position and influence. The lack of transparent, public disciplinary proceedings against other implicated candidates or delegates fuels the narrative of a lack of accountability. This can demotivate honest candidates and delegates, and erode public trust in the party’s commitment to clean politics.

Practical Advice: Strengthening Internal Party Democracy and Sanctions

Given the inherent limits of voluntary associations, what can political parties like the NDC do to more effectively combat vote-buying and strengthen their disciplinary frameworks? The following advice is based on best practices from party reform advocates and comparative political science.

1. Constitutionally Codify Electoral Offenses

The most critical step is a constitutional amendment. The party constitution should explicitly define “electoral malpractice” in internal elections. This must include: offering, giving, or receiving any monetary or material benefit to influence a vote; using state resources for campaign purposes (for government appointees); and intimidation or coercion. Each offense should be linked to a clear, graduated scale of sanctions, ranging from formal reprimand, to suspension from party offices and primaries, to full expulsion and disqualification from future candidacy. This removes ambiguity and provides a legal basis for strong action.

2. Establish an Independent and Empowered Disciplinary Committee

The body that hears these cases must be perceived as independent. It should be composed of respected, senior party members not currently running for office, possibly with co-opted independent legal or civil society experts. Its procedures must be transparent, with clear rules of evidence, the right to respond for the accused, and published findings (while respecting privacy). It must have the autonomy to initiate investigations based on credible evidence, not just wait for formal complaints.

3. Implement Proactive Monitoring and Transparency During Primaries

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