OccupyGhana’s Crusade: Why Criminalizing Intra-Party Vote Buying is Critical for Ghana’s Democracy

In a robust reaffirmation of its commitment to electoral integrity, the Ghanaian civil society organization OccupyGhana has intensified its advocacy for the criminalization of vote-buying during internal political party elections, or primaries. This campaign targets a persistent and corrosive practice that, according to the group, normalizes corruption at the very foundation of the country’s democratic process. Their central argument is stark: while national elections are governed by stringent laws against electoral malpractice, a dangerous legal vacuum exists during party primaries, allowing the “mercenarization” of candidate selection through financial inducements. This comprehensive analysis explores the multifaceted implications of this issue, OccupyGhana’s proposed legal remedy, and why this fight is pivotal for the future health of Ghanaian governance.

Introduction: The Erosion of Democratic Foundations

Ghana’s democracy, often celebrated as a beacon of stability in West Africa, rests on the principle of free and fair elections. However, a growing concern is the perceived commodification of the candidate selection process within political parties. OccupyGhana, a prominent advocacy group, posits that the unchecked practice of distributing cash and material goods to secure delegate votes in primaries is not a mere party internal affair but a direct assault on democratic legitimacy. Their renewed call to action, articulated in a formal petition dated February 9, 2026, urges key state actors—including the Attorney-General, Majority and Minority Leaders, the Speaker of Parliament, the Electoral Commission Chair, and the Special Prosecutor—to urgently amend the law. The goal is to close a loophole that permits a form of corruption which, if left unchecked, guarantees that the corruption endemic in public office begins at the candidate selection stage.

Key Points: Core Arguments and Demands

OccupyGhana’s position is built on several interconnected pillars, each highlighting a different dimension of the problem and its proposed solution.

The Normalization of Corruption

The group asserts that the frequent allegations of vote-buying in primaries have led to its “normalization.” This normalization desensitizes the public and political actors to the unethical and illegal nature of the act, embedding it as an expected cost of political participation. When financial power becomes the primary determinant of who represents a party, merit, competence, and ideological alignment are systematically displaced.

The Legal Vacuum and Its Consequences

While the Representation of the People Act, 1992 (Act 279) and the Criminal Offences Act, 1960 (Act 29) contain provisions against bribery and corruption, their application to the specific context of intra-party elections is ambiguous and rarely prosecuted. This creates a de facto exception. OccupyGhana argues that this exception turns primaries into unregulated marketplaces where candidates with vast resources, often acquired questionably, can purchase delegate loyalty, thereby distorting the political landscape long before the general electorate votes.

The Proposed Institutional Solution: The Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP)

A central and innovative demand is that the exclusive mandate to investigate and prosecute intra-party electoral crimes be vested in the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), not the Attorney-General’s office. Their reasoning is threefold:

• Perceived Independence: Since these offenses are inherently political and involve powerful party figures, assigning them to the Attorney-General—a political appointee and member of the Executive—creates an unavoidable perception of conflict of interest or political interference. The OSP, established by the Office of the Special Prosecutor Act, 2017 (Act 959), is designed as an independent institution to prosecute specific corruption-related offenses without political control.
• Specialized Expertise: The OSP possesses specialized skills and resources for conducting complex financial investigations, tracing illicit money flows, and building corruption cases—expertise crucial for unpacking the sophisticated transactional networks often involved in modern vote-buying schemes.
• Deterrence Through Independence: Prosecutorial independence is seen as the only credible path to meaningful deterrence. The knowledge that an apolitical, specialized body will investigate and prosecute such acts would, in theory, discourage candidates and delegates from engaging in the practice.

Primaries as Public Functions

OccupyGhana forcefully counters the notion that primaries are purely private party matters. They argue that because primaries are the exclusive mechanism for selecting candidates who will contest for public offices (Presidency, Parliament, Local Government), they are de facto public functions. The public has a vested interest in ensuring these selection processes are not corrupted by money. Distorting them with financial inducements, the petition states, “ensures that corruption is entrenched at the earliest possible level of government formation.”

Background: Ghana’s Electoral Landscape and the Primaries Problem

To understand the gravity of OccupyGhana’s petition, one must contextualize it within Ghana’s constitutional and political framework.

The Constitutional and Legal Framework

Ghana’s 1992 Constitution establishes a multi-party democratic system. Political parties are central to this system, and Article 55 enshrines their right to exist and operate. The Electoral Commission of Ghana (EC) is constitutionally mandated to register political parties and, under the Political Parties Act, 2000 (Act 574), to supervise their internal elections to ensure they conform to their own constitutions and the law. However, the EC’s oversight of primaries is often limited to procedural compliance (e.g., voter register, voting logistics) rather than substantive monitoring for corrupt practices like vote-buying. The primary legal instruments against bribery are found in Act 29 (e.g., Section 149 on influence peddling, Section 239 on corruption by a person in a public or private capacity) and Act 279. Yet, the explicit application of these statutes to the internal, pre-election contests of political parties remains legally untested and ambiguous.

The Historical Normalization of Patronage

Patron-client relationships and the distribution of favors for political support have historical roots in many societies, including Ghana. What OccupyGhana identifies is the evolution of this into a large-scale, monetized, and open practice during primaries. Reports from past primaries across various parties frequently include allegations of candidates distributing cash, food items, clothing, and other goods to delegates. The 2023-2024 political season, particularly the National Democratic Congress (NDC) primaries for the Ayawaso East constituency by-election (held in early 2026 as per the article’s timeline), was reportedly marred by such allegations, serving as the immediate catalyst for this renewed petition.

The Role and Mandate of the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP)

Established in 2018, the OSP is an independent prosecution agency with a specific mandate to investigate and prosecute cases of corruption and corruption-related offenses, including those involving public officers and persons with a “significant public function.” Its independence from the Attorney-General is designed to insulate it from political influence. OccupyGhana’s argument is that the corrupt selection of candidates for public office is a “corruption-related offense” that has a “significant public function” implication, thus squarely falling within the OSP’s ambit. They seek a legislative clarification or amendment to explicitly place intra-party electoral corruption under this specialized jurisdiction.

Analysis: Deconstructing the Threat and the Proposed Remedy

The issue extends beyond a simple legal gap; it strikes at the core of political accountability, party institutional strength, and national development.

The Vicious Cycle of Monetized Politics

When vote-buying becomes standard in primaries, it initiates a destructive cycle. First, it raises the financial barriers to entry for political office, favoring wealthy candidates or those with access to illicit funds or powerful backers. Second, the “elected” candidate, having incurred significant debt to financiers and delegates, enters public office with a primary objective of recouping investments—often through state resource allocation, corrupt contracts, or policy manipulation. This directly fuels grand corruption in government. Third, it disincentivizes issue-based politics and ideological development within parties, as candidates compete on their ability to distribute patronage, not on policy platforms. Finally, it erodes public trust in the entire political system, fueling apathy and cynicism.

Why the Attorney-General’s Office is Problematic

Assigning prosecution of intra-party electoral crimes to the Attorney-General (AG) presents a structural conflict. The AG is a member of the President’s cabinet and the chief legal advisor to the Executive. In a system where the ruling party’s internal elections are often the most consequential (as they produce the government’s candidates), having the AG decide on prosecutions creates an undeniable conflict. Even if a case is pursued impartially, the perception of political interference would be overwhelming, undermining the rule of law. This is not a mere theoretical concern; in many democracies, mechanisms like independent electoral commissions or special prosecutors are established precisely to insulate politically sensitive processes from partisan control.

The OSP: A Viable but Challenged Solution

While logically sound, the proposal to task the OSP faces hurdles:

• Jurisdictional Clarity: The OSP’s Act would likely require amendment to explicitly include “offenses relating to elections to public office” or “intra-party electoral offenses” within its purview. This is a legislative act requiring majority support in Parliament, which may be politically difficult if the ruling party benefits from the status quo.
• Resource Constraints: The OSP is already tasked with a massive caseload of high-profile corruption investigations. Adding a new category of politically sensitive crimes would require significant additional resources, personnel, and political backing to be effective.
• Enforcement Culture: Even with jurisdiction, successful prosecution depends on evidence gathering, witness testimony (often from intimidated delegates), and judicial processes. Changing a deeply ingrained political culture requires more than just a change in prosecuting authority; it needs consistent, fearless application of the law over time.

The “Public Function” Argument

OccupyGhana’s strongest legal premise is that primaries are a “public function.” This is a nuanced but critical point. While parties are private associations, the act of selecting candidates for state-paid offices (MPs, President, MCEs/DCEs) is a quasi-public act with profound public consequences. International norms, such as those from the UN Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC), encourage states to ensure the integrity of the process for selecting candidates for public office. By framing intra-party vote-buying as corruption that taints the public function of candidate selection, the argument for state intervention and specialized prosecution is significantly strengthened.

Practical Advice: What Can Be Done?

Criminalization and specialized prosecution are top-down legal solutions. However, a sustainable fight against intra-party vote-buying requires multi-stakeholder action.

For Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) like OccupyGhana

• Sustained Advocacy: Maintain public pressure through media campaigns, policy dialogues, and direct engagement with Parliament’s Justice Committee and the OSP.
• Legal Litigation: Explore test cases, potentially supporting delegates or aggrieved candidates to challenge the legality of specific primary outcomes or to force the AG/OSP to act on specific, well-documented allegations.
• Evidence Documentation: Systematically document and verify allegations of vote-buying through field research, delegate interviews (anonymized), and financial analysis to build a robust evidence base for advocacy and potential prosecution.

For Political Parties Themselves

• Internal Democratic Reforms: Parties must strengthen their internal constitutions and electoral codes of conduct. This includes explicit, severe sanctions (disqualification, expulsion) for candidates and delegates proven to engage in vote-buying, enforced by credible internal disciplinary committees.
• Delegate Selection Reform: Move away from a solely delegate-based system to more participatory primaries (e.g., electoral college, one-member-one-vote) where the pool of voters is larger and vote-buying becomes logistically and financially prohibitive.
• Transparency in Funding: Implement and enforce strict internal regulations on campaign financing for primaries, requiring disclosure of sources and expenditures, even if not yet mandated by state law.

For the Media

• Investigative Reporting: Move beyond reporting allegations to investigating and publishing evidence of the mechanics of vote-buying schemes (e.g., “suitcase” money, pre-paid cards, material distribution logistics).
• Naming and Shaming: Consistently highlight the names of candidates and delegates involved in proven cases, making the practice socially and politically costly.
• Public Education: Run segments explaining why vote-buying is not a “normal” or “harmless” political practice but a corrupt act that steals the people’s voice.

For Citizens and Delegates

• Reject Inducements: Delegates must understand that accepting cash or gifts for a vote is not a “perk” but a corrupt act that sells their conscience and the nation’s future. They are the primary line of defense.
• Whistleblowing: Safely report instances of vote-buying to party executives, the Electoral Commission, the OSP, or CSOs. Anonymous reporting mechanisms must be trusted and utilized.
• Vote on Merit: Consciously evaluate candidates based on their track record, competence, vision, and integrity, not on the size of their distribution list.

FAQ: Addressing Common Questions

Is vote-buying already illegal in Ghana?

General laws against bribery and corruption (Criminal Offences Act) exist. However, their explicit and consistent application to the specific act of offering money or gifts for votes in a political party’s primary election is legally ambiguous and has not been systematically tested or enforced. There is no specific statute that states, “It is a criminal offense to buy or sell votes in a political party primary.” This legal gap is what OccupyGhana seeks to close.

Why can’t parties handle this themselves through their own disciplinary committees?

Parties have a primary responsibility, but their mechanisms are often inconsistent, lack independence, and are subject to internal political manipulation. High-profile candidates accused of vote-buying are rarely, if ever, punished by their own party’s committee, especially if they are powerful or aligned with the party leadership. State-level criminal sanctions are necessary to provide an external, impartial, and deterrent check that internal mechanisms cannot reliably provide.

Wouldn’t giving the OSP this power make it too