Political Events Can Finish Vote-Buying Through Disqualifying Offenders – Barker-Vormawor

Introduction: The Persistent Scourge of Electoral Corruption in Ghana

Electoral corruption, particularly the practice of vote-buying during party primaries, remains a deeply entrenched and damaging phenomenon in Ghana’s democratic landscape. This practice undermines the integrity of candidate selection, erodes public trust in political institutions, and ensures that financial power, rather than merit or popular support, often determines political representation. In a powerful and pragmatic analysis, constitutional lawyer and Democracy Hub convener Oliver Barker-Vormawor has proposed a concrete, actionable solution that places the power to effect change squarely within the hands of political parties themselves. Speaking on Joy News’s Newsfile program, Barker-Vormawor asserted that political events (parties) possess the complete mechanism to finish delegate vote-buying but are often reluctant to relinquish the unfair electoral advantage it confers. His core proposition is a radical shift in strategy: instead of focusing solely on curbing the demand for cash from delegates, parties should implement a robust and non-negotiable policy of automatic disqualification for any candidate proven to engage in offering inducements. This, he argues, would incentivize candidates to police each other, transforming them into “spies on themselves” and creating a self-enforcing system of electoral integrity. This article will explore the context of Barker-Vormawor’s remarks, dissect the structural advantages that perpetuate vote-buying, analyze the legal and constitutional framework, and provide a detailed roadmap for how political parties can operationalize his suggested disqualification mechanism to finally break the cycle of delegate corruption.

Key Points: Barker-Vormawor’s Prescription for Eradicating Vote-Buying

Oliver Barker-Vormawor’s intervention provides a clear framework for understanding and solving the problem of intra-party vote-buying. The following key points distill his central arguments and proposed solution:

1. The Problem is Solvable by the Perpetrators

The political parties themselves are not victims without recourse; they are the primary architects and beneficiaries of the current system. They hold all the rules and disciplinary power necessary to stop vote-buying but often lack the political will because the practice advantages certain candidates, particularly incumbents.

2. The Incumbency Advantage is the Core Driver

Incumbency provides unparalleled access to state resources, machinery, and financing channels that opposition candidates cannot legally or practically match. This structural imbalance creates a desperate playing field where vote-buying becomes a tool for incumbents to secure their position, and they are unwilling to surrender this advantage.

3. Focus on the Supply Side, Not Just Demand

Traditional approaches focus on educating delegates against demanding money (the demand side). Barker-Vormawor argues this is ineffective. The more viable strategy is to aggressively target and punish the supply side—the candidates who offer cash, goods, or services in exchange for votes.

4. The Self-Policing Mechanism via Disqualification

The innovative solution is a strict, publicly declared rule: any candidate caught offering any form of inducement will be automatically disqualified. This rule would incentivize rival candidates to gather and present evidence against each other to the party’s disciplinary committee, as eliminating a competitor becomes strategically beneficial. Candidates become internal watchdogs.

5. Constitutional Limits Place Responsibility on Parties

Due to the separation of powers and the coequal status of Ghana’s branches of government, the Supreme Court cannot compel Parliament to legislate on this specific internal party matter. Therefore, the onus is on the parties themselves, as voluntary associations, to enact and enforce these rules within their constitutions and primary regulations.

Background: The Ayawaso East Catalyst and Ghana’s Vote-Buying Culture

Barker-Vormawor’s comments were sparked by a specific, high-profile incident that brought the issue of delegate vote-buying into the national spotlight: the New Patriotic Party (NPP) parliamentary primary in the Ayawaso East constituency on February 7, 2026. The controversy centered on candidate Mohammed Baba Jamal Ahmed.

The Ayawaso East Incident: Evidence and Fallout

Video evidence emerged showing Baba Jamal distributing 32-inch television sets to delegates and distributing boiled eggs to constituents. This blatant visual evidence of what appeared to be a vote-buying scheme triggered widespread public outrage and formal investigations by the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), the independent body tasked with investigating corruption-related offenses. The incident occurred against the backdrop of a by-election necessitated by the death of the sitting MP, Mahama Naser Toure, on January 4, 2026. Despite the evidence and popular condemnation, the NDC’s disciplinary committee ultimately cleared Baba Jamal to contest the March 3 by-election, a decision that was widely criticized as a failure of internal governance and a missed opportunity to assert a zero-tolerance stance.

The Systemic Nature of Delegate Vote-Buying

This case is not an anomaly but a symptom of a systemic issue. In Ghana’s delegated electoral system for party primaries, a relatively small group of delegates—often local party executives and activists—holds the power to select parliamentary and presidential candidates. This creates a concentrated market where candidates, especially those facing an incumbent or a well-funded opponent, feel immense pressure to “incentivize” these delegates. The practice is an open secret, ranging from direct cash payments (“suitcase” politics) to the distribution of consumer goods, food items, or promises of future appointments. It distorts representation, as candidates who win through such means often feel indebted to a small, paid-for group rather than the broader constituency, and it raises the financial barrier to entry for politics, excluding competent but less-wealthy citizens.

Analysis: Why Previous Efforts Fail and the Disqualification Solution

Understanding why vote-buying persists requires analyzing the incentives for both the “sellers” (delegates) and the “buyers” (candidates), and why party-led reforms have been half-hearted. Barker-Vormawor’s analysis cuts to the heart of the matter.

The Incumbency Advantage and Reluctance to Reform

As Barker-Vormawor states, “Being in power means that it has access to machinery and financing that other people who are not in government cannot do. Because of that advantage, they do not want to let it go.” Incumbent MPs and government appointees seeking re-nomination have a massive, often illicit, resource advantage. They can leverage state resources—from public vehicles to district assembly funds—and have easier access to wealthy donors seeking government contracts or favors. For them, the existing system, where vote-buying is a tolerated cost of doing business, is highly beneficial. Any reform that levels the playing field, such as strict enforcement against vote-buying, threatens their grip on power. Consequently, even when parties publicly decry the practice, their disciplinary bodies often fail to act decisively against powerful or well-connected offenders, as seen in the Ayawaso East case.

The Ineffectiveness of Demand-Side Interventions

Many anti-corruption campaigns focus on moral suasion: educating delegates on the civic duty to vote without expectation of reward. While valuable, this approach is insufficient against the material realities of poverty and the calculated strategies of candidates. It places the burden of integrity on the often economically vulnerable delegate, while the candidate with the deepest pockets can still “outbid” the market for loyalty. The demand will persist as long as the supply is readily available and risk-free.

The Constitutional and Legal Impasse

Barker-Vormawor correctly identifies a critical legal constraint. Ghana’s 1992 Constitution establishes a separation of powers with independent legislative, executive, and judicial branches. The Supreme Court’s power of judicial review does not extend to ordering Parliament to create a specific law governing internal party primaries. Such regulation is generally considered a matter for the parties’ own constitutions and the Electoral Commission’s guidelines, within the broad framework of the Constitution. Therefore, a top-down, judicial mandate is unlikely. The solution must come from within the parties themselves, through amendments to their constitutions and the rigorous enforcement of existing codes of conduct. This is a “soft law” area where voluntary compliance is the only viable path.

How the Self-Policing Disqualification Mechanism Would Work

The genius of Barker-Vormawor’s proposal lies in its game-theoretic design. It changes the strategic calculus for every candidate:

• Clear, Public Rule: The party’s National Executive Committee (NEC) or a dedicated primary committee must pass and publicize a regulation well before the nomination period. It states: “Any candidate, their agents, or assigns, found by a preponderance of evidence to have offered, given, or promised any gift, money, goods, service, or future benefit to a delegate or voter in connection with the primary election shall be automatically disqualified from contesting the primary. The decision of the disciplinary committee on this matter shall be final and not subject to internal appeal.”
• Incentivized Reporting: Candidates are allowed (and perhaps even encouraged) to submit formal complaints with evidence (videos, audio, photos, witness statements) against their rivals to the committee. The committee must investigate promptly.
• Swift and Certain Sanction: Upon a prima facie case, the accused candidate is suspended pending investigation. If the committee finds the evidence credible, disqualification is automatic and immediate. The slot is then offered to the next highest vote-getter from the previous election or decided by consensus, preventing a “win by default” that could also be tainted.
• Collective Enforcement: No single candidate needs to bear the full cost of enforcement. The system turns the entire candidate pool into an enforcement network. The threat of being reported by multiple rivals makes the cost of attempting to buy votes prohibitively high compared to the potential benefit of winning a disqualified opponent’s support.

This system internalizes the enforcement cost and leverages competitive ambition to achieve a public good: clean primaries.

Practical Advice: A Roadmap for Political Parties to Implement Change

For Barker-Vormawor’s proposal to move from theory to practice, political parties must undertake deliberate and courageous institutional reforms. Here is a step-by-step guide for party leadership, reform-minded members, and civil society advocates seeking to pressure for change.

Step 1: Constitutional and Regulatory Amendment

The starting point is the party’s constitution and the specific regulations governing primaries. A special convention or congress must be convened to amend Article X (Elections) to include a new clause: “Prohibition of Corrupt Practices and Automatic Disqualification.” The language must be unambiguous, leaving no room for discretionary leniency. It should define “inducement” broadly to include cash, gifts, favors, promises of employment or contracts, and even the provision of food, drinks, or transportation with the intent to influence a vote. The amendment must also establish a fast-track, independent Primary Disciplinary Committee (PDC) with terms of reference focused solely on