OSP Ghana Under Pressure: Parliamentary Warning on Performance and Accountability

Introduction: A Stark Warning to Ghana’s Anti-Corruption Agency

A leading figure in Ghana’s Parliament has issued a pointed warning to the nation’s primary anti-corruption body, the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP). Rockson-Nelson Dafeamekpor, the Majority Chief Whip and Member of Parliament for South Dayi, stated that while Parliament is currently refraining from taking harsh measures, the OSP must significantly enhance its operational output or face intense and sustained scrutiny. His comments, made on Joy News’ PM Express program, highlight a growing tension between the legislative branch’s financial oversight responsibilities and the OSP’s mandated independence. At the core of this political discourse is a fundamental question: is Ghana getting value for money from an agency that receives substantial annual state funding? This article delves into the parliamentary concerns, the OSP’s recent performance, the legal and institutional framework, and what this means for Ghana’s fight against corruption.

Key Points: The Core of the Parliamentary Ultimatum

The following points summarize the critical issues raised by Mr. Dafeamekpor, framing the current debate around the OSP’s efficacy and accountability.

Parliamentary Patience is Conditional and Limited

Mr. Dafeamekpor explicitly stated, “We are staying our hands,” indicating a temporary hold on potential punitive or restrictive parliamentary actions against the OSP. However, this patience is not indefinite. It is contingent upon demonstrable improvements in the office’s operational results and a clearer demonstration of impact commensurate with its budget.

Severe Concerns Over “Value for Money”

The central critique is financial. With the OSP receiving an average of ¢250 million annually, the Majority Chief Whip argues that the volume of investigations and prosecutions reported does not translate into sufficient concrete outcomes or recovered assets. The perception is of an agency engaged in activity rather than achieving impactful results.

Unmet Expectations Despite Legislative Support

Parliament has historically approved the OSP’s requests for expanded infrastructure, including regional offices and additional specialized staff (around 250 new positions). It has also authorized significant operational resources, such as bulletproof vehicles for senior staff, acknowledging the dangerous nature of the work. The failure to materialize these approved expansions is cited as a key reason for the current frustration.

A Nuanced Stance: Support for the Institution, Critique of the Incumbent

Mr. Dafeamekpor was careful to distinguish between his criticism of the current officeholder’s performance and his support for the OSP as an essential institution. He reaffirmed his belief in the necessity of an independent special prosecutor, emphasizing that the issue lies with execution, not the concept itself.

Acknowledgment of Marginal Improvement

Referencing the OSP’s recent mid-year report, the MP conceded there are signs of a positive shift. The narrative is changing from merely listing active cases to providing specifics on assets seized and their estimated value. This is seen as a step in the right direction but insufficient to allay all concerns.

Background: The OSP Within Ghana’s Anti-Corruption Architecture

To understand the gravity of this parliamentary warning, one must first appreciate the OSP’s unique position in Ghana’s governance and legal landscape.

Establishment and Legal Mandate

The Office of the Special Prosecutor was established under the Office of the Special Prosecutor Act, 2017 (Act 959). It was created as an independent specialized agency to investigate and prosecute specific categories of corruption and corruption-related offences, particularly those involving public officers and persons with prominent public functions. Its establishment was partly driven by the need for a dedicated, high-profile body that could operate with a degree of agility and focus that existing institutions like the Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ) or the Economic and Organised Crime Office (EOCO) might not possess due to broader mandates.

Independence and Operational Scope

The OSP is designed to be functionally independent. Its Special Prosecutor is appointed by the President in consultation with the Council of State and is protected from removal except on grounds of stated misbehavior or incompetence. This independence is crucial for its credibility, allowing it to pursue sensitive cases without political interference. Its mandate covers a wide range of economic crimes, including bribery, theft, fraud, and money laundering, especially when involving state resources or public officials.

Funding and Parliamentary Oversight

Despite its constitutional independence, the OSP, like all public institutions, is funded through parliamentary-approved budgetary allocations from the Consolidated Fund. This creates an inherent dynamic where Parliament, as the representative of the people and controller of public purse, has a legitimate interest in ensuring that allocated funds are used efficiently and effectively to achieve stated objectives. This oversight function is a cornerstone of democratic accountability.

Historical Context and Public Expectation

The OSP was launched amidst high public expectations and a pervasive public discourse on corruption in Ghana. Successive governments have pledged to fight corruption, and the OSP became a symbol of that commitment. Its performance is therefore constantly measured against these elevated expectations and Ghana’s commitments under international conventions like the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC).

Analysis: Dissecting the Performance and Accountability Debate

The exchange between Mr. Dafeamekpor and the OSP represents a classic, yet critical, moment in public administration: the balancing act between institutional independence and democratic accountability. A deeper analysis reveals several intersecting layers.

The Budget-Output Disconnect: ¢250 Million Questioned

The figure of an average annual budget of ¢250 million is a powerful rhetorical tool. To put this in context, this sum must cover salaries, investigations (which can be incredibly costly, involving forensics, travel, and expert witnesses), prosecutions, security, and administrative overhead. Mr. Dafeamekpor’s critique is not necessarily about the absolute amount but the output ratio. Reporting “investigating 15 cases, looking at 20 others, prosecuting seven” is seen as an accounting of activity, not necessarily of successful outcomes. The public and Parliament want to see metrics like: value of assets recovered, number of successful convictions, cases concluded (not just ongoing), and demonstrable deterrent effect. The shift in the mid-year report to detailing seized properties and their values is a direct response to this demand for outcome-based reporting.

The Symbolism and Substance of Approved Resources

The reference to bulletproof vehicles is particularly telling. Parliament’s approval for such assets was a recognition of the genuine risks OSP staff face. However, Mr. Dafeamekpor’s statement, “to sit in a bulletproof car and be prosecuting seven, eight cases is a no-no,” uses this symbol to argue that high-cost, high-risk resources should yield proportionally high-impact results. It frames the issue as one of strategic deployment: expensive tools should be used for major, high-stakes operations that yield major seizures or convictions, not for managing a portfolio of minor cases. The unfulfilled promise of 250 new regional staff and expanded offices compounds this, suggesting a gap between strategic planning and operational execution.

Institutional Independence vs. Political Accountability

This is the delicate core of the matter. The OSP must be free from day-to-day political direction to pursue cases wherever they lead. However, it is not above accountability. Its head is a presidential appointee and must ultimately answer to the people through their representatives in Parliament. The concern is not that Parliament is questioning the OSP—that is its job—but that the questions are becoming more urgent due to perceived underperformance. The warning suggests that if performance does not improve, Parliament may use its budgetary and legislative powers to apply pressure, which could inadvertently strain the OSP’s operational independence. The art lies in conducting rigorous oversight without micromanaging or undermining the very independence that makes the OSP effective.

The “Change in Narrative”: A Positive Signal?

Mr. Dafeamekpor’s acknowledgment of an improved mid-year report is significant. It shows that targeted parliamentary pressure can yield changes in reporting and possibly focus. The move from vague “we are investigating” to specific “we have seized property X worth Y” is a basic tenet of good public sector management: transparency in results. This suggests the OSP is listening. The key question is whether this is a one-time adjustment or a sustained shift towards a culture of performance measurement and public communication.

Practical Advice: Pathways Forward for All Stakeholders

Moving from confrontation to